

The turn to a 'neo-revivalist' religious identity as a form of 'self-othering'

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the turn to a neo-revivalist Muslim identity in the West as a form of self-othering. The binary dichotomy of self and other is used as a framework for the apparent divide between Muslims and the West. Second and third-generation diaspora neo-revivalists personalise religion and through their hermeneutics seek an expression of religion that transcends cultural practice. They self-other in a way reactionary to society, and also react to the religion of their parents' generation, which for them is not spiritual enough and instead is too steeped in cultural practices. Secularism and the post-secular turn is considered in Western society to provide context to the West that these neo-revivalists are located within. The diversity of Muslims is investigated to contextualise the neo-revivalist shift, which rather than being tolerant of diversity amongst Muslims seeks a separation of culture from religion. As second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims are the children of Muslim migrants to the West, the inter-generational divide is investigated. First-generation migrants have a continuity to their religious expression based on their experiences within the country of origin, whereas second- and third-generation migrants engage in a re-negotiation process to enable their religiosity to be relevant to Western societies. Qualitative case studies relating to the performance of religious identity, that is necessarily public, are utilised from Britain and the United States to further contextualise neo-revivalism. Literary mediation and mediatisation are examined in the context and globalisation. Contemporary literature is utilised to consider the self-critique of issues relating to integration and assimilation of Muslims in Western society by Muslims in Western societies. These cosmopolitan voices provide an internal understanding of the issues involved. Media-technologies have enabled a wide range of discourses to circulate about the current geopolitic following '9/11' and Muslims themselves have utilised these mediated-technologies, and as such, neo-revivalism is necessarily a product of time, place and circumstance. Finally, a conclusion is reached and in seeking to understand the neo-revivalist turn and the place of Muslims in the West, a cosmopolitan ethic of integration is proposed that seeks to turn away from essentialisations and binary oppositions, but instead, through an engagement in respectful and reflexive critical dialogue, it is hoped that our shared universal humanity may be realised.

Introduction

The term 'neo-revivalist'¹ Muslim identity is utilised to describe the 'new' turn to the privileging of a Muslim identity over national and ethnic affiliations amongst second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims² in the West³. This is not a universal 'phenomenon', contrary to media suggestions, and is not applicable to all young Muslims, however it is significant as some Muslim youth have become increasingly visible actors on the public stage.

The notion of 'self-othering' is employed to conceptualise this neo-revivalist shift in terms of the polarised notions of 'self' and 'other'. A binary construction of self-othering refers to Muslims being considered the 'other' in societal terms. This occurs in a variety of ways, with regard, firstly, to the profession of a religious identity in Western secular societies; secondly due to the salience of Muslims and Islam especially following the events on the 11th of September, 2001 or '9/11'; and thirdly through their status as 'visible minorities'. In response, it is argued that second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims engage in a re-negotiation process with regard to their religious affiliations, and more significantly their expression of Islam, that is necessarily public. The conception of 'self-othering' will thus be considered to denote the active construction of a (reactionary) religious identity in the multiple contexts of Western societies and with regard to the global politic following '9/11'. Self-othering may also take place by young Muslims distinguishing their distinctive (religious) identities from that of their parents' generation, through which their understanding of Islam seeks out 'real'⁴, 'true' and 'authentic' Islam. In this way neo-revivalists may self-other to the local Muslim community and other Muslims, and instead, locate themselves supranationally, through their consideration of the Islamic ummah.

¹ This term has been derived from Nazli Kibria's qualitative research study on: 'The 'new Islam' and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 31, No. 2. February 2008. pp. 243-66. Kibria refers to the 'new Islam' as revivalist Islam.

² Diaspora Muslims refers to Muslims living outside Muslim-majority countries.

³ The 'West' refers to Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. However, Europe and the United States will mainly be focussed on.

⁴ This relates to the preoccupation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries with the search or passion for the 'real'. See Žižek, S. *Welcome to the Desert of the Real! Five Essays on September 11 and related dates*. London; New York: Verso. 2002.

In this thesis a cultural approach to religion is followed, focussing on how a religious and more specifically a Muslim identity is enacted by second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims. The term 'Islamic' identity is not used, but instead reference is made to the hermeneutics of Islam by Muslims. Identity is considered a dynamic, ongoing process and construction that necessarily locates itself in accordance to societal context and is a product of time, place and circumstance. Both identity politics and the reflexive self⁵ are significant as the turn to neo-revivalism is an individualised marker of identity and a choice rather than simply ascribed.

This thesis approaches the issue holistically taking into account such socially ascribed variables as political, economic, educational, religious and cultural issues, as well as identity formation with regard to ethnicity and cultural heritage. All of these factors are significant in understanding the individual's relationship to society. Following this, I argue that the geopolitical context that includes what Devji has termed the 'landscapes of the jihad'⁶ is significant in influencing some who may be considered to be 'other' in Western society. For the neo-revivalist turn to an individualised religious identity is combined with a shift towards a global community-oriented religious identity as well, that of the supranational Islamic ummah. Therefore, it is argued second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims may engage in a re-negotiation process with regard to their religious affiliations and more significantly, their religious expression.

A wide range of discourses relating to Muslims, Islam and the West will be engaged with in this thesis including study of hermeneutics relating to religion in general, Islam, and Muslims in particular. Societal secularism, diaspora Muslims, identity politics, community organisation, media discourses and literary fiction will all be taken into account in order to attempt to comprehend the prevalence and privileging of the religious identity over other forms of identity construction by second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims, such as ethno-national identity markers. Religious 'extremism' will also be considered in terms of 'neofundamentalism' and global jihadis. However as the neo-revivalist Muslim identity does not necessarily indicate religious extremism or religious militancy, what is explored is the social landscape that this may take place in.

⁵ Giddens, A. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.

⁶ Devji, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.

Chapter one examines the background of Western secularism. It begins with an overview of Western secularism and the secularisation thesis proposed by social theorists stemming from Enlightenment ideals of science and rationality which discounted the individual and societal requirements for religion in terms of both human meaning and societal organisation. The framework of contemporary Western society with regard to postmodernity is considered with regard to identity politics and the re-emergence of religion in the private sector of social life. 1.2 considers the 'post-secular' turn taking place in the West through which religion has increased in visibility in the public sector of society. This visible shift of religion returning to the public sector of societal organisation is considered, for the purpose of this thesis, in terms of Muslim identity and Islam.

Chapter two provides an overview of the discourse relating to moderate Muslims, and the variety of positions that Muslims may take with regard to being Muslim in society. Issues of religious extremism will be taken up in 2.2, and reference made to neofundamentalism and global jihadis.

Chapter three focuses on issues pertaining to diaspora Muslims in the West. The 'essentialisation' and 'racialization' of Muslims and Islam will be considered in 3.1. Reference will also be made to the notion of the 'diaspora' for Muslims in the West, and conceptions of Islam and Western discourse are examined. 3.2 takes into account issues of belonging and notions of home for first-generation diaspora Muslims. The views of Tariq Ramadan, a notable scholar of Islam concerning the place of Muslims in Western society are taken up in 3.3 with regard to the societal of participation first- and second- and third-generation migrants. Second- and third-generation conceptions of cultural dislocation and religious re-location are investigated in 3.4. 3.5 will contextualise this discussion through qualitative research case studies carried out in Britain and America.

Chapter four examines mediated and mediatised discourses. Contemporary literary fiction written by Muslims about Muslims in the West is considered in 4.1. These works are significant in reflecting an internal critique of issues of integration and religion. The significance of globalisation and the media is explored in 4.2. Through techno-mediation, a

global and virtual (inter)connectedness has taken place whereby the primary affiliation to localised contexts have been overshadowed by the global stage. Reference is also made to mediatised discourse.

Chapter 1. Secularisation, the post-secular turn and religion

To examine the place of religion in contemporary Western society, this chapter will present an overview of both the secularisation thesis prevalent in the West and the simultaneous (and paradoxical) continued religiosity found there. Bosetti and Eder⁷ assert that the United States (perhaps due to denominational and sectarian factions that have always been present in its history⁸) has not gone through the same period of secularisation whereby religion has been privatised. Therefore, 'the West' referred to in this section will mainly refer to Western Europe. However, the information presented will be relevant to all contemporary Western countries⁹ in providing a context and background through which global issues such as multiculturalism can be viewed¹⁰. Such issues as the 'invisibility' of religion in the public sphere of society, its reappearance, and the continued and continuing significance of religion relating to individuation and identity, which is reflected both in contemporary individuals and in society, will also be discussed. I will be using the term 'neo-revivalist' Muslim identity rather than Islamic identity as my concern is not with the religion of Islam in general, but of how Muslims enact their Muslim identities in Western society, through their hermeneutics of Islam.

This chapter is specifically more concerned with religion in general, rather than Muslims and Islam in particular, which will be dealt with more fully in Chapter two. I will begin this chapter by establishing the institutionally secular context of the West, in particular Europe and contemporary analyses pertaining to the place of religion in society. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background of the place of religion within contemporary Western society¹¹. This background is important in order to provide a context through which the place of religion in general and Islam in particular can be considered in the West.

⁷ Bosetti, G. and Eder, K. 'Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere'. Eurozine, 17th August, 2006. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html> See also Anderson, B.C. 'Secular Europe, religious America'. Public Interest Spring 2004. 155. pp. 143-158.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Including New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United States.

¹⁰ Diaspora Muslims in the West will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3, regarding identity, the assertion of religious identity and immigrant communities. It should be noted here that I will discuss a particular context (the West) rather than the universal and global perspective of the continued significance and presence of religion.

¹¹ This will be a general discussion, however, which will mainly refer to Islam and Muslims in the West.

1.1 Religion, secularism, the secularisation thesis

There are two etymological roots of the term 'religion'. The first is *relegere*, 'to bring together', and the second is *religare*, 'to tie or bind together'¹². Both these etymologies relate to the notion of membership and *religare* relates also to regulations created and maintained through some communal form. 'Religion', however, is a contested term¹³, and as well as being a self-definition by adherents, may also be defined externally by those outside of the religious parameters. Smith refers to religion as an anthropological rather than a theological category that describes "...human thought and action, most frequently in terms of belief and norms of behaviour"¹⁴. During the course of this thesis, religion is defined as a set of beliefs, symbols and practices binding a group of individuals together in what may often be a common community. I will consider religion in cultural terms, that is, how it is experienced, practiced and lived. 'Culture' is defined by social science as, "all that in human society which is socially rather than biologically transmitted...thus a general term for the symbolic and learned aspects of human society"¹⁵. Thus, there is an inextricable link between culture and society and I would add, between culture and religion. Religion is lived through the cultural collective of the sacred¹⁶ as a way of life in terms of attitudes, beliefs, language, dress, diet, custom and convention¹⁷, I would also suggest that a shared experience of history and collective memory adds to the cultural experience of religion. Religion may be considered as the overarching collective and also as the 'authentic'¹⁸ locations of belief, ritual and practice¹⁹. Religiosity can be considered as the individuated response and expression of religion. Traditionally classified in terms of belief, the term 'religiosity', as used in this thesis, will be expanded to include contemporary forms of individuated religious expression, such as spiritual and individualised interpretations of particular religions that may be transcendent of sectarian differences. Religiosity will refer also to religion

¹² See Turner, B.S. 'Religion'. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 23, Nos. 2-3. 2006. pp. 437-455.

¹³ See McCutcheon, R.T. 'The Category "Religion" in Recent Publications: A Critical Survey'. *Numen*. Vol. 43, No. 3. October 1995. pp. 284-309.

¹⁴ Smith, J.Z. 'Religion, Religions, Religious'. In M.C. Taylor (ed.) *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 1998. p. 269.

¹⁵ Scott, J. and Marshall, G. (eds.). 'Culture'. *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. (1994) 2005. pp. 132-3.

¹⁶ Scott, J. and Marshall, G. (eds.). 'Religion'. *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*. Ibid. p. 560.

¹⁷ Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B.S. (eds.). 'Religion'. *Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*. London; New York: Penguin Books. 2000. p. 83.

¹⁸ As perceived by some adherents and also those outside of the religion.

¹⁹ Defined in collective terms, practices and beliefs that fall outside of the collectively-located orthodoxy and authentic perception of religion, may be defined by the collective majority in dissent terms.

being practiced so that it is an individualised identity marker. Whilst the scope of this thesis is concerned with a neo-revivalist Muslim identity in the West, it is vital to consider secularism in the West although of course due to the Judeo-Christian heritage of the West, Islam not specifically dealt with. However, it is important to contextualise the neo-revivalist Muslim identity with Western secularism as this is the physical location for second and third generation Western diaspora Muslims.

The term 'secularism' is often considered to be the antithesis of religion and implies non-religiosity. It can apply to individuals or to the state of society. Being secular or non-religious does not necessarily mean being anti-religious. It refers to the fact that individuals in a society (or a society itself) do not necessarily ascribe to religious faith either for ontological security or to provide the epistemological underpinning of reality and existence. Moreover, religious faith in a secular society is not practiced in terms of phenomenology as taken-for-granted meaning within society. The notion of secularism implies freedom of religion and impartiality of the State towards any particular religious tradition. Ideally, however, secularism would be inclusive and aware of religious plurality within a given society. Rather than trying to be impartial to any particular religion by not accepting any type of public religious display, what needs to be considered is whether the break with religious institutions and religious authority in secular societies needs to necessarily include individual religious expression. For example, a secular society is not necessarily synonymous with an anti-religious society, but instead, ideally would be a society that respects religious plurality, religious conscience and religious traditions without using religion and religious institutions as a necessary basis to morally instruct governance in terms of liberties and freedoms. (The French notion of *laïcité*²⁰ is a secular notion that in practice may be considered anti-religious if the recent headscarf debates surrounding the public display of religious symbols are taken into consideration. Religious symbols and religious expression is to be limited to the private sector of society, and whilst this would include all religious symbology, the hijab or headscarf, can be considered a highly symbolic expression of profession to a religious faith, and more significantly perhaps, to a contested set of cultural values, interpreted by some as the subjugation of women.)

²⁰ French secularism that is based on the principle of the separation of Church and State that emerged specifically out of the French context. The roots of *laïcité* are based in the French Revolution in 1789 when social and political systems were restructured. The involvement of the Roman Catholic Church was confined to religious matters only in 1801, and Judaism, Lutherans and the Reformed Churches were formally recognised. Religion became an individual matter and separate to the state. See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A2903663>

A theoretical overview of societal secularism and religiosity will be given below to provide a context to the continuation and transformation of religious practice within Western society. This background will inform the turn to a neo-revivalist Muslim identity amongst some second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims in the West. It will also provide a framework for the repositioning of this individuated Muslim identity, for a small minority, to the supranational and communal focus of the global jihad. My main focus in doing so is to show that although institutional secularisation in the public sector was historically proposed and accepted as part of the 'modern' condition, the behaviour and practices of individuals have not necessarily reflected this, and religious identity is still relevant to many people of all faiths in contemporary society. The public face of religion is also changing, as social theorists²¹ have now proposed, with the move towards post-secularism within the larger context of post-modernism. Yet secularisation always allowed to some degree a split between the public and private faces of religion. This can be seen historically in the case of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

The movement towards the Western Christian notion of secular society emerged in 1648 following the Thirty Years War, with the Treaty or Peace of Westphalia. Political boundaries were re-shaped and more autonomy granted for religious freedoms to Protestants and Catholics, who were now seen as equal before the law in Europe. Religious denominations that were not considered part of established religious institutions were given freedom to publicly practice their religion. Although there are variations in political citizenship in the West, most Western governments have assumed the Westphalian model of government²². The Treaty of Westphalia enabled a clear separation of Church and State and gave sovereigns the right to "confessionalize" their states and "to determine the religious affiliation of their kingdoms"²³. Religion was relegated to a matter of private conscience and individuals were granted the choice to "leave a state from whose established religion one dissented"²⁴. Thus, religion was

²¹ See for example, Halman, L. and Draulans, V. 'How Secular is Europe?' *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2006. pp. 263-88; Bosetti, G. and Eder, K. 'Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere'. *Eurozine*, 17th August, 2006. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html>; Hervieu-Leger, D. 'In search of certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity'. *The Hedgehog Review*. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69.

²² Turner, B. S. 'Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 97, No. 3. July 2007. p. 408.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

removed from the public sphere of society and its authority replaced by the political over the religious.

The origin of modern-day secularism however, is associated with the Age of Enlightenment in Europe from the eighteenth century onwards. The Enlightenment was associated with science, reason, rationality and the notion of progress²⁵. Whilst religion was considered to play a central role in social life of pre-modern societies in which religious ideology dominated daily life, scientific and rationalist thought re-evaluated previously taken-for-granted religious 'truths'. Thus, religious revelation and scientific rationalism were viewed in opposition to one another. Religion was no longer considered necessary in providing a moral order for society as morality could be reasoned and considered without the need for revealed texts. Enlightenment philosophers such as Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot, considered religion (namely, Christianity due to the Western context) to be "...a form of irrational or mistaken knowledge of the world"²⁶ that stifled individual liberties. Monotheism, and especially Catholicism, was regarded as politically intolerant due to the authoritarian nature of Christian institutions.

The Age of Enlightenment may be historically connected to the Christian Reformation of the sixteenth century and Renaissance humanism of the fifteenth Century²⁷. This historical context informs the anti-authoritarian views of the eighteenth century philosophers with regard to the place of religion in society and individual liberties. Rationalism and reason were considered far superior and "...important in the liberation of human beings from the false consciousness of revealed religion"²⁸. During the period of modernity (from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, characterised by the rapidly accelerating industrial and democratic revolutions), religiosity declined and many nineteenth-century Positivist social theorists²⁹ predicted that religion would eventually lose its significance in society due to the rise of scientific rationalism and urbanisation. These theorists had an evolutionary view of human behaviour and considered individualised religious beliefs to be erroneous which would necessarily be replaced epistemologically by scientific theories of knowledge, such as Darwinism. The evolution of

²⁵ See Fitzpatrick, M., Jones, P., Knellwolf, C. and McCalman, I. (eds.). *The Enlightenment World*. New York: Routledge. 2004.

²⁶ Turner, B.S. 'Religion'. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 23, Nos. 2-3. 2006. p. 438.

²⁷ Ibid. p. 439.

²⁸ Ibid. p. 438.

²⁹ Such as Comte and Durkheim who were proponents of the scientific and empirical study of society.

rational thought was considered as progressing through a series of stages from theology to metaphysics to positivist or scientific thinking³⁰. Institutional secularism came about out of Enlightenment ideals of reason and rationality and religion was essentially juxtaposed to science as a legitimate worldview. There was a move towards a separation of Church and State and the gradual replacement of religious institutions by State organisations. It was this separation that led to the decrease of the religious in contemporary institutions that organise daily life. Examples of such institutions in contemporary society are medicine, science, education, the economy, government and education³¹.

In 1887, Nietzsche claimed that God was dead and that God had been killed by peoples' indifference³². This statement reflected the nineteenth century positivist worldview at the time³³, that the belief in a transcendental figure was no longer necessary to the lives of contemporary people. There was no longer a consensus on a singular location of truth, as life could be lived without reference to religion, the world could be explained through multiple alternative claims of truth such as science, a secular history and psychology. These ideas reflected Enlightenment ideals, of knowledge, reason, rationality and self-reflexivity, which led to a move away from a worldview shaped and supported by the community towards a more individualistic understanding of the world. Secularisation was an assumed part of modernisation of society, and was considered to be in part, a result of societal differentiation. Through societal differentiation, the authority of religious institutions declines and "...religion becomes simply one institution to provide various services to its followers or to the community"³⁴. Thus, Nietzsche's proclamation of God being dead reflected the reorganisation of individual and social life from arguably being God-centred to becoming free from being rooted in the religious institution and also from being constrained and influenced by it.

³⁰ See Marshall, G. and Scott, J. (eds.). 'religion, sociology of'. Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. pp. 560-1. Sociologists of religion developed their theories' response to this Positivist view. Whilst Positivists focused on belief and knowledge, sociologists of religion focused instead on the collective, symbolic and non-rational aspects of religion such as the human need for meaning.

³¹ Victor, J.S. 'Forecasting the future of religion: the next 50 years'. The Humanist. May-June 1, Vol. 56, No. 3, May-June 1996. pp. 20-3.

³² Nietzsche, F. [1887]. The Gay Science. Random House: New York. 1974.

³³ Although Nietzsche was not a Positivist.

³⁴ See Turner, B. S. 'Religion'. Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 23, Nos. 2-3. 2006. p. 439.

The result of this reorganisation meant that God and religion were no longer necessary for the organisation and experience of modern social life. The secularisation thesis³⁵ proposed by Weber in the early twentieth century was related to Enlightenment ideals of rationality. It posited that as societies became more industrialised and 'modernised', the need for religion as an institutional force would subside as people would become more rational. Although there has been a decline in the public display of religion in the West³⁶, as seen through declining Church attendance, religion still remains a powerful force (albeit a privatised one) both to the general public and to politics³⁷. Moreover, there has been the return of public religion, even as private belief has continued to decline, especially in Christianity.

The continuing force of religion highlights the fact that it is not a static phenomenon mired in the past, but instead is extremely fluid and adaptive because its presence is reflective of societal conditions. This rise in "transcendental metaphysics"³⁸ was commented on by Sidney Hook in 1943. Writing from America, but addressing Western society during World War II, at a time of economic, political, and social crisis in society, Hook proposed a "new failure of nerve" reflected by a rise in mysticism. He relates that scientific method was questioned, distrusted³⁹ and regarded as only "information" needed by individuals rather than "knowledge" and "truth"⁴⁰. In this way, the rise in mystical beliefs was a "desperate quest for a quick and all-inclusive faith"⁴¹ to respond to societal disorder and dissatisfaction with the status quo. These observations reflect the adaptability of religion and spirituality and of those drawn to them. In a sense, the contemporary revivalist neo-Islamic identity can be considered in this context of 'a failure of nerve'. Revivalist communal identities of second-generation diaspora Muslims in this context may be seen to be reflective of societal change. Considering this in the post '9/11' situation, the 'othering' of Muslims, negative associations espoused by the media, counterterrorism strategies and racial profiling of Muslims⁴² can create conditions that lead to a

³⁵ This was generally agreed upon by social theorists through the twentieth century such as P. Berger, B. Wilson, T. Luckmann.

³⁶ Such as with the decline of Church attendance in Western Europe, New Zealand and Canada

³⁷ Religion has been allowed back in to society through postmodern ideals of plurality, relativity and diversity that has been shown through the post-secular turn that will be discussed in 1.2

³⁸ Hook, S. 'The New Failure of Nerve'. *The Partisan Review*. Vol. X, No. 1. January-February 1943. pp. 2-23.

³⁹ Ibid. p. 4. Along with related fields such as: positivism, naturalism, empiricism and scientific philosophy.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 23.

⁴² Or the 'racialization' or 'ethnoisation' of this identity.

contemporary failure of nerve reflected not by mysticism, but through the formation of a universalised neo-revivalist communal Muslim identity.

Later in the twentieth century, social theorists⁴³ in the 1950s and 1960s reflected the rationalist view concerning religion that emerged out of the Enlightenment period, and Berger's 1969 secularisation thesis is an example of this⁴⁴. Berger predicted that as religion was not a rational social force, as individuals developed a more rationalistic mind-frame, religion would simply be rejected by individuals and this would be reflected in societal organisation. Berger asserted that it was due to structural changes in society, that included industrialisation, rationalisation and modernisation, that the "crisis of credibility in religion" had taken place⁴⁵. Thirty years later, however, Berger recanted his secularisation thesis and instead stated that the "world today ... is as furiously religious as it ever was"⁴⁶. Instead of simply fading away, he now views religious institutions as incorporating strategies of rejection and adaption to a secularised world. These are significant strategies that reflect the significance of variables such as time, place, history and contemporary geo-political and national contexts.

What has changed in the West with regard to religion is what Heelas, Lash and Morris have termed the de-traditionalisation⁴⁷ of religious authority and institutionalised religion. As there is no institutionalised religiosity in Islam, it is fitting that the visible reflection of religious change would not necessarily happen in institutional terms, but would be reflective in how people express their religious identities in the context of (and perhaps also, in opposition to) the contemporary national collective consciousness and geo-politic contexts. Thus, the development of a neo-revivalist Muslim communal identity amongst diaspora youth is reflective of this. According to Saint-Blancat, there are two forms of distancing that occur in a diaspora context. The first is "...the refusal to be assigned to an 'essentialized', inherited, unavoidable,

⁴³ Such as Thomas Luckmann and later, Bryan Wilson.

⁴⁴ See Berger, P.L. *The Social Reality of Religion*. London: Faber & Faber 1969, published in 1967 in the USA as *The Sacred Canopy*. See also Luckmann, T. *The Invisible Religion*, London: Macmillan. 1967.

⁴⁵ Berger, P.L. *Ibid.* p. 126.

⁴⁶ Berger, P.L. 'The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview'. In P.L. Berger (ed.) *The Desecularization of the World*. Washington: Ethics Public Policy Centre; Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans. 1999. p.2.

⁴⁷ Heelas, P, Lash, S. and Morris, P. (eds.) *Detraditionalization: critical reflections on authority and identity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1996.

fixed religious culture”⁴⁸. This suggests that ‘essentialising’ or ‘othering’ in religious terms may also in fact lead to ‘self-othering’ that is also expressed in religious terms, and perhaps in a reactionary form to the society that the diaspora is physically located in. The second form of distancing is the internal debate between Muslims. This is reflective through “...challenges to a normative, univocal definition of religious belonging.”⁴⁹ It can be argued that this distancing and internal debate also takes place between and across diaspora generations as cultural aspects of religious belonging, such as the distancing of religion from an ethno-located-culture, take on new forms and relocate according to the new socio-cultural context. Religion has been adapted in accordance with social changes and has become a response (from within) to contemporary Western society. Whilst the neo-religious response may be to society in general, it may also be to the local Muslim community in particular as well. Thus this is reflective of the social expression of religion in terms of conceptions such as the authentic response and interpretation of religion, in particular to the context of how to be an authentic Muslim in the West. This notion is significant as it reflects the lack of a singular Islamic hegemonic authority⁵⁰ that has the answers to questions on social issues pertaining to religion. Individual Muslims instead are able to choose from a variety of religious interpretations dependent on the type of Mullahs, Mosques and text that the individual chooses from or is directed toward.

Whilst there has been a visible decline of religiosity in the West with the advent of modernity, many non-Western countries, and specifically Muslim ones, have not followed suit by separating religion from the state. However, just because countries with Muslim majorities have not necessarily defined themselves in terms of Western secularism, (or as some positivists may say ‘have progressed’), does not mean that these societies, and the way in which the religion is practiced, is static and unchanging⁵¹. Religion and religious practice has historically been fluid and adaptive to societal and political forces and structures. It is important to question whether

⁴⁸ Saint-Blancat, C. ‘Islam in Diaspora: Between Reterritorialization and Extraterritoriality’. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. Vol. 26, No. 1. March 2002. p. 142.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ There is no singular hegemonic authority within Islam although it may be (internally and externally) perceived that there is due to competing claims by multiple authorities. The two main schisms in Islam are Shi’a Islam and Sunni Islam. They each have different authorities and whilst Muslims all share the Five Pillars of Islam, it can be said that there are many other theological and legal issues that continue to be debated.

⁵¹ Of course many non-Western and Muslim majority countries are also secular, or have had a historical past relating to secularism. Such countries include Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey. It should also be noted that although Muslim majority countries often define themselves as Islamic, there is generally some type of a separation of power and a degree of co-existence that takes place between the rulers and government, and between the religious leaders or Mullahs.

there has really been an increase in religion, or whether what has changed is the visibility of religion in the ways that people practice, display, identify and profess their faith. In an analogous way, it is important to consider whether crime per se has increased, or whether increased visibility is shown through the reporting of it. Is it that religion has also become a visible societal force by attention being given to the importance of it, in informing politics, immigration and even freedom of speech and expression? For religion may inform these areas and issues through the discourse of multiculturalism, migrants, integration, assimilation and what may be regarded, to a certain extent, as the suspicion of loyalties.

A further significant change is that of religiosity and individualised response. These changes may be reflective of what has been termed 'post-secular' society. Roy⁵² relates this to Islam in terms of deterritorialisation of the religion. Due to globalisation and migration, Roy asserts that the religiosity of contemporary Muslims has also adapted (like the Christian experience in the West) to incorporate a move towards "...individualisation, the quest for self-realisation, the rethinking of Islam out of a given culture, and the recasting of the Muslim ummah in non-territorial terms"⁵³.

However it is not entirely accurate to say that the Muslim ummah has been recast in non-territorial terms, as the Islamic ideal has never ever been territorial (due to the very notion of the transnational ummah) and the concept of the ummah has always been a powerful extra-territorial concept. The 'change' that has taken place is that this ideal has been allowed to be realised in modern times due to mass migrations of Muslims to all parts of the world⁵⁴. The concept of the ummah necessarily reflects a ready-made global community that the individual may have links to and with all over the world. This ideal allows Muslims a sense of being self-contained in a communal setting and therefore may have implications for assimilation or integration into the adopted country. The notion of the ummah in this sense is not simply an expansionist notion, but an extra-territorial force through which Muslims located transnationally can position themselves. However, through the forces of globalisation⁵⁵, the notion of the ummah may also be viewed to some extent as a push for global hegemony and in a

⁵² Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 232.

⁵⁴ Hence the desire to break with ethno-cultural aspects of Islam.

⁵⁵ Such as the information flow of techno-mediation such as the internet, cassettes, DVDs, videos, audiotapes.

sense a monolithic and univocal version of Islam enacted in communal terms. In this way, particular and peripheralised notions of Islam⁵⁶ may be enacted on the global arena.

Paradoxically however, these patterns of individualisation, personalisation and the realisation of the ummah in extra-territorial terms could relate either to a liberal and inclusive interpretation of the religion on the one hand, or to the spread of a neofundamentalism on the other. This neofundamentalism is also spread across global networks in the context of, what Devji has termed, the 'landscapes of the jihad'⁵⁷.

The landscapes of the jihad is a conceptual term used to refer to the ways in which Islam has become a powerful force of globalisation (and utilised by militant groups such as Al Qa'eda) due to mass Muslim migration, the use of mediated technologies and through the unintended global consequences of major militant acts such as '9/11' that have taken the jihad, and in a sense the perception of Islam, "...well beyond the politics of control."⁵⁸

Islam and Muslims have become more visible following the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York, the October 12, 2002 Bali bombings, the May 16, 2003 Casablanca bombings, the November 15 and November 20, 2003 attacks in Istanbul, the March 11, 2004 train bombings in Madrid, and the July 7, 2005 London bombings, and fear of both 'home-grown terror' and global networks instigating violence professed in the name of religion, has led to much debate surrounding the nature and place of religion in the modern world⁵⁹. This has raised questions regarding the true extent of secularisation. Whilst the West has gone through a period of secularisation in institutional terms, other continents and nations have not gone through the same type of secularisation. However, even in Europe, one of two continents to have experienced secularism⁶⁰ (the apparent 'disappearance' of religion from the public sphere of society) besides Australia, many social theorists⁶¹ have predicted a wave of post-secularism, that

⁵⁶ Such as those that may be considered to hold views in opposition to local and national religious orthodoxy.

⁵⁷ Devji, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London; New York: Hurst & Company. 2005.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* p. 2

⁵⁹ This can be considered paradoxical as the vast majority of violence that occurred in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries were not religious, but political in nature.

⁶⁰ Bosetti, G. and Eder. K. 'Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere'. *Eurozine*. 17th August, 2006. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html>

⁶¹ See for example, Halman, L. and Draulans, V. 'How Secular is Europe?' *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2006. pp. 263-88.; Bosetti, G. and Eder. K. 'Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere'. *Eurozine*, 17th

is, the return of religion to the public sector of society through discourse and even its return in political terms. The post-secular turn signifies the 'return' of religion to the public sector. However, is it a return, when the religion that appears to be the most publicly discussed is Islam rather than Christianity⁶²? The post-secular turn can be considered through the return of Christianity in the West and through the emergence of Islam. Another way this post-secular turn can be read is through the visibility of religion and religious plurality in the public sector. It seems perhaps short-sighted to have dismissed the significance of religion, because demographically and geographically, the majority of the world still professes a variety of religious faiths and religion has appears to have retained its importance in the non-West.

One important view that has been put forward is that religion itself has not declined, but rather that secularisation prompted the decline of religious authority⁶³. This seems valid, as it appears that the world is not becoming less religious, but that religion has less of an authoritative hold in society due to competing and multiple truths that exist⁶⁴. This is also due to the earlier-mentioned declining authority of religious institutions within the social structure of society. However, as will be discussed towards the end of this subsection, this view may also be changing, as the place of religion is increasingly discussed in the public sphere, in social and public policy, in the political arena and through the mass media. An example of this from the United States is the increased involvement of the government in matters of religious organisation. Exemptions are given by federal law to many religious organisations in areas as diverse as pensions, immigration and land use⁶⁵. As analysed by The New York Times, since 1989, there have been over two hundred cases of "special arrangements, protections or exemptions for religious groups or their adherents"⁶⁶. This relates to the fact that whilst historically, Europe has become increasingly secular with regard to Church attendance and to

August, 2006. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html>; Hervieu-Leger, D. 'In search of certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity'. *The Hedgehog Review*. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69; Asad, T. 2003. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

⁶² Although of course there has also been a visible turn to Pentecostal Christianity. See Turner, B.S. 'Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 97, No. 3. pp. 405-418.

⁶³ Chaves, M. 1994. 'Secularization as declining religious authority'. *Social Forces*. Vol. 72, No. 3, March 1994. pp. 749-775.

⁶⁴ Such as science and a reflexive morality framed by human rights discourse.

⁶⁵ Henriques, D.B. 'As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation'. *New York Times*. October 8, 2006.

<http://www.NewYorktimes.com/2006/10/08/business/08religious.html?ei=5070&en=35229a7c11bac47a&ex=1175227200&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1175054686-mlA1sMoOIVGdWnfRn4YXQQ>

⁶⁶ Ibid.

the importance of religion in people's lives, the United States has not followed suit. In Europe, only twenty-one percent of people consider religion to be a very important part of their lives whilst over sixty percent of Americans consider religion to be an integral part of their lives⁶⁷. It is apparent that religion remains a powerful force in the United States.

However, in comparison to many non-Western countries, religion is no longer necessarily the primary way of understanding the world in Western countries. In a sense, the religious framework has been disconnected from holding an 'official' place within society (although even in secular countries, religious holidays such as Christmas and Easter are still official holidays). However, the degrees of secularisation within Western countries are diverse. The same is the case with many countries in the non-western world which still identify themselves on religious grounds. In countries such as these, there may not be such a change in the official place of religiosity in terms of individuals' religious practices and religion through inheritance. As the world becomes more globalised, religion is 'deterritorialised'⁶⁸ and countries are linked to each other especially through the global mass media, perhaps the way in which people are religious (and more significantly, how people identify themselves as religious and assert their religion) has changed.

Although in the Western world as a rule there has been institutional secularisation, due to alternative competing claims of truth and authority, and in general because of the official separation of religion from State or Government, peoples' beliefs and practices do not necessarily reflect this secular direction. Therefore a decline in traditional Church services for example, does not necessarily represent a decline in religiosity, as religiosity may also imply personal belief rather than the outward expression of that belief in the form of ritual observance⁶⁹.

⁶⁷ See Anderson, B.C. 'Secular Europe, religious America'. Public Interest. Spring 2004. Vol. 155. pp. 143-158 for a discussion of post-Christian Europe and religious America.

⁶⁸ See Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

⁶⁹ And also traditional service attendance may be replaced by variances in sectarian diversity, religious plurality and religious hybridisation. See Davie, G. Religion in Modern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000.

Religious institutions are still important in peoples' lives as markers for rites of passage, such as births, weddings and funerals⁷⁰. As Brill⁷¹ asserts however, religion has become more privatised, indicating that it is more of a personal choice in the contemporary world than an inherited one⁷². It is important to note that Brill is American in focus and that the European experience may be quite different. It is clear that religiosity can and does mean different things in different locations and for different theorists.

One way through which people can interact with religion in society today is one of 'religious consumerism', or as Hervieu-Leger⁷³ refers to it, a do-it-yourself attitude towards religion. Although there have always been religiously pluralistic societies, the way in which secular, Western societies reflect plurality and diversity of religion has changed. In the Western context, people are no longer necessarily born into a specific religion, and if they are, there are possibilities to reject one faith for another, or to reject religion altogether. Religious identity in contemporary society has become a choice of association (or rejection) and affiliation, an active construction in which individuals have become "choosers"⁷⁴. Perhaps the reason why some do remain affiliated with traditional denominations is due to the 'adaption' of the religious that Berger⁷⁵ referred to. Any religious authority may be considered to be open to (often textual) interpretation, and increased reflexivity and selectiveness of accepted teachings may appeal to churchgoers in the context of the postmodern⁷⁶ and secular world. Within the Muslim context, the rise of individual textual interpretation has also become more widespread. Perhaps more accurately, it is not that traditional religious authority has necessarily broken down, but that

⁷⁰ Brill, E.J. 'Religion and identity: the Canadian, American, and Brazilian cases'. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. Vol. 39, No. 2. June 1998. P. 240.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Voye, L. 'Secularization in a Context of Advanced Modernity'. *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 60, No. 3. Fall 1999. p 275.

⁷³ Hervieu-Leger, D. 'In search of certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity'. *The Hedgehog Review*. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69.

⁷⁴ Bauman, Z. 'Postmodern religion?' In P. Heelas, D. Martin and P. Morris (eds.) *Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1998. p.68.

⁷⁵ Berger, P.L. 'The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview'. In P. Berger (ed.) *The Desecularization of the World*. Washington: Ethics Public Policy Centre; Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans. 1999.

⁷⁶ The term 'late modern' may be substituted for 'postmodern' (see Giddens, A. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.), as the term postmodern signifies the end of modernity. Postmodernity and late modernity may also be contested as this type of theorising can be regarded as Eurocentric in that these theories may be more applicable to the Western cultural experience rather than those of the non-West.

there are individualised responses and interpretations of the religious teachings⁷⁷. This diversity and plurality of religious authority is apparent in the 'visibility' of global jihadi networks that spread their worldview via audiovisual mediums such as mosque sermons, the internet, television, audio- and video-tapes and DVDs. Technology has enabled the visibility of multivocal Muslim authorities. These 'new' authorities may be, and often are, in opposition to more established authorities and also often come from opposing Muslim factions⁷⁸. In this sense, the type of Islam being spread across the internet can be considered to be 'progressive'⁷⁹ through their engagement with technology in the late-modern world. Thus the internet, as a force of globalisation, has enabled the spread of religious discourse in all religions. Increasingly, the religious has become a way through which political discontent can be vocalised and expressed⁸⁰.

The contemporary late-modern Western world is framed by religious plurality and individuals live in a secularised world where, in general, the religious context is peripheralised and privatised. There is an established view in social science⁸¹ that the breakdown of traditional kinship systems, and the rise of the citizen, has led to a fragmented state where society may be characterised as no longer claiming a singular ultimate truth in religious terms as it did before the advent of modernity. In contemporary society, there are not only 'alternative' claims to religious knowledge but also a plethora of truth claims and worldviews that do not necessarily have to refer to religious claims at all. As the traditional hold of communities and societies have broken down, people lead more individualised lives and have the choice to pick their worldviews, be they religious affinities and associations or non-religious ones.

However, the viewpoint of the breakdown of traditional kinship systems is of course extremely Eurocentric and does not allow space for religious minority groups and immigrants who have settled in the West and who may not have experienced the same changes in traditional and

⁷⁷ See Hervieu-Leger, D. 'In search of certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity'. *The Hedgehog Review*. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69; Gole, N. 'Islam in European Publics: secularism and religious difference'. *The Hedgehog Review*. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 140-6. Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

⁷⁸ See Devji, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London; New York: Hurst & Company. 2005.

⁷⁹ But not in the Positivist sense.

⁸⁰ This point will be later expanded in Chapter 4 through the discussion of the media.

⁸¹ See Marshall, G. and Scott, J. (eds.). 'Postmodernism'. *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. pp. 508-10.

community values. It does however provide some understanding of the type of societies that diasporic⁸² or religious minorities may feel 'othered' to or be reactionary towards. This apparent development of tensions can escalate if minorities feel their position as 'other' in the dominant organisation of social life in the countries they are residing in. Whilst some may be able to understand and accept these differences in community organisation⁸³, others may feel as though their culture or religion is under threat. This may inadvertently lead to a need to 'defend' and identify only with their (ethno-cultural or religious) heritage, and in a sense define themselves as what and who they are in opposition to the mainstream. This 'self-othering' is evidently problematic, as individuals can develop reactionary identities and a minority may look for allegiances elsewhere in arenas such as religious extremism and religious militancy. These allegiances may be found through transnational networks that transcend cultural differences within a minority group and may seek a global belonging such as that of neo-fundamentalism.

Allegiances and belonging may be sought in many different ways by individuals within the community context. Morris⁸⁴ is a proponent of examining communities in a multifaceted way, rather than viewing community organisation as singular and homogenous. Two important models of community organisation are communities of descent and communities of assent⁸⁵. He rejects the modernist evolutionary approach to community organisation that suggests that communities of descent are necessarily replaced by assent communities and instead views them as not in opposition, but as different forms of community organisation.

Descent communities, which Morris refers to as traditionally-linked to Jewish communities, may be associated with communities in which culture and religion are significant and are overlapping factors in the community's organisation. Culture and religion in this model, are interlinked and cannot be separated from one another. This accounts for cultural continuity being tied to the religion. Identity, in descent communities is ascribed through birth and is

⁸² The term diasporic or diaspora will be utilised to denote immigrant or religious groups in the West that have been re-negotiated outside of their traditional context.

⁸³ And perhaps 'self-other' in terms extrinsic to cultural and religious heritage.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Morris, P. 'Community Beyond Tradition'. In P. Heelas, S. Lash and P. Morris (eds.), *Detraditionalization: critical reflections on authority and identity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1996.

“(very nearly) unnegotiable”⁸⁶. It is considered to be a given and “...something beyond personal construction”⁸⁷. The descent community is a physical community that exists in a reified form, separate from the individual which relates to myths of “...eternal descent”⁸⁸. A descent community cannot be chosen by an individual, but chooses the individual. Choice therefore lies in a polarised way “...between acceptance or rejection, of the community’s recognition of us.”⁸⁹ Thus, communities of descent are: “...unasked for, unquestionable, beyond construction.”⁹⁰ Due to the detraditionalisation⁹¹ of communal authority⁹² however, one way in which the individual does have choice is by re-negotiating assent categories such as prioritising class or ethnicity, or, more significantly for this thesis, being “‘born again’”⁹³. Whilst dissent is decided upon in communal terms, the notion of being ‘born again’ or (re)claiming one’s religious identity in a zealous manner is one area in which the individual has freedom within a religious structure to do this in a personalised and individualised way. One can hardly be accused of dissenting if one is overly-zealous about one’s relationship to the religion by descent. This is significant to the Muslim experience and arguably, a parallel in the Islamic context is that of *dawa* or religious conversion activities. As this model is mainly based on the Jewish experience of descent communities, Morris brings up issues relating to “...the detested categories of ‘biology’ and ‘race’”⁹⁴ being prevalent in this narrative. These essentialised notions however, are taken to be part of the nineteenth century modernist grand narrative of European superiority.

Communities of assent, however, (which Morris considers to be more closely related to Christian and Islamic models) are constructed through descent communities. They are non-familial, voluntary and continually forming and re-forming⁹⁵. Rather than religion being ascribed at birth, in this model, “purity of doctrine”⁹⁶ is emphasised over purity of religion

⁸⁶ Ibid. pp. 238-40.

⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 243.

⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 244.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 245.

⁹¹ The breakdown of, in this case, the ultimate authority of a communal organisation

⁹² Morris discusses the simultaneous processes of detraditionalisation and re-traditionalisation, indicating a reconceptualisation of traditionalisation, in this case in community terms.

⁹³ Morris, P. ‘Community Beyond Tradition’. In P. Heelas, S. Lash and P. Morris (eds.), *Detraditionalization: critical reflections on authority and identity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1996.

⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 241.

⁹⁵ Ibid. pp. 238-9.

⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 239.

through familial descent. Morris considers assent communities to be anti-pluralistic and intolerant of dogmatic variations in that "...hierarchies of assent have to decide on the orthodox form of assent, that is, who is in and who is out."⁹⁷ Thus, the focus is on shared truths, values and creeds and the familial community is replaced by the metaphorical community. This model is based on the Christian model and has universalistic tendencies, whilst the descent model is based on the local context. Whilst Morris considers these to be two distinctive community types, there may undoubtedly be some overlap between the two⁹⁸. This overlap can be seen in the Muslim experience. Whilst the Jewish experience informs descent communities, Morris proposes that examples from other religions such as Christian dogmas, the Buddhist Eightfold Path and the Five Pillars of Islam are reflective of an assent approach to religious communalism.

Relating Morris' community analysis to the Muslim experience, Muslim communities can be said to embody aspects both of descent and assent communities. Whilst Muslim communities can be considered to be communities of assent due the universality of creed and truths, they can also be considered to be very much communities of descent as well due to religion being ascribed at birth in patrilineal terms. Religion of the individual is assumed according to the religion of the father, and the child does not have to go through rites of passage to assert this religious identity in terms of assenting to the religious doctrines.

As mentioned above, the notion of being 'born-again' is significant in the Muslim context⁹⁹ with regard to identity construction and formation. Dissent is not tolerated within assent communities, and any action considered antithetical to Islam can be dealt with through instruments such as the issuing of fatwas or religious decrees. Turner¹⁰⁰ notes that in a diaspora context, group solidarity is significant and thus individual rights of 'opting out' of the religious community could be considered a threat to the very idea of the community's survival.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid. pp. 238-9.

⁹⁹ Although this is, of course, a Christian concept. As mentioned earlier, a parallel term in Islam could perhaps be the concept of *dawa*

¹⁰⁰ Turner, B. S. 'Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 97, No. 3. July 2007. p. 413.

The very notion of diaspora communities implies that they could be both communities of descent and assent. Within the Muslim diaspora, whilst culture and religion may be ascribed at birth through heritage, there may also be wider affiliations and associations through the notion of the transnational Muslim ummah. This type of association may be considered to be in a continual state of flux and association with this vast community may or may not be viewed as voluntary, depending on the worldview of individuals within the community setting.

By associating with an established or establishing diaspora community, it may be difficult for individuals to feel a freedom of religious association. However, diasporic religious communities may be established within a wider societal context, in which there is freedom of religious association and religious conscience. Traditional religious expectations, such as the ways of being a Muslim and acting as one in society, are necessarily fluid when taken out of the context of Muslim majority countries and transplanted within a Western context and society.

The point relating to the choice of religious associations is reiterated by Bauman¹⁰¹, who states that societal and personal freedom of choice born of polytheistic reality, “does not mean believing in nothing”, but “believing in too many things – too many for the spiritual comfort of blind obedience; it means being aware that there are too many equally important or convincing beliefs” to choose responsibly from. Thus, that people may not hold a specific religious affinity does not necessarily mean that this reflects a secular worldview. It does show that types of religiosity in contemporary society are fluid and not static and exclusively associated with institutionalised forms of religion. Durkheim believed that religion would gradually die out, but stated that “the old gods are dying or are already dead. But this is not to say that society is incapable of creating new ones”¹⁰². This may refer to the way in which God and religion are re-conceptualised in our contemporary context and also in terms of politics, culture and nationalism which may all act as new authorities. In opposition to the climate of secularisation, according to Brill¹⁰³, secularisation in fact stimulates ‘religious innovation’. This can be seen through the rise of extremist and non-extremist sectarian groups, cults and New Age spirituality movements as conventional religious groups may begin to lose their significance.

¹⁰¹ Bauman, Z. *Postmodernity and its Discontents*. New York: New York University Press. 1997. p. 201.

¹⁰² Brill, E.J. ‘Religion and identity: the Canadian, American, and Brazilian cases’. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. Vol. 39, No. 2. June 1998. p. 237.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*.

This religious innovation has also allowed space for individuals to re-conceptualise traditional religion and religious authority. As mentioned above, examples of this are 'born-again' religious individuals who may break away from their respective religious 'communities' in order to seek alternative and individualised interpretations of their religion¹⁰⁴. This point is especially significant to this thesis as it relates to the notion of revivalist identity formations that are expressed in religion, and more specifically to the neo-revivalist Muslim identity that is occurring amongst second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims.

However, an important distinction needs to be made. It is apparent through this overview of secularisation and religiosity in the Western context that the individuals being discussed are those within the Judeo-Christian context. The majority of literature dealing with religion and secularisation in the West does not necessarily deal with the religions and religiosity of immigrants¹⁰⁵, or immigrant communities that are now part of the West. As earlier mentioned, I will be discussing diaspora Muslims more fully in Chapter three. Thus, although religion is no longer embedded in social systems and social structures in the West, it does not necessarily follow that people are also increasingly secular or that religion is no longer significant in society. All this does indicate that people may have more choice to become secular. However, a secularised state does not necessarily lead to a secularised population on the whole. The Turkish experience is an example of this. Whilst in institutional terms, Turkey is a secular state, the expression of Islam, especially outside the major city centres, is still apparent, as in the case of women wearing the hijab which indicates the visual performance of religious faith. Turkey appears to be a divided country in terms of secular and religious ideals. Whilst an estimated fifty percent of the population are against religious symbols and political representation that stems from an Islamic party, the divisiveness in public opinion has been reflected by the recent government elections with more political power being reached by the AKP which is considered to have 'Islamist' roots¹⁰⁶. The wearing of the headscarf has been symbolic and representative of much debate surrounding Turkey's commitment to Ataturk's secularisation of Turkey. The fact that the AKP was re-elected in July 2007, indicates much

¹⁰⁴ To be further discussed in the final subsection of this chapter.

¹⁰⁵ However, for a discussion of Islam, see Asad, T. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2003.

¹⁰⁶ See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6910444.stm>

popular support also for a party rooted in political Islam¹⁰⁷. Thus, whilst a nation may be institutionally secular and be committed to these secular ideals, public opinion may not necessarily reflect this. However, a secular society has the theoretical freedom of religion, and in a sense also, the freedom from religion, due to the separation of religion from the institutional State.

Thus, due to the legacy of institutionalised secularism that has arisen from Enlightenment ideals of the separation of Church and State, there is declining religious authority within Western society. Multiple truths and authorities are reflected in contemporary society and that has led to a choice in the construction of a religious (or lack of religious) identity. Religion has become more of a personal and privatised issue. Identity politics and the identity project that has arisen through postmodern relativism has enabled religion to be privatised. Religion however, in contemporary times appears to have gone beyond the private, and during the last few years, there has been a move in thinking towards post-secular society, that is, the return of religion to the public sector. Thus, whilst there may be an appearance of secularism in Western societies, religion is still significant to the public sector of society with regard to cultural memory. This may be transferred across generations with regard to religious ritual and traditions¹⁰⁸. An example of this is through rites of passage. Another significant area is that of personal and public crises¹⁰⁹, such as through problems of health, death, war, natural disasters. During these times religious ideas may be relevant in providing meaning and security. The prevalence of religion in secular societies will now be briefly discussed.

1.2 Religion and the Post-secular turn

Although many Western societies have gone through a period of secularisation, there has recently been much discourse around the notion of post-secular society¹¹⁰. Halman and

¹⁰⁷ See Irvine, S. Defending the secular 'faith'. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6603141.stm>

¹⁰⁸ Davie, G. Cited in Mitchell, C. The Religious Content of Ethnic Identities. *Sociology*. Vol. 40, No. 6. 2006. pp. 1135-1152.

¹⁰⁹ Hervieu-Leger, D. Cited in Mitchell, C. Ibid.

¹¹⁰ See for example, Halman, L. and Draulans, V. 'How Secular is Europe?' *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2006. pp. 263-88.; Bosetti, G. and Eder. K. 'Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere'. *Eurozine*, 17th August, 2006. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html>; Hervieu-Leger, D. 'In search of certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity'. *The Hedgehog Review*. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69.

Draulans¹¹¹ discuss secularisation in contemporary Europe in their 2006 article 'How Secular is Europe'. They provide data and analysis taken from a 1999/2000 European Values Study¹¹², which includes the majority of European countries but not some of Scandinavia and Eastern Europe.

Their findings indicated that secularisation in Europe has been uneven and varied, and that a lack of Church participation¹¹³ did not necessarily indicate secularisation in terms of individual belief or religiosity. Religious pluralism in Europe was found to produce lower levels of religiosity. Where religiosity did remain significant, it was found that cultural heritage and socioeconomic factors were relevant to explaining religiosity and religious participation.

Through the breakdown of the hegemony of community, the individual has become the primary point of reference in contemporary Western society, regarding such areas as "values, attitudes and beliefs"¹¹⁴. As a result, religion has also become personalised (in terms of a sense of ownership towards religion) and individualised (the atomisation of this ownership). Davie¹¹⁵ characterised this societal change as 'believing without belonging', where a lack of religious participation does not necessarily indicate a lack of belief. This indicates a shift in emphasis in (historically Christian) society, (and perhaps also social analysis), from religion, defined in terms of practice, to religiosity, defined in terms of belief¹¹⁶. The individuation of this shift can also be said to be inclusive of exclusive identification with, and assertion of, that belief. In other words, due to the rise of identity politics in terms of the choice of religious association (or its lack), and the decline of community dictates in terms of religious belonging, people are free to choose their religion, and more significantly, how they practice their religion, how they identify themselves with it by asserting that belief as the essential core of their personal identities. Believing without belonging can also refer to individuals or groups that are opposed

¹¹¹ Halman, L. and Draulans, V. Ibid.

¹¹² It is important to note that whilst this is a 2006 article, the data gathered was during 1999-2000 and was pre-'9/11' and before the more recent European 'terror' attacks. The time-frame that the data was gathered within therefore may have implications to the religions analysed and, to religious plurality in general and to Islam in particular.

¹¹³ For more on the notion of an 'Unchurched' Europe, see Davie, G. *Religion in Modern Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000.

¹¹⁴ Halman, L. and Draulans, V. Ibid. p. 265.

¹¹⁵ Davie, G. *Religion in Modern Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000. p. 3.

¹¹⁶ However, this emphasis on personal belief over practice can be argued to be more relevant to the Christian tradition. Traditionally, within orthodox Islam, religious practice through daily prayer can be said to be just as important as belief.

to traditional communal religious orthodoxy¹¹⁷ and whose notions of belonging may extend outside of the ethno-cultural community. An example in the Muslim context is global jihadis, who can be described as religious extremists¹¹⁸, who are peripheralised by the vast majority of Muslims, and who self-peripheralise or 'self-other' in the context of local or national communities. In other words, differing religious factions may share core beliefs, but have their own extended criteria of belonging, practice and belief.

The notion of 'believing without belonging' can also be inverted to 'belonging without necessarily believing', in a community setting¹¹⁹. This may be indicated by the continued significance of religion in diaspora communities in Europe. As mentioned earlier, cultural and socioeconomic heritage have been considered significant for the continuation of religiosity in Europe. However, it is not mentioned in Halman and Draulans¹²⁰ article whether individuals from other religious traditions, besides Christianity, were surveyed. One of the questions asked is specifically related to Church attendance rather than referring to religious institutions in general¹²¹. As there is a significant presence of Muslims who have settled in Europe, this lack of inclusion of other religious institutions appears problematic. (Perhaps the word Church has been taken as a generic term for religious institution? The authors do not make this clear.)

However, whilst this personalisation and individualisation of religion is relevant to the Western context which is traditionally Christian, it can be argued that the ways in which these interpretations of religion are played out, are different according to the different religious traditions being referred to. Whilst this individuation is a notable shift, there are other factors to consider. These include generational differences and different emphases on individualistic expressions according to the religious tradition. Furthermore, in the context of a religiously plural and multi-ethnic societal context, the acceptability of the individuated response to religion by the immediate religious community is also important. Modern Western society in general is based around the individual rather than the collective community, and through postmodern society there has been a notable shift towards individuated identity construction

¹¹⁷ Who still 'believe' however in the Five Pillars of Islam.

¹¹⁸ For the purposes of this thesis, religious extremism is defined as relating to any ideologies that lay claims in religion that profess separatism and incite or accept violence.

¹¹⁹ For example with regard to religious heritage.

¹²⁰ Halman, L. and Draulans, V. 'How Secular is Europe?' *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2006. pp. 263-88.

¹²¹ *Ibid.* p. 286.

in general terms¹²² and with regard to religion. Immigrant or diaspora communities may be 'othered' from this as they may have more of a collective community focus in general and consider the collective community as a whole to be more important than any one individual. Thus, an individuated religious response in relation to the diaspora Muslim context may very well have different implications for the immediate religious community and wider implications for the reified ummah¹²³. These differing cultural norms may, in turn, inform the type of responses that individuals with a Muslim background, for example, may seek whilst constructing their identity in relation to religion in general, and Islam in particular. However, it can be argued that through Western postmodern society, 'the cult of the individual' has been positioned in opposition to the community. According to Giddens, self-identity is thought to simultaneously shape, and be shaped by society. The self is considered to be an active, receptive entity through which "individuals contribute to and directly promote social influences that are global in their consequences and implications"¹²⁴. The identity project signifies the notion of the self, not as 'a finished product', but as a work in progress in a continual state of flux and development. Further, the self is considered a 'reflexive project' that is characterised by a search for meaning in a world with multiple truths and a plethora of choices¹²⁵. Thus, with regard to the second- and third-generation Muslim diaspora in the West, it is fitting that the type of Muslim identity that is sought is one that is individuated and personalised.

The renewal and revivalism of religion has occurred amongst all 'world religions' and political processes have increasingly become linked with religious ideologies. These renewal and revivalist movements can be linked with the processes of globalisation that has made the world appear borderless and accessible. The communications revolution has allowed religious and cultural processes (that may be global in scope) to be internalised and made local, and simultaneously local concerns can be made into global interests through what has been termed 'glocalisation'¹²⁶. Global travel and communications facilitate this process with regard to

¹²² See Giddens' notion of the self as a reflexive project. Giddens, A. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.

¹²³ The Ummah may be reified due to the attention given to it with regard to the unity of Muslims, and as a perceived site of 'authentic' religious expression.

¹²⁴ Giddens, A. *Ibid.* p. 20.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ See Featherstone, M. 'Cosmopolis: An Introduction'. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 1-16; Robertson, R. Cited in Beck, U. 'The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies'. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 17-44. The glocal originally referred to marketing strategies, but I apply it the dialectic

religious communities and the result may be a production of "...diasporic, fragmented and localized communities"¹²⁷. This media-facilitated social change has caused a paradox to occur through which there is an "...integration of dispersed religious communities"¹²⁸ through media-space, and also "...a challenge to traditional religious teaching, training and recruitment"¹²⁹. Thus, geographically-traditional strongholds of religious orthodoxy are re-oriented and localised in other physical domains¹³⁰. These social changes have implications for the accessibility of a multitude of religious ideologies and through religio-techno-space, individuals are able to choose the ideology that serves their (political) interests¹³¹.

It is within the context of the postmodern/ society that religion or 'the spiritual' has been seen as more acceptable in society. This may be indicated by 'religious consumerism' that has come through the 'postmodern turn' in Western society. In an article in *The Humanist* in 1996, Victor¹³² proposed two contradictory social changes taking place in religion¹³³. These were, an increase in societal secularisation, and an increase also in "supernaturalism in personal belief"¹³⁴. The latter refers to a belief in something that cannot be scientifically explained. The rise in supernatural belief in contemporary society can be seen as 'the postmodern turn', through which religion has been allowed back into society through the politics of identity. The postmodern turn implies emphases on relativity, diversity and plurality. Religious identification in general terms in the West has been relocated from religion by descent to religion by choice. Individuals can express choice in the religion (if any) they identify with, and also, more significantly, how they personalise their own religious experiences (in terms of religious performance, practice, belief, expression, sectarian associations, transnational associations, community participation and personal observance amongst other such issues). The postmodern

between the global and the local in general. See Robertson, R. *Globalization: social theory and global culture*. London: Sage. 1992.

¹²⁷ Turner, B. S. 'Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 97, No. 3. July 2007. p. 412.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid. pp. 412-3.

¹³⁰ Examples of this are the growing importance of Africa to orthodox Christianity and the re-orientation of Islam to South-East Asia in demographic terms. See Turner, B.S. Ibid, B. S. Ibid. pp. 405-8.

¹³¹ The media will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

¹³² Victor, J.S. 'Forecasting the future of religion: the next 50 years'. *The Humanist*, Vol. 56, No. 3. May-June 1996. pp. 20-3.

¹³³ It should be noted that Victor's article was written in 1996 and could therefore be considered a little dated. However, I would argue that this article is still extremely relevant to the study of religion today as society is going through the changes he describes.

¹³⁴ Victor, J.S. 'Forecasting the future of religion: the next 50 years'. *The Humanist*, Vol. 56, No. 3. May-June 1996. pp. 20-3.

turn is also reflective of Giddens' notion of the reflexive self¹³⁵. The individual has become increasingly self-reflexive and identity (and the association this may have with religion) may be viewed as a process. Religion may also be sought as reactionary to what Beck has termed 'risk society'¹³⁶.

There has also been a rise in more orthodox and traditionalist religious factions, perhaps as a reaction to secular society and the hope to return to a 'mythical' past (as adapted in the present). However, there has also been an increase in more individualist, conservative fundamentalist and neo-fundamentalist religious groups. Alternative sources of information and knowledge challenge the concept of a singular (religious) authority and a society that experiences rapid social change may appear to be one that lacks a singular thread of meaning to hold people together. Following this, to achieve a sense of belonging and to ensure that life has meaning, it is not difficult to understand how religion may serve as a unifying factor¹³⁷.

As a modern society is often thought to be synonymous with, and even characterised by, secularism, the return of religion may be viewed as a threat to secularisation and to the foundations that make a society modern. Examples of religious groups that reject or react against the secularisation of modernity¹³⁸ are orthodox or traditionalist religious groups that may aim for an alternative modernity that reflects security and certainty in what may be considered an uncertain world. In these instances, religiosity is not considered to be a choice, but a regulated way of life that aims at finding a "supreme authority ... to end all other authorities"¹³⁹. This worldview may lead religious sub-cultures to isolate and remove themselves from society, and may also lead to religious extremism that may challenge the mainstream Western perception of the secularisation of the contemporary world.

Religious extremists may be defined not only as those who are militant but also those who engage in violent religious discourse and textual violence, utilised mainly through mediated

¹³⁵ Giddens, A. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.

¹³⁶ See Beck, U. *World Risk Society*. Oxford; Malden, Mass: Polity Press. 1999. It has been argued that 'risk society' developed out of societal modernisation. Economic capitalism has created an uncertain world in terms of unknown hazards such as environmental pollution. The notion of risk can also be extended to social relations within other areas of the social structure.

¹³⁷ This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

¹³⁸ Religious extremism and fundamentalism will be discussed more fully at the end of this chapter.

¹³⁹ Bauman, Z. 'Postmodern religion?'. In P. Heelas, D. Martin and P. Morris (eds.), *Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1998. pp. 74-5.

technologies. Technology has become an important catalyst with regard to the access to and spread of religious literature that may incite militancy or separatism, and in this way can be regarded as textual violence. This may also refer to religious extremists within religious, such as in Muslim societies. Although from the outside, the society may appear to be religious in a static way, factors such as rapid social change, globalisation, foreign trade, consumerism, and the dissemination of information by the mass media may contribute not only to a changing society but also specifically to the erosion of traditional religious values¹⁴⁰. 'Extreme' religion can be considered in terms of sectarian groupings and in a sense considered 'other' against the wider society. Thus these 'extremists' can be described as those who seek an alternative way of epistemologically, ontologically and phenomenologically existing, believing and acting ('performing') in the world with reference first and foremost to their perceptions of a singular religion and religious authority¹⁴¹ which, in the context of this thesis, is Islam. However, it should be noted that 'extremist' is of course an external qualification of one of the ways religiosity is enacted. Extremism can be considered a shifting criterion, located from the outside (in this case, external to Islam) and from within (that is, a rejection of these ideological claims by the majority of Muslims).

These societal changes (such as the shift from religion as practice, to religiosity as personal identity) have not only taken place in the post-Christian West. Roy¹⁴² notes a global shift in terms of the relationship between Islam and the identity of its followers. However, there has also simultaneously been a return to the institution¹⁴³ as location of truth, through which Mosques and Imams or Mullahs may be perceived as possessing the truth about religion. The location of 'the real'¹⁴⁴ has become to an extent institutionalised during what may be perceived as turbulent times. Such a description of the contemporary age may be justified because of the lack of a stringent societal code of social and religious morality which has been brought about

¹⁴⁰ For the purpose of this thesis however, Muslim societies will not be looked at, but the place of the transnational 'Muslim community' will be focused on in the Western context.

¹⁴¹ This type of an extremist religiously-based ideology can be considered with reference to all religions that must re-negotiate their place in contemporary society. In the context of this paper, only the experiences of Muslims are considered.

¹⁴² Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

¹⁴³ Such as Muslim Student Associations and Mosques.

¹⁴⁴ First considered by Alan Badiou, the 'passion for the real' was considered a significant feature of the twentieth century. See Zizek, S. *Welcome to the Desert of the Real!: Five Essays on September 11 and related dates*. London; New York: Verso. 2002. The notion of 'the real' for Zizek, relates to the nostalgic search in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries for something that has been lost, and in this way, is the search for a new order in the contemporary world.

by the postmodern emphases on subjectivity and multiplicity of truths, authorities and meanings. Certainty and authority may be sought in an uncertain and fluid world. This change is similar to the growth of mega-Churches within Christianity, through which the institution or religious community is chosen by affiliation and is perceived as taking on the responsibility of guiding individuals in terms of their postmodern interpretation of religion.

As religious extremists act primarily against their own religious communities first and foremost, straying from Mosques and religious communities, they may be seen as taking matters into their own hands when disillusioned with their place in the larger society. This relates to Nancy's notion of the 'inoperative community'¹⁴⁵. An individual acts out as an individual, and not as someone affiliated to a community, due to the lack of community or as an indication of a breakdown within the community. Nancy describes the community as reflective of "no singular being without another singular being"¹⁴⁶. This relates to the importance for the community of the community and the struggle that this implies between conceptions of who is paramount, the individual or the community? This disillusionment of religious 'extremists' is primarily within the younger generations of Muslim migrants who may feel their spiritual needs are not being met. Mirza¹⁴⁷ relates this fragmentation and alienation to the rise of identity politics¹⁴⁸ where questions such as 'who am I' and 'who are we' are constantly being asked. Therefore, religious leaders take on an increasingly important role in guiding individuals in fulfilling their putative religious duties. Mediated technologies also take on an increasingly significant role in transmitting these messages globally. An example of this is the mediated broadcasts of Osama bin Laden calling for a global jihad against 'infidels'.

According to Bosetti and Eder¹⁴⁹, post-secularism is characterised by the return of religion to the public sphere. Religion was thought not to have disappeared completely from society during secularisation, but to have become invisible due to diminishing Church participation, and in this sense, to have been separated from the public sphere of society. The emergence of religious traditions other than Christianity in the public sphere in the West is significant for

¹⁴⁵ Nancy, J-L. *The Inoperative Community*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 1990.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p.28.

¹⁴⁷ Mirza, M. 'Getting to the root of 'homegrown terrorism''. *Spiked*. 30 August, 2006. <http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/1572/>

¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁸ As mentioned earlier through Giddens' notion of the self as a reflexive project.

¹⁴⁹ Bosetti, G. and Eder, K. 'Post-secularism: A return to the public sphere'. *Eurozine*. 17th August, 2006. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html>

the definition of a post-secular society, for, as noted previously, secularism in the West has historically been concerned primarily with Christianity. This shift is also reflective of the multi-ethnic character of European and Western societies in contemporary times as there are large numbers of individuals who are part of ethno-national and religious diaspora communities. Thus, the post-secular shift in these societies is a significant characteristic of religiously plural societies.

There has been much European discourse on secularism and European identity¹⁵⁰ as more European nations are initiated into the European Union. The membership of Turkey into the European Union is an example of this. Although Turkey (as discussed earlier) is officially a secular country (although religion and religious expression is still controlled or suppressed by the State¹⁵¹), the fact that the country has a Muslim majority appears to be problematic for the European Union's definition of a European identity.

Examples of the significance of religion to the public sphere in society are numerous. One such example is the Muhammad cartoon controversy. Others include the headscarf and burqa debates in Europe and also the debates surrounding the use of any religious symbolism as adornment. A recent New Zealand example is the debate over women-only swimming pools. Other issues involving the 'visible' return of religion are issues involving Muslim schools, and the Pope's speech in September 2006 when he quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor's (derogatory) opinion about the Muslim prophet Muhammad. These issues will be taken up more fully in Chapter 4.

Post-secularism does not only imply the return of religion to the public sphere, but also the return of religious identities in the public arena. In what has been described as postmodern society, religion has become a choice of association and identity. The visible emergence of 'neo-Muslim' identities in the Western context are no exception in this respect. Rather than being a linear continuation of religious orthodoxy, the politicisation of Islam in Europe has become a

¹⁵⁰ See for example the European online journal Eurozine for a discussion on European secularism, post-secularism and European discourse on identity relating to religious plurality:

<http://www.eurozine.com/comp/focalpoints/postseceurope.html>

¹⁵¹ As can be seen through the debates surrounding the wearing of the headscarf in tertiary institutions. The law permitting the wearing of headscarves there has recently been overruled, because wearing headscarves in these institutions has been considered a threat to the secular character of Turkey.

See <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/06/turkey19050.htm>

choice and recourse to identity for some of the younger generation of Muslims in Europe¹⁵². In this sense, religious fundamentalism differs from this neo-fundamentalism, because for fundamentalists, religion is not seen as a choice, whereas some second- and third-generation immigrants have consciously rejected both the expression of religion and the societal integration of their parents' generation and have claimed their religious difference in terms of self-definition, self-affirmation, social distinction and cultural confrontation against the Western societies that they are part of¹⁵³. Following this, these new-forming revivalist religious identities may be described as being a form of 'self-othering'.

This new phenomenon is distinctive as it cannot be characterised and reduced to a 'clash of civilisations' or a clash of religious traditions. It can instead be described as a clash of cultural and hybrid identities, and a clash of worldviews, of what it means to be Muslims in, but not of, Europe¹⁵⁴, or being in and not of the West. Thus, there is nothing inherently incompatible about Islam and the West or Islam in the West. Such essentialisation is not constructive in attempting to comprehend the issues surrounding the recourse or turn to a neo-Muslim identity or even a turn to a religious extremism. The fact that religion is being 'utilised' by diaspora Muslim youth indicates that there are second- and third-generation Muslims¹⁵⁵ who do not consider it incompatible to profess a religious identity and to remain part of society, for example Tariq Ramadan is a strong proponent of what it means to be a European Muslim¹⁵⁶.

This discourse pertaining to the religious expression amongst Western Muslim youth indicates the need to attempt to understand this turn, not in terms external to the West, but located from within. Significant issues are those relating to the experience of Muslims as being treated as outsiders in the West (that of 'other'), their experiences as multi-ethnic migrants and issues pertaining to migration, such as dislocation and the internalisation of these matters by diaspora Muslims. Thus, what is most significant is not the religious difference, but the social standing,

¹⁵² See Gole, N. 'Islam in European Publics: secularism and religious difference'. *The Hedgehog Review*. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp.140-6.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Asad, T. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2003. p. 164.

¹⁵⁵ And also of course first-generation migrants as well.

¹⁵⁶ See Ramadan, T. *To be a European Muslim*. The Islamic Foundation: Leicester. 1999.; Ramadan, T. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2004. Ramadan's views of European Muslims will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3.3.

and how these groups of people are represented, treated and present in society and what it is about their understanding of Islam in particular, or religion in general, that pulls them towards it. Issues pertaining to the hybridity of identities are also relevant, especially in the context of postmodern relativity, plurality and diversity. Thus, it is apparent that it is not an inherently located Islamic violence that is 'at fault' but instead, the primary focus of research should be the 'why' factor. What is it about particular ideologies that attracts particular individuals, what is their status in societal terms in relation to their familial context, local context, educational context, socio-economic context and national context? How do they see themselves in the world and what do they consider their personal prospects to be with the 'cultural capital'¹⁵⁷ that they hold?

In this sense, new religious identities may be viewed as a critique of the ideals of contemporary Western (and also non-Western) society. It can be posited that this new identity-formation based on religion, rather than on ethnic heritage, is a claim towards what has been traditionally considered 'other' to modern society. Religion, and more specifically 'other', are religious traditions that do not have a European cultural and institutional heritage, namely Islam. Thus, by claiming or re-claiming a collective Muslim identity as the basis of their identity construction, this identity can be considered a form of individuals themselves 'self-othering'.

Will Herberg¹⁵⁸ discussed the turn (or return) to a religious identity amongst third-generation immigrants in the United States in his 1955 book *Protestant Catholic Jew*. Whilst he discusses a return to religiosity amongst the third-generation of immigrants, what we are seeing now, especially in Europe, is again a return to religiosity amongst immigrants, this time Muslim, and also amongst second- as well as third-generation immigrants.

To discuss what religion means in a postmodern world, it is necessary to distinguish between individual belief or community beliefs. In dealing with the issue of the formation of a neo-revivalist and collective Muslim identity that may be said to have wider implications for a

¹⁵⁷ This term refers to Bourdieu's notion of capital as a habitus that relates to the embodiment of symbols and ideas that enable the strategic utilisation of resources. According to Bourdieu there is a close relationship between economic and social capital. Marshall, G. and Scott, J. (eds.). 'Cultural capital'. *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. pp. 129-30. I use the term cultural capital here to refer the individual's place in the social structure of society and more significantly, what the individual perceives his/her prospects to be in society.

¹⁵⁸ Herberg's thesis will be discussed more fully in relation to diaspora Muslims in Chapter three.

homegrown religious extremism, I am concerned with the possibility of choice in individual belief and practice, and also the individual extremist as self-othering to not just the society or country that s/he is part of, but also to the local religious community. The attraction of jihadi or 'Islamist'¹⁵⁹ networks appears to be the puritanical attitude not just against the West, but also against anyone who does not share the same beliefs, and this even includes other Muslims. The attitude of these networks appears to be one of monopoly over religious truth, interpretation, belief and practice. Mirza¹⁶⁰ suggests that the reason behind the Muslim younger generations' attraction to extremism is because of the disillusionment with their religious community's stance on religion, in that they view it as overly culture-ridden without the due emphasis on the personal duty of a believer. Hence the younger generations of Muslims are attracted to these organisations which question the local religious community's claim to authenticity. Thus, this reflects the shift to the individualisation of religious identity as paramount within the context of the global jihad.

Whilst it is apparent that religion has been in a sense 'allowed back in' by postmodernity, many may not feel as though that is enough. Religion in the West is still characterised by a Christian heritage, but more so now by a plurality of religious truth claims, and in this way, there is no monopoly on salvation. This view is disturbing to those religiously-oriented individuals or communities who may feel as though their way is the ultimate truth and is the only authentic way to be and act in any national and global context.

The following chapter will provide an overview of a classification of 'moderate' Muslims, and the diversity of ways through which Muslims consider themselves Muslims. It will also expand on issues concerning religious extremism and the merging neo-fundamentalism in the West in the context of the global jihad.

¹⁵⁹ The terms global Jihadi and neofundamentalism will be used to refer to what has been termed 'Islamist' identity

¹⁶⁰ Mirza, M. 'Getting to the root of 'homegrown terrorism''. Spiked. 30 August, 2006. <http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?site/article/1572/>

Chapter 2. An introductory classification of 'moderate Muslims', the perceived roles of Muslims' in society and a spectrum of the global *jihad*

This chapter provides an introductory classification of moderate Muslims and a spectrum of the diverse ways in which Muslims can act as Muslims in society, considering revivalist Islam in the context of the global jihad and neofundamentalism. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a context of the classification of Muslims in the global arena.

In the past decade, there has been a noted emergence of a 'neo-revivalist' Muslim identity amongst Muslim youth in the Western context. Their relationship with Islam is shifting and changing in relation to first generation immigrants, for whom Islam can be said to be grounded within their ethno-cultural heritage¹⁶¹. This neo-revivalist Muslim identity is discussed within the context of the 'global jihad' or the 'landscapes of the jihad', as termed by Devi¹⁶². According to Devi, "...the jihad makes Islam into an agent as well as a product of globalisation by liberating it from its specific context."¹⁶³ Thus there has been a shift from a particularistic understanding and practice of religion that may be based on ethno-cultural norms to a perceived universalistic conception of Islam that is supranational. Islam however, is not just perceived as a universalistic religion, the universality of Islam is central to its claims. What has changed is the globalised Islamic identity that is now taken as normative over and above any cultural and national identities through a "culture-blind approach"¹⁶⁴. This universalistic notion of Islam relates to Roy's¹⁶⁵ notion of the deterritorialisation of Islam, that is, Islam taken from the local to the global context¹⁶⁶. He uses the term globalised Islam to refer "...to the way in which the relationship of Muslims to Islam is reshaped by globalisation, westernisation and the impact of living as a minority"¹⁶⁷. The deterritorialisation that Roy refers to is not so much related to the spread of Islam as it is of Muslim people through

¹⁶¹ Islam is particularistic and dependent on their experiences of it in their 'home culture' or 'home countries'.

¹⁶² Devi, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.

¹⁶³ Devji, *Ibid.* p. xii.

¹⁶⁴ Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004. p. 330.

¹⁶⁵ Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

¹⁶⁶ However, as earlier mentioned, due to the notion of the Ummah in Islam, it would be more accurate to suggest the shift that is taking place is not the deterritorialisation of Islam (as Islam has always been extra-territorial), but instead, the realisation of this ideal due to the significant number of Muslims living transnationally.

¹⁶⁷ Roy, O. *Ibid.* p. ix.

globalisation and immigration¹⁶⁸. It can be argued that the notions of 'Islam' and 'Muslim' are different claims of identity and authenticity. I consider Islam in terms of the Qur'anic principle of the shahada¹⁶⁹ and Muslims as the actors who utilise their own specific hermeneutics to understand and apply Islam¹⁷⁰ in their lives. Living as minorities, the ways in which diaspora Muslims conceive of themselves and their children as Muslims necessitates reflexive thinking with regard to their experience of religion and how to 'keep their religion alive' in their new location.

With regard to the minority status of Muslims, it is important to bear in mind that being a minority, in ethno-religious and even in some cases, in socio-economic terms to the dominant majority society, the minority, in order to be taken seriously, have to 'prove themselves' or assert their identity to counter being 'othered'¹⁷¹. This may be carried out by striving for educational and professional success with regard to societal contribution, or through the assertion of one's ethno-cultural, and more significantly for this thesis, religious identity. This assertion of identity may be enacted in both individual and collective arenas, and reappropriated in terms of both the individual and collective. In this way, according to the societal landscape, the normative expression of Islam by Muslims can change as the relationship between the religion, and the religious expression of the religion, is a dynamic process. In diaspora terms, there are two significant appropriations. The first is, "[t]he construction of a subjective, self-reflexive memory"¹⁷², that is a common narrative, which enables the continuity of membership over time, and the ability for this membership to be expanded and rooted in local contexts. The second appropriation is that the collective identity transcends ethnic and cultural origins¹⁷³. In relation to Islam it is the extraterritoriality of the religion that allows, symbolically, the universal to be merged with the particular. Thus, for second- and third-

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 18.

¹⁶⁹ The shahada asserts that there no other God but God and Muhammad is his messenger (Prophet). See Al-Jubouri, I. 'Fundamentals, Islamists and the West'. *Philosophy Now*. July-August, 2006.

¹⁷⁰ It is for this reason I consider the 'neo-revivalist' Muslim identity rather than the 'neo-revivalist' Islamic identity. However, this 'neo-revivalism' locates itself within perceptions of the collective Muslim Ummah.

¹⁷¹ 'Othering' refers to being considered in opposition to the dominant mainstream society, with regard to religion and perhaps also the dominant culture. This may be carried out through binary dichotomies of self/other us/them, that stress inherent, and immutable, differences and beliefs. However, at the same time, minorities may 'self-other' to the dominant society, by also perceiving themselves as distinctive in the same religio-cultural terms.

¹⁷² Saint-Blancat, C. 'Islam in Diaspora: Between Reterritorialization and Extraterritoriality'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. Vol. 26, No. 1. March 2002. P. 140.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

generation diaspora Muslims, a hybrid religious culture that is simultaneously individualistic¹⁷⁴ and collective¹⁷⁵ is enabled to be formed.

Islam as a religion is 'a way of life' and religion is not simply confined to personal belief or weekly practice. The religion stems to all areas of social life, including morality, politics and behaviour, and in this way is a public religion. However, Islam is also a private religion in that each Muslim's salvation is his/her own and no intermediary is needed between the individual and God. This relates to the place of authority in Islam, for which there is no singular authority and uniform voice of Islam. There is one basic principle however, that all Muslims adhere to. This is the shahada, the assertion that there is no God but God and that Muhammad is His messenger. This fundamental principle may be performed through the Five Pillars of Islam¹⁷⁶. The omniscience, omnipotence and oneness of God and the shahada is something all believing Muslims have in common. According to Al-Jubouri, those termed 'Islamists', or for the purposes of this thesis, extremists, neo-fundamentalists or jihadis, have four extra 'rules' that they adhere to. These are first: "To recognise there are monotheists who are not Muslims"¹⁷⁷, second, "To recognise that there are polytheists, both Muslim and non-Muslim"¹⁷⁸, third, "To fight them all, without making a distinction between one group and another"¹⁷⁹ and finally "The polytheists of today are worse than those encountered in the early days of Islam"^{180,181}. This synthesis is a worthwhile starting point in order to comprehend what makes the extremists' view of Islam different to the majority view, and 'extreme'. In this way, what can be seen is the remaking of tradition.

It is important to consider, when dealing with any dogma or ideology, religious or otherwise that hermeneutics are necessarily based on one's experience of the world or life history with regard to one's psycho-social experience in the environment. If, for example, an individual has

¹⁷⁴ And personalised, due to the postmodern context that allows for the individual interpretation and personalization of religion as text. What follows is a turn to individual hermeneutics and the remaking of tradition. See Devi, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London: Hurst & Company. 2005; Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

¹⁷⁵ In the sense that individuals are able to identify with and locate themselves within the supranational Islamic context of the Ummah.

¹⁷⁶ The shahada, the five daily prayers, zakat or alms, the fast during Ramadan, Hajj.

¹⁷⁷ Al-Jubouri, I. 'Fundamentals, Islamists and the West'. *Philosophy Now*. July-August, 2006. p. 12.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ This includes those who supplicate saints for the singular God.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

not personalised the experiences he/she may have had of religious 'racialisation'¹⁸² and xenophobia, then it is unlikely that the individual will be attracted towards an 'extremist' interpretation of the religion. If however, an individual has personalised xenophobia and perceives his/her status in society to be in an arena of 'structural disempowerment', 'oppression' and 'victimisation', then it seems more likely that the individual will be attracted to extremist ideologies that empower the individual through notions of religious superiority. Through personalised claims of victimology and victimisation the individual may be far more likely to find meaning in such a network that empowers the individual and provides him/her with a collective duty and purpose that is perceived as morally correct and superior in enacting justice on God's behalf.

The term 'Islamism' has been circulating widely amongst theorists and in the news media to refer to the 'new' identity formations that are taking place amongst Muslims in the West and non-West. This term has been used as a blanket-term to refer to 'new' religious identity formations that appear to be problematic for the West. This is inclusive of militant and non-militant ideologies and is therefore a contested term, and I would assert, problematic. 'Radicalism' and 'extremism' refer to the propensity to violent ideologies of global jihadis. The term 'global jihadis'¹⁸³ is used to identify radical and extremist transnational movements with a propensity towards violence, such as Al Qa'eda. It is put forward that it is inaccurate to refer to 'fundamentalism' in this context, but instead, the term 'neofundamentalism'¹⁸⁴ is more accurate, as rather than a return to the past, neofundamentalists seek to redefine the fundamentals of religion in the context of contemporary society.

Throughout the course of this thesis, reference is made to the 'global jihad' that has become popularised in the global media and politics and has increasingly become a subject for analysis by such theorists as Faisal Devji and Olivier Roy¹⁸⁵. As a post-analysis to the bombings that took place in the London underground in July 2005, Ziauddin Sardar¹⁸⁶ has articulated 'Islamic'

¹⁸² See 3.1 for a discussion on the 'racialisation' of Muslims.

¹⁸³ Devji, F. Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

¹⁸⁵ See for example, Devji, F. Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst & Company. 2005; and Roy, O. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

¹⁸⁶ Sardar, Z. 'The Struggle for Islam's Soul'. New Statesman. 18th July, 2005.

<http://www.newstatesman.com/200507180004>

terrorism as being “an internal Muslim struggle within Islam” despite statements being given by community representatives stating that the violent acts have nothing to do with Islam.

I use the term ‘neo-revivalism’ which refers to the ‘new’ religious identity that attracts some second- and third-generation children of Muslim migrants to the West. It is a personalised form of religiosity located within perceived notions of an Islamic collective or ummah, which is necessarily within the wider context of Devji’s notion of the global jihad¹⁸⁷. This identity is made ‘real’ through the public identity performance¹⁸⁸, and whilst this public assertion of identity may be considered to be a political act, this does not necessitate extremism or militancy.

2.1 ‘Moderate’ Muslims and a spectrum of the perceived roles of religion in society

Although the primary focus of this thesis is to investigate how the turn to a neo-revivalist Muslim identity can be considered a form of ‘self-othering’ in the landscape of the global jihad, it must be noted that the vast majority of Muslims are ordinary citizens whose daily practice of religion is not confrontational to others or to society itself. Through this first decade of the twenty-first century, due to the very public wave of global terrorism that has had connections with Muslims, policy makers and world leaders have been appealing to the moderate Muslims to denounce radical claims made by other Muslims or Muslim groups to pressure these ‘rogue’ elements within the Muslim context. Whilst perhaps the aim of this is for Islam and the beliefs of Muslims to change and become less radical from within, the concept is not entirely realistic¹⁸⁹. It may be that the moderate majority do not wish to speak out against militant or jihadi ideology as they don’t consider it to be their duty to be apologists for the religious beliefs and religious expression of a minority. It could also be that moderate Muslims do not want to be targeted themselves by those who hold extreme ideas about what an authentic Muslim is and how one should behave as they are aware that these extremists would target them as well for not being ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ enough. This could be interpreted as moderate Muslims’ support of those who see Islam as violent. One conception of ‘moderate’ Muslims, put forth by

¹⁸⁷ See Devji, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. Hurst & Company: London. 2005.

¹⁸⁸ Such as through ‘ethnic’ dress being considered as the ‘authentic’ ways in which to publicly enact one’s religious identity.

¹⁸⁹ Especially if change is sought and imposed from outside rather than organically from within the Muslim community. See Ramadan, T. *To be a European Muslim*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 1999; Ramadan, T. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2004.

Turner, is that of a 'Westphalian Islam'¹⁹⁰, which he notes is the type of Islam favoured by Western politicians due to the problematic state of Islam in Western society¹⁹¹. Turner argues that "[t]he West can accept Islam, provided it conforms to the Westphalian liberal model"¹⁹², is privatised and "acculturated"¹⁹³.

In their article, 'In Search of Moderate Muslims'¹⁹⁴, Muravchik and Szrom begin with the premise that it is moderate Muslim communities and organisations that the United States and its allies should be focussing on in the 'War on Terror'. The policy aim appears "to call forth the Muslim majority against the acts and ideology of the terrorists"¹⁹⁵. Muravchik and Szrom investigate Daniel Pipes' claim that the problem lies in radical Islam and that the solution is moderate Islam. However, the now-universal notion of the 'silent majority'¹⁹⁶ should be raised in this context, as the Muslim majority may not wish to become politically involved.

In trying to ascertain what a moderate Muslim is, Muravchik and Szrom state that because moderate implies a lesser quantity of something, does a moderate Muslim mean someone who isn't too devout? They concede that if this is the implication, "then the prospects for success will be both poor and beyond our control"¹⁹⁷. If the definition of a moderate Muslim implies that Muslims should become less devout, there may be a stronger pull towards Islam if those of faith consider the tenets and piety of their religious duties and observations to be under attack. In other words, if moderate Muslims are told that they can't be that religious, most likely they will consider that their faith is being attacked and inadvertently become stronger proponents against this particular intolerance.

To counter this interpretation of what it means to be moderate (as opposed to being an extremist), Muravchik and Szrom assert that the primary focus should be on "the acceptance or

¹⁹⁰ See Chapter 1.1 for a brief explanation on the Treaty of Westphalia that led to the separation of Church and State in Europe.

¹⁹¹ Turner, B. S. 'Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 97, No. 3. July 2007. p. 409.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Muravchik, J. and Szrom, C. 'In Search of Moderate Muslims'. *Commentary*. 2008. pp 26-34.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ The first time this notion was used was by US President Richard Nixon in his address to the nation on the war on Vietnam on 3rd November 1969. See www.watergate.info/nixon/silent-majority-speech-1969.shtml

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

rejection of pluralism"¹⁹⁸, as this encourages tolerance. In Muravchik and Szrom's view however, the "fierce"¹⁹⁹ fundamentals of Islam "insists that the world in its entirety must come to acknowledge Allah and the teachings of his unique messenger."²⁰⁰ They also assert that there are contrary passages in the Qur'an to the 'state of war' or jihad that is implied and that the aim of a global conversion is similar amongst Christians and Jews. However, without delving too deeply into theological issues within Islam, it is not a balanced assertion to assume that this "fierce"²⁰¹ ideal of conversion is a fundamental teaching and message that every Muslim abides by or agrees with. This however, leads to their point about tolerance and pluralism being achieved through moderate Muslims.

Bokhari, who once professed to an 'Islamist' ideology which he has now denounced²⁰², has identified four groups of moderate Muslims²⁰³. The first are citizens in Muslim countries who are religious but not in the political sense. They are considered to be a silent majority for whom faith is significant in their daily lives. They generally do not participate in or support violence in the name of religion.

Second, are moderate regimes such as Jordan and Egypt²⁰⁴ who align themselves with the West on some levels. However, moderate regimes are likely to deny political freedoms to their citizens. So, although these regimes may be moderate, it is not clear in which direction the general population of the country align themselves. Moderate regimes may appear to be politically moderate but it does not necessarily follow that there is no underground dissent amongst the citizenship.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Although Kamran Bokhari signed a document (with many other notable scholars of Islam) on the 9th of September 2002, rejecting terrorism and Islamism following the attacks on the 11th of September, 2001 (see http://www.islam-democracy.org/terrorism_statement.asp) his position as a Senior Analyst of Strategic forecasting for a private U.S. intelligence firm (see <http://www.post-islamist.info/>) has been questioned by other scholars of Islam such as Daniel Pipes <http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:aj2DFMI2-kcj:www.danielpipes.org/article/1650+statement+by+kamran+bokhari+denouncing+islamism&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4>. Bokhari's reasons for severing ties with al-Muhajiroun (which has been linked to Al Qa'eda) are unclear.

²⁰³ Muravchik, J. and Szrom, C. 'In Search of Moderate Muslims'. Commentary. 2008. p. 27.

²⁰⁴ Which may be compared to Iran which is a theocracy and can be conceived of as being anti-Western.

Third, are secular liberals who are sympathetic to the cultural and political stance and values of the West. They however are minorities within their own countries. The Middle East region has a history of secular and even anti-religious post-colonial ideologies²⁰⁵. However, by not giving priority to religion through separating religious and political ideologies with the aim of modernisation, it does seem as though there has been a post-colonial backlash. Ataturk's Turkey is an example of this. Modernisation was sought by radically secularising the country to the detriment of peoples' religious freedoms. If a country moves in a direction that the majority of the population are not prepared for, it seems inevitable that there will come a time when a balance will have to be struck between religious freedoms and secularism.

Finally, in Bokhari's analysis are moderate Islamists who have 'reformed' from violence and extreme religio-political ideologies. The claim of these moderates is to strive for political recognition that is not exclusive or dogmatic. Their aim appears to be the formation of a religio-political party such as democratic Christian parties in the West.

Most change can be made with the secular liberals and moderate 'Islamists', according to Muravchik and Szrom and there are six basic questions that have been formed by Muravchik and Szrom to be taken into account when considering any 'moderate' Muslim group²⁰⁶. The first is whether it both espouses democracy and practices democracy within its own structures. In considering this question, democracy should be defined. Is a Western democracy implied, or is the Islamic conception of the consensus of the ulama acceptable? Their second question is whether the group eschews violence in pursuit of its goals? Violence can be considered as having a universalistic understanding, so this question would not be problematic. Muravchik and Szrom's third question is whether the group condemns terrorism. Again, the term needs to be defined as the definition of 'terrorism' is relative. For example, Hamas in Palestine was elected, but the ways in which the group carries out its goals can be considered problematic. Their fourth question is, does it advocate equal rights for minorities? The notion of equal rights can be considered as universal, but may be dependent on legalistic conceptions²⁰⁷. Fifth

²⁰⁵ Such as, Baathism, pan-Arab Nasserism and Arab socialism.

²⁰⁶ Muravchik, J. and Szrom, C. 2008. 'In Search of Moderate Muslims'. Commentary. pp. 33-34.

²⁰⁷ A parallel to with regard to minority rights can be seen in Germany where from the 1960s (when a sizeable number of 'guest workers' entered Germany), to the end of 1999, children born to foreign nationals in Germany were not automatically entitled to German citizenship. Only since the 1st January 2000 have children born to foreign nationals been granted citizenship rights, although this is still conditional and the preceding generations

is whether the group advocates equal rights for women. Again the legal system should be considered, such as whether the country has Shari'ah law, and if so, what legalistic school it positions itself with. For example, in the Jafari school of law, which is Shi'a, the inheritance law is more favourable to women than the Sunni sects. The final question proposed by Muravchik and Szrom is, does the group accept a pluralism of interpretations within Islam? This is dependent on the Islamic school of thought. Most strands can be considered to be exclusive, whilst the Hanafi school, which is the school of jurisprudence most widely recognised in Pakistan, is more inclusive²⁰⁸.

In order to discuss the place of religion amongst Muslims worldwide, I will use Abdullah Saeed's preliminary classification as a starting point²⁰⁹. There are difficulties in attempting to assess the different groups and sects within a religion, especially one as diverse as Islam in which there is no singular authority on the religion. Normally, classifications of Muslims are based on several areas such as: religio-political differences (often referring to religious authority and lineage after Prophet Muhammad's death), legal differences regarding fiqh and Shari'ah law, theological and spiritual differences and the emphases on rationalism, traditionalism and modernism²¹⁰. There have been more recent classifications such as: 'Islamists', radicals, militants, extremists and moderates. Based on the areas referred to above, Saeed has classified eight different trends concerning Muslims in the contemporary world. The first of these are the legal traditionalists whose primary concern is with maintaining and implementing the laws of the classical legal schools or madhhab. They reject reform and are traditionalists who follow their legal school in an uncritical manner (taqlid). Saeed's second classification is of Theological Puritans, their focus, as the name suggests, is primarily on theological issues, for example, "correct belief"²¹¹ and their aim is the purification of society from customs and practices they consider to be un-Islamic. They are literalists who dislike what they consider to be Saint-worship by Sufis and consider these practices to be against the teachings of Islam that requires no intermediary between God and people. Although they disagree about how jihad should be

are still not citizens. See

www.london.diplo.de/Vertretung/london/en/06/other_legal_matters/Reform_Germanys_citezenship_seite.html

²⁰⁸ It can be asserted that it is Wahhabi Islam, as practiced in Saudi Arabia that is the most intolerant to plurality within Islam, due to the literalist textual interpretations.

²⁰⁹ Saeed, A. 'Trends in Contemporary Islam: A Preliminary Attempt at a Classification'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 97, No. 3. July 2007. p. 395.

²¹⁰ Ibid. p. 396.

²¹¹ Ibid. pp. 397-8.

undertaken, they have revived the notion of jihad. According to Saeed, they also seek “some form of “separation” between Muslims and non-Muslims” because they consider this association “harmful to the Muslim’s beliefs, behaviour and outlook.”²¹² They are also referred to as Salafis and follow the teachings of Abd al-Wahhab²¹³.

A third trend that Saeed looks at is the most significant to this thesis, that of Militant Extremists. The issues involved with this classification are those of national liberation struggles and anti-Western sentiment following global encounters in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Militant Extremists have “...a particular understanding of jihad whose theater is global and [are motivated] by a belief that less resourceful people can defeat a powerful enemy using terror as a tool to achieve specific objectives.”²¹⁴ Osama bin Laden can be placed within this trend due to his anti-Western and more specifically anti-American rhetoric and actions. Those holding such an anti-Western stance, such as Al Qa’eda, have been deemed responsible²¹⁵ for the events of ‘9/11’ and other violent acts that have taken place in Western and Muslim countries through a global network of extremists. The dominant worldview of militant extremists appears to primarily be one of injustice stemming from the time of the Crusades to colonialism and through “to post-colonial domination of Muslims by the “Christian” West”²¹⁶. Other sites of outrage are the Israel-Palestine conflict and more recently, a backlash to the perceived American and Western occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Saeed, “This view includes a belief that the West is committed to the domination and subjugation of Muslims, the ‘stealing’ of Muslim lands and resources and the economic, military and political control of Muslims to prevent any challenge to this domination.”²¹⁷ This view is suspicious and critical of the West and perceives the West as opposed to Islam. Proponents of this view, such as Al-Qa’eda, would also be opposed to Muslims whom they feel to be collaborating with the West against Islam. jihad is a global objective and bin Laden’s

²¹² Ibid, p. 398.

²¹³ Wahhab founded the pattern of Islam that is common in Saudi Arabia. The Qur’an and Hadith (through which the practices and sayings of the Prophet, or Sunnah were written down) are taken as fundamental texts of the Wahabis and are interpreted literally. They consider their interpretations as authoritative, and practices such as Saint-worship by Sufis or Shi’a visiting the tombs of Imams are considered shirk, meaning idolatry or worshipping something that is not God. Wahabism has no space for plurality within Islam. They follow the Hanbali school of jurisprudence and Salafis are related to this type of Wahabi Islam.

²¹⁴ Saeed, A. Ibid. p. 399.

²¹⁵ Following ‘9/11’, the United States made the claim that Al Qa’eda was responsible, which they did not deny. The ‘terrorists’ involved all had links to Al Qa’eda.

²¹⁶ Saeed, A. Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

agenda is espoused by advocates of the same worldview who state that it is the individual duty of all Muslims to fight against the Western oppressors in order to liberate their lands²¹⁸.

Saeed's fourth trend is the Political Islamists. The emphasis of this group is on an Islamic society with a focus on 'Islamic' values in all socio-political terms. There is a theoretical rejection of "...modern ideologies of nationalism, secularism and communism."²¹⁹ 'Westernization' is also rejected. Societal reform and change are sought not through violence, as with Militant Extremists, but at a grassroots level, through education. The goal is a reactionary one to the effects of Colonialism. They consider Islam to have been marginalised during the colonial period²²⁰ and the aim is to bring Islam back into the forefront of society by challenging religious and state authorities from within. The Muslim Brotherhood²²¹ of Egypt and Jamaat-I Islami²²² of Pakistan are groups associated with these ideologies²²³.

Secular Liberals²²⁴ are Saeed's fifth classification of the trends in contemporary Islam. They are in favour of a democratically organised state. The focus of this group with regard to faith, is that faith is an individual matter and is confined to a private relationship between the individual and God. Faith is viewed in terms of personal belief, no need is seen for an Islamic State or any State involvement in religion. Instead, Secular Liberals wish for religion to be separated from the control of the state and value freedom of religion for those of all religions. They are not in favour of religious symbols²²⁵. In this classification, Islam is largely confined to the private sphere of society.

The focus of Cultural Nominalists, Saeed's sixth classification, as the name suggests, is on culture, not religion. Cultural Nominalists may describe themselves as "culturally Muslim"²²⁶, meaning that being a Muslim does not necessarily imply religious practice (or even necessarily

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Such as "man-made law" replacing Islamic law.

²²¹ They seek to re-establish an Islamic 'empire' and advocate social justice through an Islamic government based on the Qur'an and Sunnah (practices and words of the Prophet).

²²² They are advocates of social justice in the form of an Islamic government in Pakistan, through which God is sovereign expressed through Shari'ah law.

²²³ Saeed, A. Ibid. pp. 399-400.

²²⁴ Ibid. p. 400.

²²⁵ Such as the hijab.

²²⁶ Ibid. pp. 400-401.

belief). They are Muslim through descent. According to Saeed, Cultural Nominalists represent "...a very large number of Muslims today."²²⁷

Classical Modernists are reformists who focus on legal and theological issues. They are strong proponents of *ijtihad*²²⁸ (a concept internal to Islam that focuses on analogical reasoning). The aim of Classical Modernists is to continue in the line of the eighteenth and nineteenth century reformist movement within Islam. The goal is to remain "faithful to the basics of Islam"²²⁹, whilst reforming certain aspects to adapt to changing society and modernity. The emphasis is on rationalism, reason and reappraisal whilst keeping with the traditions of revelation. Accordingly, it is thought that "social change must be reflected in Islamic law"²³⁰. Classical Modernists are opposed to certain Sufi practices and religious syncretism as they consider them to be "deviations"²³¹. Rather, change can be made through scientific knowledge and by reforming the Islamic education system.

The final classification that Saeed describes are the Progressive *Ijtihadis*. They are closely related to the Classical Modernists, however their primary focus is on reforming Islamic law to relate to contemporary society. The aim is to focus on "core Islamic values of justice ('adl)²³² and "goodness and beauty (ihsan)"²³³. The goal is to focus on these core values inherent to Islam and engage with other core values relevant to Human Rights discourse (such as religious pluralism, social justice and gender equality) in order to strive towards "a universal notion of justice"²³⁴. Progressive *Ijtihadis* accommodate pluralism and align themselves with the compassionate and rationalist traditions of early Islam. They seek to turn away from literalist interpretations of Islam. Notable Progressive *Ijtihadis* are Muslim feminists such as Fatema

²²⁷ Ibid. p. 401.

²²⁸ *Ijtihad* seeks independent interpretation of law and is the opposite of the concept of *taqlid* or imitation. *Ijtihad* is associated more with the Jafari (Shi'a) school of law than with Sunni schools.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid

²³³ Ibid

²³⁴ Ibid.

Mernissi²³⁵ and those that seek full participation of Muslims in the West such as Tariq Ramadan²³⁶.

2.2 Religious extremism, neofundamentalism and the global *jihad*

The secularism thesis was an idea put forward by sociologists who proposed that as society became increasingly modernised and rooted in science there would no longer be a need for religion to provide meaning and certainty. Whilst this arose out of the Western Enlightenment context, secular ideologies were not exclusive to this part of the world as colonial and post-colonial histories have shown²³⁷. In fact, according to Vakil, there was a shift in ideological thought stemming from disenchantment with the secular pan-Arab defeat in 1967. Pan-Arab nationalism was challenged by Israel, and "...a journey...has taken hold in the minds of many young Arab men...a call to cleanse...[and] to fight..evil"²³⁸. The imported nationalist ideology was replaced by a home-grown vision for a pure Islamic state by some in the region. The goal was to de-stabilise traditional autocrats and thus, according to Gerges²³⁹, "The key to understanding the jihadist journey is politics, not religion"²⁴⁰. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 gave hope to many in achieving the ideal of an Islamic State and changing the current social and political order, although of course the revolution that took place in Iran was rooted in Shi'a rather than Sunni Islam. The realisation of an Islamic State however proved to be an arduous task and the focus shifted to Mujahaddin fighters in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion in 1978. It is during this time that the notions of anti-American rhetoric took root and the United States was deemed hypocritical in funding and employing the Mujahadeen for their purposes in the Cold War, whilst also supporting Israel and not forging out a plan for peace with Israel-Palestine²⁴¹. Also the United States' support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988 was further considered an act of hypocrisy. Militancy also expanded in

²³⁵ Fatema Mernissi is a Moroccan sociologist and Muslim feminist who is concerned with women's roles in Islam. See <http://www.mernissi.net/index.html> for a list of publications.

²³⁶ Tariq Ramadan is a Muslim theologian who advocates for the notions of European and Western Muslims. He seeks an Islam culturally rooted in these contexts. See Chapter 3.3 for a discussion of Ramadan and Western Muslims.

²³⁷ For example many post-colonial societies still have legal constitutions that are founded and comprised in both secular and religious terms, such as Egypt and Pakistan.

²³⁸ Vakil, S. 'Journey of a Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy'. Middle East Policy. Vol. 13, Issue 3. Fall 2006. p. 175.

²³⁹ Author of: Journey of a Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy. Orlando: Harcourt. 2006. (Cited in Vakil, S. Ibid.)

²⁴⁰ Gerges, F. Journey of a Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy. Orlando: Harcourt. 2006. p. 11. (Cited in Vakil, S. Ibid. p. 176.)

²⁴¹ Vakil, S. Ibid. pp. 176-7.

reaction to the targeting of 'Islamists'²⁴² in the 1990s. Between 1999 and 2005 there was a division amongst jihadis and many chose not to follow the path of bin Laden, as it was deemed counterproductive and instead chose a non-violent approach to the ideal of an Islamic state.

The attacks on '9/11' however grouped all involved in the 'Islamist' movement²⁴³ into "...a global battle with the United States"²⁴⁴. Thus, considering the historical context, the "war between..[Al Qa'eda and the United States]..broke out in the early 1990s, not on September 11, 2001"²⁴⁵. The events of '9/11' acted as a catalyst not only for a confrontation between the United States, the United States-led Coalition forces and Al Qa'eda, but also for the future of political Islam. As Vakil asserts, after '9/11', what ensued "within the umma was a civil war for the soul of the community"²⁴⁶. In this way, Afghanistan and Iraq have become linked to each other, and linked also to the Israel-Palestine conflict in the ongoing struggle against the West. The differences of opposing Muslims groups have become concealed through uniting against a common enemy. Iraq has become a physical site for Al Qa'eda to locate itself in and has provided a venue²⁴⁷ that is given global attention through the media. Vakil states that "Political change is often sparked by extremism"²⁴⁸ and whilst some jihadis do seek political change through militancy, there are those who do seek an Islamic state but do not agree with the direction of violence, but instead choose moderation. Whilst this may not appear to be the case, according to Gerges, once political gains are made (such as through Turkey's Islamic Justice and Development party Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in Palestine), these signs of political progress signify the potential for "...warriors of God...to reassess their old ways...[revealing] a new course, one committed not to violent revolution but to political persuasion and *dawa* or religious calling."²⁴⁹

Through this historical context, the emergent roots of a political Muslim ideology begin to take form. Whilst political Islam is historically rooted in Muslim countries, it can be argued that the potential attractiveness of these ideologies to second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims in

²⁴² This term refers to those seeking an Islamic state.

²⁴³ 'Islamist' movement in this context is used to refer to those who seek the ideal of an Islamic State.

²⁴⁴ Vakil, S. 'Journey of a Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy'. Middle East Policy. Vol. 13, Issue 3. Fall 2006. p. 177.

²⁴⁵ Gerges, F. Ibid. p. 228. (Cited in Vakil, S. Ibid.).

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 178.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Gerges, F. Ibid. (Cited in Vakil, S. Ibid.).

the West lies not in an inherent incompatibility between Islam and the West, but instead lies in a failure to balance multiple identities satisfactorily to both the Western context (that is, the general perception of Islam in the West), and to diaspora Muslim youth in the context of their localised experiences of Islam (this being their immediate experience of Islam transmitted through the practices of their parents and the wider localised Muslim community).

This thesis is mainly focussed within the context of the West as it looks at changing religiosity amongst second- and third-generation Muslims in the West. So whilst it would be worthwhile to include the historical shifts in Muslim countries relating to fiqh and Sharia law and secularism, a thorough analysis of these issues is not within the scope of this thesis. However, this brief historical background is relevant to understanding political motivations of global jihadis existing as a global network of individuals in both the non-West and West.

The post-secular turn has also been discussed in Chapter one with regard to the individualisation of religion and whilst Church participation is in decline in Europe²⁵⁰, this is not to say that people are no longer religious, it is their relationship to religion that has changed, and how people express their religious identity that has shifted.

However, what has been of note, especially with regard to Europe, is the tradition, cultural and religious (Christian) heritage that forms some form of national identity²⁵¹. Wharton²⁵² asserts that not only has Islam and Islamic identity become problematic to European society due to its continuation in the public sphere, but Christianity and in particular Europe's Christian heritage and collective identity is also problematic to the contemporary landscape. These issues however have so far been by-passed by the visibility of problematic Islam through media coverage of Islamic radicalism and terrorism. However, the Christian heritage will become more significant, especially through European Union expansion, as Eastern Europe has traditionally been more religious and Western Europe more secular.

²⁵⁰ See Davie, G. *Religion in Modern Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000.

²⁵¹ See Amin, A. 'Multi-ethnicity and the Idea of Europe'. *Theory, Culture and Society*. Vol. 21, No. 2. 2004. pp. 1-24.

²⁵² Wharton, B. 'Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam'. *Global Change, Peace & Security*. Vol. 20, No.1. 2008. pp. 41-58.

A further significant issue in Europe concerning Islam is that of Turkey being accepted into the European Union (EU). There has been much discussion surrounding this issue, of whether a country that has a Muslim majority is 'European enough' to be part of the EU. Wharton's discussion relating to crises of identity in Europe and European Islam puts forth the notion that social and cultural dislocation of Muslims in Europe is set within the context "...of an increasingly vague and ill-defined European socio-cultural identity"²⁵³. This relates also to Asad's notion of the importance of a "civilisational essence"²⁵⁴ that underlies a European collective identity. As Europe becomes more integrated, multi-ethnic and diverse in terms of national, ethnic and religious heritage of individuals, a new form of collective identity has to be formed. Discussing the new Constitution for Europe²⁵⁵, Amin relates that the commonalities being formed are those of the 'old Europe' such as, through: "...heritage and tradition...a perennial idea of European belonging based around myths of origin such as humanism, respect for Reason and (Christian) charity and mutuality."²⁵⁶ These notions do not necessarily reflect the 'new' Europe that is multi-ethnic, inclusive of hybrid and transnational diaspora identities and cosmopolitan in scope.

According to Asad, in order to understand the place of Islam in Europe, it is important to first consider the conceptualisation of Europe by Europeans. Asad argues that, if ideologies of Europe and Islam appear incompatible, "...this has less to do with the "absolutist Faith" of Muslims living in a secular environment and more with European notions of "culture" and "civilization and "the secular state," "majority," and "minority."²⁵⁷ Thus, to include 'the other' or 'them', it seems apparent that what has to be looked at first is who is 'the self', and what is meant by 'us'²⁵⁸. This is an important issue for all Western countries with multi-ethnic migrant populations. An inclusive national and collective identity that is cosmopolitan in scope has to be formed in order to integrate 'others' into this national collective rather than be displaced by

²⁵³ Wharton, B. 'Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam'. *Global Change, Peace & Security*. Vol. 20, No.1. 2008. p. 41.

²⁵⁴ Asad, T. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2003. p. 168.

²⁵⁵ This EU Constitution that Asad refers to was established in 2004 and sets out the foundations for European institutions and treaties. See the Treaty for establish a new constitution in Europe: <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML>

²⁵⁶ Amin, A. 'Multi-ethnicity and the Idea of Europe'. *Theory, Culture and Society*. Vol. 21, No. 2. 2004. p. 1.

²⁵⁷ Asad, T. *Ibid*. p. 159.

²⁵⁸ See also Colermajer, D. 'If Islam is our other, who are we?' *Australian Journal of Social Issues*. Vol. 42, Issue 1. pp. 103-125 for a discussion of essentialising Islam through 'culture talk', that is, perceiving Islam as ahistorical, unchanging and the fear of visible Muslim identities displayed through the hijab.

it. Thus, a clarification of collective identity is paramount for the inclusion of individual identities and it is important to consider whether this can be achieved from the top-down, or whether a grassroots initiative would be more sustainable. There is a tension of collective and individual identity formations as the locus of identity in historical²⁵⁹ terms in the West focuses more on the individual than the collective. This leads to the 'othering' of those with a more continuing collective identity focus and formation and thus the collective 'other' may appear radical, simply through the notion of a religiously located multicollective identity that portrays a different locus of authority. Accordingly there may be a ghettoisation on all sides and not only are Muslim minorities peripheralised according to their physical location, in the sense that they may feel security in a common heritage by living in close proximity to other minorities²⁶⁰, but this ghettoisation may also work inversely where ethnic Europeans may also take comfort in living close to the majority like themselves rather than with 'others'. A cosmopolitan world-view that recognises hybrid and syncretic identities that move away from simply essentialising 'others' in religious terms would be valuable through which "...everyone may live as a minority among minorities"²⁶¹.

A deradicalisation programme is recently being established in the UK to attempt to de-radicalise those who may be susceptible to or have already joined the jihad²⁶². This process includes encouraging individuals to feel more valued and confronting particular myths and stereotypes that may have led to their radicalisation. A profile has been established of vulnerable individuals. This includes individuals "who have experienced trauma through migration or asylum; those who have gone through a personal crisis such as divorce, family estrangement or time spent in prison; and those frustrated by having a job way below their perceived skills or education"²⁶³. Criminal activity and the perception of foreign policy objectives, discrimination and counterterrorism measures can also be contributing factors according to counterterrorism experts²⁶⁴. It is interesting to note that understanding of religion

²⁵⁹ Through detraditionalisation, the break-down of traditional authorities and through the focus on the nuclear family rather than extended kinship networks.

²⁶⁰ Of course, socio-economic factors are relevant here.

²⁶¹ Asad, T. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2003. p. 180.

²⁶² Travis, A. 'New plan to tackle violent extremism: Mentors to be drafted in to help reverse the process of radicalisation'. *The Guardian*. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jun/03/uksecurity.islam> 3rd June, 2008.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

is encouraged in instances where theology is utilised to espouse and justify extremist rhetoric. The government has official support of the Radical Middle Way website²⁶⁵ which is a forum through which Muslim clerics²⁶⁶ are able to answer questions from the public and many issues are dealt with such as, 'mercy and compassion, citizenship, social justice'²⁶⁷ along with what it means to be a Muslim in the twenty first century. This is reflective of a self-critique by Muslims and in this case of forging a 'new'²⁶⁸ British Muslims identity. It is significant to note that the website has the term 'radical' in its title, perhaps to attract those that are becoming radicalised or are attracted to those type of ideologies.

As 'Islamic' doctrines have been used to justify the actions of the global militant acts, it seems reasonable to assert that the religious context of these militants be taken into account. Sardar proposes that although these acts are reprehensible to the vast majority of Muslims who emphasise the message of peace within the religious tradition, other aspects of Islamic history and tradition must also be taken into account in trying to understand and explain the actions of these few militants, as neo-Kharjites²⁶⁹. Although this analysis is valid to contextualise the basis of 'fundamentalist' forms of Islam, the 'global jihad' and revivalist Islam can be said to have emerged out of a broader global context.

Global networks such as Al Qa'eda may have as their basis historical, national and political struggles but the genealogy of the global jihad does not necessitate commonalities in "geography, language or religious and political tradition"²⁷⁰. Social theorists such as Olivier Roy²⁷¹, Faisal Devji²⁷², John Gray²⁷³ and Bassam Tibi²⁷⁴ instead put forward that the

²⁶⁵ <http://www.radicalmiddleway.co.uk/>

²⁶⁶ This is reflective of the utilisation of technology by Muslim revivalists who seek ways that are appropriate to contemporary society in forging a collective Muslim identity.

²⁶⁷ For a discussion on 'Third Way' politics that deals with issues of the centrality civil society, see Giddens, A. (ed.). *The Global Third Way Debate*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2001.

²⁶⁸ That is, an identity that is relevant to contemporary society.

²⁶⁹ Three aspects of tradition are related by Sardar: ahistoricity, tradition as monolithic and self-righteousness. See Sardar, Z. 'The Struggle for Islam's Soul'. *New Statesman*. 18th July, 2005.

<http://www.newstatesman.com/200507180004>

²⁷⁰ Devji, F. *Ibid.* p. 24.

²⁷¹ Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

²⁷² Devji, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.

²⁷³ Gray, John. *Al Qa'eda and What It Means To Be Modern*. London: Faber&Faber. 2005.

²⁷⁴ Tibi, B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the new world Disorder*. Berkley, L.A.; London: University of California Press. (1998) 2002.

hermeneutics of Islam in the context of the global jihad is that of neofundamentalism²⁷⁵. The current wave of extremist ideology involves a necessary involvement with the forces of globalisation such as through utilisation technology. In this way they are modernists rather than traditionalists. Whilst religion is utilised, the major goal appears to be a political one against Western modernity and hegemony and ironically, cultural modernity is dismissed whilst instrumental modernization is embraced²⁷⁶ through the Internet and the use of mobile phones. Thus, contemporary extremism is not simply an ideology rooted in the past lacking engagement with the modern world. Instead, neofundamentalists utilise technology, are global travellers and through this are able to engage beyond national particularities and struggles to a broader metaphysical struggle²⁷⁷. Globalisation and the global arena is incredibly important in this respect and networks such as Al Qa'eda have adapted their strategies to involve themselves in secular Western society, such as through their training encouraging drinking alcohol, womanising and shaving their beards and thus engaging in "Western decadence"²⁷⁸. Devji²⁷⁹ asserts that it is important to consider the global effects and unintended global consequences of '9/11' as this has brought Islam to the forefront of global political concerns made this type of Islam a global phenomenon. For the purposes of this thesis, the implications of this global phenomenon (of this type of militant Al Qa'eda global jihad) will be considered on the identity projects of second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims in the West.

The term 'religiosity' is used deliberately to denote the process of construction involved in individualised religious identity. Roy²⁸⁰ stresses the significance of the deterritorialisation of Islam to the new revivalist Muslim movements. It may be more accurate to suggest that rather than deterritorialisation, it is globalisation that is a catalyst for revivalist Muslim movements. This is because, through the notion of the ummah, or supranational Muslim community, Islam has necessarily always been conceived of by Muslims themselves as being extraterritorial. Globalisation of Islam, due to a significant number of Muslims living outside Muslim

²⁷⁵ Although they do not all use the same terminology, their analyses are similar. Roy (ibid.) uses the term neofundamentalism.

²⁷⁶ Tibi, B. Ibid. p. 66.

²⁷⁷ Devji, F. Ibid. p. 27.

²⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 18.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Roy, O. Ibid.

countries, is embodied in what may be referred to as the Muslim diaspora. This diaspora is reflected in and reflective of the ummah and transcends culture and ethnicity.

The move to a more individualised religious identity is coupled with a move towards a global community-oriented religious identity as well. Although this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, religiosity is stressed in relation to new conceptions of the global Muslim ummah or the transnational Islamic community. Thus there is a move towards an individualised religious identity in relation to its place in the global whole. Thus 'othering' and 'self-othering' take place first and foremost against and within the immediate family, the immediate ethno-national religious community second and third to wider mainstream society. Thus embracing a religious identity is as much a part of diaspora Muslim youth critiquing the portrayal and practice of their religion by other Muslims as it is a part of critiquing the place of religion in general or Islam in particular in the secular West and of course in the contemporary geo-political context as well. Embracing a religious identity is about discovering, asserting and claiming a sense of belonging, security and community within an increasingly fragmented and dislocated world. This situation especially relates to youth and in particular minority youth who, it can be argued, are caught between two cultures and belong fully to neither²⁸¹. Thus, this privileging of a religious identity cannot be defined as fundamentalism as that implies the desire to return to a mythical past. It does however, have aspects of this fundamentalism in the construction of a purified and authentic Islam. However, the influences of globalisation and the fact that the context is specifically from within the contemporary West suggest that this trend can be defined as a form a neo-fundamentalism²⁸² born not out of a return to tradition²⁸³, but created out of what it means to be modern²⁸⁴.

In the following chapter the situation of diaspora Muslims will be considered and the global jihadi context will be utilised to consider the notion of 'self' and 'other' and how second- and

²⁸¹ For example, the culture of their parents' generation for whom religion is not separated from ethno-national or regional identity, practice and ways of being and that of mainstream secular Western society for whom religion is viewed as a peripheral state to be contained in the private sphere. See Davie, G. *Religion in Modern Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000, for a discussion of 'unchurched Europe'.

²⁸² Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

²⁸³ See Tibi, B. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the new world Disorder*. Berkley, L.A.; London: University of California Press. (1998) 2002, for a discussion on fundamentalism as closer to modernity than traditionalist religious ideologies

²⁸⁴ Gray, John. *Al Qa'eda and What It Means To Be Modern*. London: Faber&Faber. 2005.

third-generation diaspora Muslims may position themselves in the contemporary geo-political context. At issue is how this relates to the salience of Islam and the recasting of what it means to be a Muslim in the West.

Chapter 3. Diaspora Muslims in the West: The visible recourse to religious identity and the transcendence of culture amongst second- and third-generation Muslims in the West as a form of self-othering.

This chapter examines individual and group affiliations of diaspora Muslims in the West. The reformulation of religious expression, in providing a sense of belonging and increasingly transcending other identity affiliations (such as ethnic heritage and culture), especially amongst second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims, will also be discussed. Feelings of alienation, anomie, belonging and the liminality or notion of being 'in between' the home of their first-generation parents and the society they were born into, will also be considered in the context of the essentialisation or 'racialization' of Muslims and Islam. The views of Tariq Ramadan, a notable scholar of Islam, will also be looked at regarding what it means to be European Muslim.

3.1 Othering, 'self-othering', the essentialisation of Muslim identity and 'Islamophobia'

I will engage with the binary dichotomy of 'self' and 'other'²⁸⁵ with reference to the West and Islam and vice versa. The notion 'self-other' will be related to the reconstruction by an individual or group of how the self²⁸⁶ is perceived in accordance with societal constructions. If Muslims are viewed as the 'other' in mainstream Western society, then it may follow that some Muslims may react to this essentialisation and 'self-other' themselves by creating an identity distinctive to mainstream Western culture. They may do so by asserting their identity-space²⁸⁷ through a Muslim neo-revivalism and also 'self-other' themselves to their own immediate experiences of Islam (that of their parents' generation or Islam practiced by first-generation migrants) in order to locate the self²⁸⁸ 'out there' in the wider context of the global jihad. Roy²⁸⁹ classifies the identity reconstruction of diaspora Muslims and presents tensions between five

²⁸⁵ The terms 'self' and 'other' were popularised by Edward Said's discourse on Orientalism and Occidentalism. Through Western interest in the Orient, Said's discussion follows that the Orient and Orientalism were 'created' and power relationships were considered significant. See Said, E. *Orientalism*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1985. I however, will not be using the concepts of self and other in this respect, but will refer to the dialectic between the West and Islam and Western society and Muslims.

²⁸⁶ As individual or collective.

²⁸⁷ As the self or individual is a reflexive project, 'identity-space' refers to the interaction of the self in society.

²⁸⁸ The individual.

²⁸⁹ Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004. p. 117.

layers of identity. The first layer is, the relocation of a “well-bonded solidarity group”²⁹⁰ based on ethno-national location, and the second, collective identity based on ethno-national conceptions. The third layer is a “neo-ethnic” Muslim definition exemplified through Muslim heritage and genealogy, and the fourth is Muslim identity defined exclusively on religious terms (rather than having reference to ethno-cultural or linguistic heritage). The final tension, according to Roy, exists in relation to acculturation or socialisation to the new Western location which accounts for the creation of a ‘new’ subculture. I argue that this new subculture indicates the development of the neo-revivalist Muslim identity claimed by some second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims. Whilst first-generation immigrants often experience both economic and social hardships in their attempts to find their footing within a new social and cultural context, it is the subsequent generations (in their liminal state) that may experience more cultural confusion between the home of their parents (both the physical house or home, and also the national idea of home) and the country they were born in. For whilst the new generations may consider the country they were born in as ‘home’, the real question of their identity comes about when the country they accept as home does not accept them.

To understand the situation fully in the West with regard to Muslims, the heterogeneity of Muslim communities within European nations, the United States, Canada and Australia and New Zealand should be emphasised, as should the particularities of the ‘host’²⁹¹ nations and the historical background vis-a-vis Muslims²⁹². National context, multicultural policies, notions of assimilation and integration are all significant. The ways in which religion is conceptualised within these societies is extremely significant. The approaches to interfaith issues and religious plurality are also of great importance. When dealing with religion and religious identity, it would be too narrow a focus to solely examine the theology of the particular religion without examining the roles of culture, regional and national affiliations. This is because these

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ The term ‘host’ countries will be referred to in inverted commas as it is a contentious term in that it implies a temporary state when dealing with the binary inverse ‘guest’. Immigration is not necessarily a temporary state, but a permanent one in which the new country of residence implies permanent ties through the naturalization process.

²⁹² As mentioned in chapter two, the way in which an individual can express and claim his/her Muslim identity is not monolithic. There are a range of Muslim identities based around the fundamental beliefs of Islam (expressed through its five pillars). Furthermore, the expression of these beliefs can range from secularism to neofundamentalism. Islam is a religion expressed through practice. There are diverse practices according to ethno-national context and in this way, the expressions of Islam vary for example between countries in South Asia and the Arab world.

identities and associations are inextricably linked. Religion is a lived experience and expressed in cultural terms. In contrast, neo-revivalist Islam seeks, not only a separation of culture from religion, but moves further by attempting a transcendence of culture, in order to (re)create a 'pure' and 'authentic' supranational Islam. This itself may be described as a 'modern'²⁹³ act and reflects the adaptive ability of radical Islam to contemporary times of supranational globalisation. Second- and third-generation children of Muslim migrants are coming of age in a time where technology allows the constant and continual spread of information and enables people to communicate instantaneously across time and place²⁹⁴. This dislocation of time and place creates a new space through which global jihadis are able to contribute ideologies and amend them to keep current with geopolitical changes and in accordance with responses received. A significant area to be considered is the relationship between 'host' countries and migrants. It may be argued that some second- and third-generation migrants occupy what may be described as a liminal and hybridised religio-cultural landscape through which they experience the salience of Islam both internally and externally.

The notion of the 'Diaspora' has been traditionally applied to the Jewish experience of historical displacement²⁹⁵ but has more recently been used to refer to the experience of migrant groups living outside of their traditional homelands²⁹⁶. In the course of this thesis, I will be referring not to an ethnic-based, but a religion-based diaspora, that of Muslims and the Muslim experience outside of Muslim countries. As Soysal argues, "Diaspora is the location where...background finds meaning"²⁹⁷. In this sense, the ideas that people have of their 'homeland' concerning lived, remembered and 'imagined' experiences of culture and religion are significant and continual. Although I use the term diaspora to refer to Muslims living outside of Muslim countries, I do not intend this term to suggest homogeneity because Muslims are ethnically, nationally and culturally diverse. It can be argued that because religions are dynamic and adaptive in practice across time, place and circumstance, particular

²⁹³ In opposition to the viewpoint that this type of Islam is simply a desire to return to an idealised past stripped of societal and global influences. For further discussion on the modernity of neo-revivalist Islam, see Gray, J. *Al Qa'eda and What It Means To Be Modern*. London: Faber&Faber. 2005.

²⁹⁴ This is especially possible through the engagement with technology.

²⁹⁵ See Kitaj, R.B. *First diasporist manifesto*. London: Thames and Hudson. 1989.

²⁹⁶ See Soysal, Y. N. 'Citizenship and identity: living in diasporas in post-war Europe?' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 23, No. 1. January 2000. pp 1-15.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

components of religious expression vary according to local and current context although the fundamentals may remain the same.

According to Soysal, "Diasporas form when populations disperse from their homeland to foreign lands, engage in movements between the country of origin and destination and carry out bi-directional transactions- economic, political and cultural."²⁹⁸ This assumes that the primary attachments that immigrants have are to their homelands and cultures. The primacy of this attachment is of course a contentious point as attachments vary and attachments one may feel to the country of origin and the host country are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

The Muslim diaspora in the West refers to Muslims who live in countries that are predominantly secular or have Christian roots. Although the term diaspora has been used to refer to migrants in general, it is a term that has inspired debate²⁹⁹. Soysal³⁰⁰ has discussed the usefulness of the term 'diaspora', and concluded that due to rights of citizens and human rights discourse, diaspora may not actually be the most accurate description as many migrants living in Europe (and other developed or industrialised countries) do have access to certain citizenship rights that enable them to deal with issues of culture, identity and community orientation. By utilising the concept of the diaspora, the issues that arise are those of belonging, the continual relevance of the homeland, and the notion of home as an almost-idealised and reified concept. However, the context that I am discussing relates to an inter-generational diaspora, so that over a generation, it is the children of the first-generation of migrants who have picked up this notion and idea of home³⁰¹ not necessarily as the geographical, physical space, but as the geopolitical, socio-religious 'home' through which "...personal and social meaning [is] grounded"³⁰².

Following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on the 11th of September, 2001 ('9/11'), there has been much media and geopolitical discourse on Muslims (and Islam) and their (and its) relationship to the West. This discourse has enabled Islam to be relocated from

²⁹⁸ Ibid. p 3.

²⁹⁹ See Soysal. Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ As a space through which one may feel grounded, and a space of belonging and security.

³⁰² Papastergiadis, N. *Dialogues in the Diasporas: Essays and Conversations on Cultural Identity*. London; New York: Rivers Oram Press. 1998.

its traditional locations in the Muslim world to become part of the global consciousness. "Landscapes of the jihad"³⁰³ have become part of popular culture and Islam is no longer defined by tradition or physical space³⁰⁴. Islam is now 'in' and 'of' the West. In response, there has been much anxiety of an 'Islamic threat' to the West following the aftermath of '9/11' and the changing demographic in Western countries which includes Muslims³⁰⁵, Muslim schools, mosques, traditional clothing, headscarves and beards is now seen as problematic and has been dichotomised within the framework of traditionalists and modernists³⁰⁶. This all means Islam has become salient and Manichean dualisms have surfaced between the West and Islam on both 'sides'.

One major issue relating to Muslims in Western Europe is the fact that unlike Christians and Jews, "Muslims have not had several centuries to work out the implications of their multiple allegiances in Western Europe."³⁰⁷ Considering this from the point of view of mainstream society, the multiple allegiances of Muslims have also not yet been accepted. For it is assumed that choices are binary in nature rather than cosmopolitan in scope in terms of multiple identities and affiliations within mainstream society. A further issue relating to the significance of religion to Muslims in Western Europe is that this religiosity may be regarded with suspicion, as religion itself may be considered antithetical to the secular West. Following one's religious conscience and following the law in this respect should not be considered mutually exclusive, and religious belief and practice should be taken seriously in society³⁰⁸.

With regard to theoretical formulations, diaspora Muslims in the West can be considered in terms of the sociological categories of alienation and anomie. Alienation, as put forward by Marx, originally referred to economic alienation due to the inequalities of capitalist society. However, the term has broader connotations and can also refer to culture and society. Those (individuals, communities or subcultures) who may be positioned as minorities in society due to historical convention, may feel alienated, marginalised and seen as 'other' due to their

³⁰³ Devji, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.* p. xiv.

³⁰⁵ There are 11 to 12 million Muslims in Europe. See Bayat, A. 'A Symposium on "Political Islam": When Muslims and Modernity Meet'. *Contemporary Sociology*. Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. pp. 507-11.

³⁰⁶ Bayat, *Ibid.* p. 507.

³⁰⁷ Fetzer, J.S. and Soper, J.C. *Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. p. 153.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

minority status within society. Muslims in the West, especially following '9/11', may consider themselves especially targeted as 'visible' minorities³⁰⁹ due to their faith and ethnicity. This is exemplified by racial profiling and suspicion of their intentions towards their adopted homelands in the West.

However, this situation is not new, having historical context. Most notably for Samuel Huntington, "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power."³¹⁰ Huntington continues that for Islam, the problem is the West whose people believe in the universality and superiority of their power³¹¹. Although written in 1993, Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis has re-emerged post-'9/11' as a subject of enquiry. He states that there is an inherent incompatibility between the West and Islam due to inherently opposed values and ideologies. This civilizational 'clash' has been continuing for the last fourteen hundred years through which Islam and the West (which he views as synonymous with Christianity) have each been "...the other's Other"³¹². In this way, Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis purports an inherent incompatibility between the West and Islam due to the nature of the religion of Islam itself and of the culture the religion defines.

The clash of civilizations or clash of cultures reflects a one-dimensional reductionism of a divide between the East and West and indicates a prevalence of Grand Narratives³¹³. In the current Western context with regard to second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims and to second and third migrants more generally, it would be more accurate and useful to describe the 'clash' or differences in more ways than simply traditionalism (of the 'home' country) and modernism (prevalent in the 'host' country)³¹⁴. In this way, rather than second- and third-generations being analysed as "caught between two worlds"³¹⁵, it would be more worthwhile to

³⁰⁹ See Silverstein, P.A. 'Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe'. *Annual Review of Anthropology*. Vol. 34. 2005. pp. 363-84.

³¹⁰ Huntington, S.P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. N.Y.: Simon & Schuster. 1996. p. 217.

³¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 218.

³¹² *Ibid.* p. 209.

³¹³ That were prevalent in binary constructions of modernisation theory.

³¹⁴ Ngo, B. 'Beyond "Culture Clash": Understandings of Immigrant Experiences'. *Theory into Practice*. Vol. 47, No. 1. January 2008. p. 5.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 4.

engage in the multiple affiliations and sites of belonging that individuals may engage with, such as the communal basis of the present country, past country and continual religion and religious identity in these contexts and within the generational differences. To analyse these issues clearly, it is important to gain insight and engage with research that involves cultural differences. Binary oppositions such as the tradition/modern dichotomy referring to first-generations and subsequent generations and 'home' and 'host' cultures "reifies the notion of culture"³¹⁶ and deems it to be immutable. An alternative is that identity and culture, as in Ngo's view³¹⁷ are dynamic modalities of positioning. Whilst it is worthwhile to examine intergenerational differences between conceptions of 'home', belonging, cultural and religious continuity, it is important to be aware that these are generalisations, and of course all modes of being and acting in the social world are fluid according to time, place and circumstance.

Essentialisation and Muslims

Following the Second World War, there was an influx of economically motivated immigration to the West, and to Europe especially. Whilst many South Asian Muslims moved to Britain, other countries in the West received Muslims from other ethnic origins such as North Africans in France and Turks in Germany. Initially these migrants were considered to be 'guest workers' but following family reunification in the 1970s, these economic migrants became a permanent part of the social landscape. These first-generation migrants had and have ongoing transnational ties, and according to Silverstein, there have been "...fears over the transnationality of European Muslims...and its implication for the future of national loyalty and participatory citizenship"³¹⁸. This relates to anxieties over double belonging and dual loyalties. So although there was a demand for labour in the post-WWII period this need for labour later became coupled with a growing anxiety regarding the social cohesion of the migrants with mainstream society and the national unity of nation-states³¹⁹.

What is increasingly forgotten is that Muslims as a religious group are not monolithic but are diverse in their linguistic, ethnic, national and cultural histories and backgrounds. The different ethnic origins makes for very contextually-different situations for first-generation

³¹⁶ Ibid. p. 5.

³¹⁷ Ibid. pp. 4-11.

³¹⁸ Silverstein, P.A. 'Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe. *Annual Review of Anthropology*. Vol. 34. 2005. p. 375.

³¹⁹ Ibid. p. 364.

migrants and subsequent generations. Through the salience of Islam, there has been a 'racialization' of Muslim identity and because of this, by labelling South Asians, North Africans and Turks as Muslims, "immigration problems...[have been labelled as] Islamic"³²⁰ and specific immigration issues have been overlooked. Taking Britain as an example of a multicultural country dealing with issues of migrants, Max Farrar³²¹ notes that although the term multiculturalism has been used in Britain, it has not been explicitly defined other than via the epithet "'Celebration of diversity'"³²². Discussion of multiculturalism in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s appeared to be a response to the Asian Youth Movements (AYMs) which were often ethnically and religiously diverse (including Hindus, Sikhs and Jains) and were often socialist in focus. According to Farrar, the decline of these movements in the 1980s may help to account for the rise of Salafi-ism³²³ (or a type of radical Islam) as an expression of Muslim identity. This displays the shift in focus from ethnic and cultural identity to a more religiously-oriented identity that is reflective through Islamic movements and religious groups. As individuals may be essentialised on the basis of Muslim identity, this creates and reinforces 'othering' and 'self-othering', and because of one's heritage one may be viewed as 'just like them'- the 'them' referred to of course, is dependent on the current and dominant discourse.

As noted, the notion of the Muslim 'Other' has been considered by Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations thesis³²⁴. The 'Other' is racialised and marked by essentialist differences that are irreconcilable for Western society. This reflects a reductionist and essentialist understanding of culture, civilization and religion. It is not constructive to approach these socially-defined traditions and practices in this way as this not only reifies these practices and deems them immutable and static but also discounts the significant impact of historical, social and geopolitical context on people and cultures.

³²⁰ Bayat, A. 'A Symposium on "Political Islam": When Muslims and Modernity Meet'. *Contemporary Sociology*. Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. p. 507.

³²¹ Farrar, M. 'When Alienation Turns to Nihilism: The Dilemmas Posed for Diversity Post 7/7'. *Conversations in Religion and Theology*. Vol. 4, No. 1. May 2006. pp. 98-123.

³²² *Ibid.* p. 103.

³²³ *Ibid.* p. 101. See also Malik, K. 'Born in Bradford'. *Prospect Magazine*. Issue 115. October 2005.

http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=7070

³²⁴ Huntington, S.P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. N.Y.: Simon & Schuster. 1996.

The dichotomous view of Islam and the West has been considered in relation to geopolitical shifts and shifts to the 'Realpolitik'³²⁵. After the Cold War ended, there has been a transformation in the perceived enemies of the West from Communism to militant religious ideologies³²⁶. The West had been defined in relation to the East, the West being "defined as liberal capitalism and the East as communism"³²⁷. In this way, the self-definition of the West is "...relational...and has meaning only in contrast or opposition to an East"³²⁸, or an 'other'. This relational dichotomisation is currently "...pitted against an East now embodied by Islam"³²⁹, and dichotomies relating to the new East now include oppositions such as secular/fundamentalist and tolerant/reactionary. These binary constructions are bi-directional and in this way reinforce each 'side's view of the 'other'. This relates to Said's paper on The Clash of Definitions³³⁰ through which he asserts that the creation of binary dichotomies exists on both sides of Huntington's 'civilizational divide' through oversimplification and a rhetoric of homogeneity amongst East and West and a monolithic treatment of the two³³¹.

After '9/11', the Al-Qa'eda suspects involved have been associated with acting on behalf of Islam. In particular, Osama bin Laden is supportive of the view that Islam is at war with the West. In a speech video-taped and broadcast on Al-Jazeera satellite television on the 3rd November, 2001, bin Laden states: "This war is fundamentally religious. The people of the East are Muslims. They sympathized with Muslims against the people of the West, who are the crusaders."³³² Referring to the media response following the '9/11' attacks, bin Laden further states: "This clamour is unprecedented. It conveyed the opinions of people on these events.

³²⁵ See also Rehman, J. 'Islam, "War on Terror" and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism in the Aftermath of the London Bombings'. Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 29. 2007. pp. 831-78.

³²⁶ See Qureishi, E. and Sells, M.A. 'Introduction: Constructing the Muslim Enemy'. In The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003. pp. 1-47.

³²⁷ Ibid. p. 12.

³²⁸ Ibid. My italics.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Said, E. 'The Clash of Definitions'. In The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003. pp. 68-87. 2003. [originally published 2000].

³³¹ See also, Asad, T. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2003; Wharton, B. 'Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam'. Global Change, Peace & Security. Vol. 20, No. 1. February 2008. pp. 41-58.

³³² See, 'Bin Laden rails against Crusaders and UN'. BBC News. 3rd November, 2001.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1636782.stm

People were divided into two parts. The first part supported these strikes against US tyranny, while the second denounced them.”³³³

This dualism is also reflected in U.S. President George W. Bush’s post-‘9/11’ speech on the 20th of September, 2001³³⁴ reflected (and perhaps also reinforced) a divisive atmosphere in the religio-political world by forcing nations (and in turn, individuals) to make a choice about their affiliations, loyalties and where they stand in terms of supporting the United States’ led invasions of both Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in March 2003. By stating, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”³³⁵, it is clear that a choice is being offered of either ally or enemy. This speech had implications not only for the geopolitical world, but also for individuals worldwide who made personal choices of affiliations and loyalties based on international relational conflicts.

The resulting underlying dichotomous view that is reflected on the global stage is currently one of opposition between the notion of the secular West and the expression of Islam in Western and Muslim majority counties. Whilst it may be valid to suggest that there are a minority of Muslim groups who profess to be anti-Western³³⁶ and are antagonistic to the West, it is not enough to say that this shows the incompatibility of Islamic and Western values and ideologies. These dualisms and oppositions reflect reductionism and essentialism of the ‘other’ in reducing conflict to an ‘us’ and ‘them’ scenario and discounts commonalities between universally-shared values. This polarisation can thus be regarded as a simplistic reading of historical and political contexts which discounts the contextual complexities underlying such binary polarisation.

Self-othering

‘Self-othering’ refers to the binary opposition and constructed dualism of an ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ mentality. This relates to Asad’s notion of Muslims who are ‘in’ but not ‘of’ Europe³³⁷, and

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. 20th September, 2001.
<http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:g48wIod8JHMJ:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html+Bush,+with+us+or+against+us+speech&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2>

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Such as Al Qa’eda, and those who seek an Islamic State, who are often termed ‘Islamists’.

³³⁷ Asad, T. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2003.

refers to the limitations on acceptance of the 'other' within mainstream society in that they can never be fully accepted into the mainstream society. Therefore, self-othering refers to a reactionary identity formulated around the binary conceptions of self/other. For if a group or individual is treated as 'other' by society, then they may 'self-other' by making their difference even more distinctive. This may be seen through the turn to a neo-revivalist communally-located Muslim identity by second- and third-generation migrants in the West as religion is seen as incompatible to secular society. Furthermore, these groups of diaspora Muslims may also 'self-other' to the religion of first-generation migrants and instead locate their individuated religiosity within the context of the global ummah rather than identify with their parents' expressions of religion, which they may see as too steeped in culture and so not 'pure' enough. This neo-revivalist Muslim identity is reactionary and may also be more widely located within neofundamentalist and global jihadi discourse. Of course, this does not mean that by claiming a neo-revivalist religious identity, militancy necessarily follows, just that it may.

This notion of 'self-othering' which may also be considered a type of 'empowered victimisation' does not, by any means, aim or attempt to dislocate responsibility from the individual or group by presuming that they have no choice in undertaking a violent course of action. However, the value of these concepts do arise in attempting to understand and explain why and how people do what they may do. For example, they may undertake militant action against those they consider to be 'the enemy'. In a sense, grievances towards their socio-economic status in society are exploited by those with greater (meaning more far-reaching) agendas relating to the perceived incompatibilities between the West and Islam.

The 'new terrorist'

Khan³³⁸ writes of the 'new' essentialised terrorist as "...the Muslim militant who uses violence to terrorize governments and communities"³³⁹. He states the rhetoric of the 'new' terrorist, as espoused by 'Highly Influential Terrorist Literature'³⁴⁰, is invented and made believable. In this, the new terrorist is described as "...dark and evil, part real and part phantom, part human and part animal, part man and part woman, part bearded and part veiled, part strategic and part

³³⁸ Khan, L. A. 'The Essentialist Terrorist'. Washburn Law Journal. Vol. 45, No. 47. Fall 2005.

³³⁹ Ibid. p. 47.

³⁴⁰ "Highly Influential Terrorist Literature" (HITLit) are academic and popular books about terrorism and the essentialisation of Islam (written by authors such as Bernard Lewis. Khan also refers to the '9/11' report as part of the HITLit discourse.

crazy.”³⁴¹ Described as violent by nature, the new terrorist is essentialised, demonised, hates the West, Israel, democracy and freedom. Unlike conventional terrorists who utilise violence as a means to enable personal or collective goals, the new essentialised terrorist “uses violence as an end in itself”³⁴² and this violence has “little to do with any outward political or geopolitical grievances”³⁴³. This “...monster resides in sleeping cells, prays to Allah, lurks in tunnels and airports, wears a belt of explosives, and craves traveling in buses, trains, and airplanes.”³⁴⁴ Such essentialisation of the Muslim militant has propaganda implications and perpetuate inherent us/them dualisms. Furthermore, such militants are unable to be protected from torture through domestic or international policies because they are regarded as ‘unlawful combatants’ as in the Guantanamo Bay arena. This has implications for treating all human beings equally under domestic and international law³⁴⁵. Describing the ‘new’ terrorist as Muslim, who has been bestowed an inhuman status, undoubtedly has further implications for Muslim citizens living in both the West and around the world. There is a danger of creating and perpetuating such violence through ‘racial profiling’, and because of the official suspicion and rhetoric of fear of Muslims in the West. Essentialisms are employed to portray Islam as a religion that is inherently violent³⁴⁶, intolerant and incompatible with Western cultural norms and values. Resentments may build in those who view their duty is to ‘defend’ Islam, and this may then be enacted through violence.

Silverstein, an anthropologist, has reviewed the ‘racial’ genealogy categorisation of immigrants in the New Europe³⁴⁷. Multiculturalism and citizenship policies continue to address ‘Europeanization’ in ‘racial’ terms³⁴⁸ and its continued significance is reflected through debate amongst states, scholars, the media, and the migrant population. ‘Race’ is defined as “...a cultural category of difference that is contextually constructed as essential and natural”³⁴⁹

³⁴¹ Ibid. My italics.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 50. See also Rehman, J. ‘Islam, “War on Terror” and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism in the Aftermath of the London Bombings’. Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 29. 2007. pp. 831-78.

³⁴⁶ See Huntington, S.P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. N.Y.: Simon & Schuster. 1996 and Lewis, B. ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’. Atlantic Monthly. September 1990.

³⁴⁷ Silverstein, P.A. ‘Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe. Annual Review of Anthropology. Vol. 34. 2005. pp. 363-84.

³⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 377.

³⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 364. My italics.

embodied through scientific and popular perceptions of genetics. Thus 'racialization' refers to the definition of any aspect of "social personhood- including class, ethnicity, generation [and] kinship affinity"³⁵⁰ that is reduced, essentialised and treated as natural. Through this 'racialization', migrants have perpetually been considered problematic in Europe. However, according to the geopolitic, there is a shifting construction of perceptions towards migrants³⁵¹. As Islam and Muslims are prominent in the current geopolitic, it follows that through suspicions of Muslims, Muslims have "increasingly been slotted as the 'significant other' "³⁵² in Western society. The 'racialization' of the 'other' is a shifting category and is dependent on the social climate in the West. Silverstein relates "a discursive shift in Western Europe"³⁵³ from viewing the 'other' as the biologically-'racialised' individual to the culturally-entrenched 'racialised' individual. Culture in this context can perhaps also include religion³⁵⁴. Historically, immigrants to the United States from southern and eastern Europe, Slavs, Hebrews and Celts were all 'racialized' as "inbetween peoples"³⁵⁵. However, these historical 'others' have now been "whitewashed"³⁵⁶ and have assimilated into the majority culture. It can be argued that due to the physical characteristics of non-Caucasian Muslims, it is not possible for this 'whitewashing' to take place. It follows that rather than emphasising assimilation, what should be stressed instead is integration, that enables not ethnic and cultural replacement to the 'new' society, but cultural and ethnic compatibility.

Clinton Bennett³⁵⁷ presents three notions of diaspora Muslims in the West concerning Muslims as religious minorities and their association with the wider non-Muslim society. These are: assimilationist or pluralist (adaptive within society) on the left, separatist or siege syndrome (the notion of the Muslim identity as separate and distinct from mainstream society with the goal being self-determination) in the centre, and confrontational (the aim being Western conversion to Islam through politics and law as well as religion) on the right³⁵⁸. These categories are undoubtedly extremely generalised and would apply more to community

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Ibid. pp. 364-5.

³⁵² Ibid. p. 367.

³⁵³ Ibid. p. 365.

³⁵⁴ It should be noted that according to Silverstein, Ibid, class mobility is an effective form of "deracialization".

³⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 365.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Bennett is a scholar of Islam.

³⁵⁸ Bennett, C. *Muslims and Modernity: An introduction to the issues and debates*. London; New York: Continuum. 2005. p. 178.

orientations than to individual affiliations. It is significant that Bennett considers the assimilationist model to be adaptive within society, rather than the integrationist approach. Assimilation implies a cultural exchange (and perhaps even a 'cultural replacement') between the 'old' cultural roots and the 'new' culture of the host nation, whereas integration is a fluid concept that enables individuals to retain their cultural background and heritage in a pluralistic sense.

Bennett's second approach³⁵⁹ for diaspora Muslims within Western society is the middle approach that is the separatist or siege syndrome. That this classification is in the middle, implies that perhaps he views this as the middle way or way of the majority. If so, this reflects his attitude concerning how Muslims consider themselves in the Western societal context. It is problematic that rather than considering that Muslims may choose to live in close proximity to one another due to commonalities in ethno-socio-cultural (and perhaps even socio-economic) terms, he considers this as being something necessarily religious. By viewing this group as 'separatists' or of the view that they are under some type of 'siege', this denotes some type of resistance or opposition to Western society. The goal of these Muslims is also considered to be self-determination. That these Muslims may perceive their identities as Muslims to be different to the mainstream religious context does not mean that they cannot co-exist with people from other religious backgrounds. However, if the separatist model is valid, where there is a group within society with an agenda to separate from the mainstream society, this would be problematic. Therefore, it is important to take these concerns of separatism seriously because having a separatist agenda to begin with undoubtedly points to problems within the sub-sector of society. Nevertheless, as earlier mentioned, separatism, ghettoisation and polar communities are a two-way process. It could also be that the majority culture does not wish to live close to minorities.

The confrontational sector of Muslims appears to be the one most likely to tend towards 'extremism', and 'militancy'. However, the turn to militancy may also stem from both the assimilationist and separatist³⁶⁰ models in the context of the West if we utilise Bennett's

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ And therefore become confrontational.

broad classification³⁶¹. It could be that the more people and communities are forced to assimilate, (rather than integrate) and to consider their allegiances and belonging solely to their new country of residence, the more they may, at some point, question their own individual affiliations concerning such areas as ethnicity, nationhood and even religion. By encouraging new immigrants to assimilate rather than integrate, one form of identity is prioritised over another. The assimilationist approach implies that one's cultural heritage is unimportant³⁶² and because of that, inferior. A value judgement is being made when, 'to be at home', or to 'fit in' with the host culture, a migrant must forego his/her past culture and instead assimilate into the new one. This implies a binary undercurrent of old/new, good/bad, traditional/modern, us/them. Whilst integration enables one to retain one's cultural roots, assimilation implies that one must become 'just like us' or 'just like them' to be accepted by society. This is what may lead to the notion of inferior and superior cultures, rather than being accepting of the culture of one's heritage as one intrinsic part³⁶³ of an individual's being and make-up. Alternatively, integration, is a more constructive approach as it is inclusive in scope. Cultural enrichment is valued, a multiplicity of identities is accepted and in this way, it is cosmopolitan in scope. Cultural heritage may be retained and considered to be a valid part of one's identity formation, but does not necessarily solely define what an individual consists of or who an individual is.

The transnational, technologically-driven and globalised age in which we live, has made the world seem and be experienced as a smaller place. Physical barriers and the distance between countries and cultures have theoretically, and to some extent practically, broken down. Saying this however, it is apparent, especially in this first decade of the twenty-first century that issues of cultural diversity and national identity are at the forefront of most Western countries' immigration policies. Previous conceptions of multiculturalism that have assumed that immigrants would somehow integrate, or better yet, assimilate if left alone, have had to be re-examined. According to Bayat, there are three main groups of Muslim minorities in Western Europe³⁶⁴. These are: secular Muslims, second-generation Muslims³⁶⁵ and first-generation Muslim migrants. Secular Muslims are integrated, participate in society and "...try to reach out

³⁶¹ Bennett, Ibid.

³⁶² To some degree, this may be seen as a valid assertion as one is not 'culturally bound' due to one's heritage.

³⁶³ This does not imply that this is the 'essential' part, but a significant identity marker.

³⁶⁴ This formulation can be applied to all Western countries.

³⁶⁵ Which will be discussed in 3.4.

to the 'majority culture', economy, and social interaction"³⁶⁶. This group experiences frustration at not being accepted as 'fully' European. Using France as an example, Bayat asserts, "they embrace liberal democracy"³⁶⁷ and consider Islam and being a Muslim compatible to French society. A 'European Islam' is sought through textual interpretation. There is a resentment of Muslim extremism and a respect for human rights. This group possesses the necessary 'capital', in terms of education and socio-economic status, and following this it can be argued that it is their socio-economic position and education that enables these viewpoints.

The second group are first-generation migrants "who try to speak the European language, strive to hold regular jobs, and wish to live a normal life"³⁶⁸. In this way they are integrated whilst also retaining practices of their 'home' culture such as "...food, fashion, rituals, or private religious practices"³⁶⁹. However, anxiety over economic and cultural processes, according to Bayat, pushes them towards "...immediate circles"³⁷⁰, the language and religious groups, informal economic networks, and communities of friends and status groups built in the neighbourhoods or prayer halls."³⁷¹ This, feeling "at home on the margin of the mainstream"³⁷² or engaging in a "peripheral communalism"³⁷³ or 'ghettoisation' can be understood as a coping mechanism with regard to security, reassurance and feeling 'at home' with those with whom they share common interests and background.

Rather than viewing this congregation as a reversion to tradition, or as a resentment or rejection of Western modernity, culture and secular society, or something necessarily representative of Islam or Muslims in the West, this peripheral communalism can instead be seen as "a typical coping strategy that lower-class immigrants often pursue when they encounter complex foreign life-worlds"³⁷⁴. This type of coping strategy results in parallel or peripheral

³⁶⁶ See Bayat, A. 'A Symposium on "Political Islam": When Muslims and Modernity Meet'. *Contemporary Sociology*. Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. p. 508.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Such as kinship groups and people with the same ethno-national heritage.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Ibid. p. 509.

³⁷⁴ Ibid. pp. 508-9.

communities or reactionary isolationism³⁷⁵ and can be considered common amongst all migrants or expatriates in the contemporary world of transnational travel, including those that re-locate within their own countries, such as though rural-urban migration³⁷⁶. Re-locating from one country to another necessitates a reflection of self through which the self must “constantly...negotiate [and define] between home and abroad, native culture and adopted culture, or...between a here, a there, and an elsewhere.”³⁷⁷

3.2 Home and belonging: first-generation migrants

The transnational relocation from one country to another gives rise to reflexive questioning of ‘who we are’ and ‘where we belong’³⁷⁸. ‘Home’ becomes a symbolic space rather than a physical place and by travelling from the country of origin to the new country of permanent residence, “home is the sacred place from which everything else is mapped”³⁷⁹. Home is remembered, imagined, sustained and made ‘real’ through the enactment of cultural products such as dress, customs, traditions, collective memory, food, and religion. This “cultural sustainability”³⁸⁰, is continued through narratives of personal identity and notions of collective identity, and thus one’s place in the ‘new’ world is allowed to be made stable through notions of ‘who I am’ and ‘who we are’ in relation to others with the same ethno-national heritage, and also in relation to the majority culture and society. Identity “...lies at the intersection of dwelling and travelling and is a claim of continuity within discontinuity”³⁸¹. Narratives of migrants exist within the boundaries and wide spectrum of “...hostility and welcome”³⁸². When a minority group is treated as hostile to the dominant society, “...it tightens its cultural bonds to present a united

³⁷⁵ See also Wharton, B. ‘Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam’. *Global Change, Peace & Security*. Vol. 20, No. 1. February 2008. pp. 47-8, 53-4.

³⁷⁶ See Bayat, A. ‘A Symposium on “Political Islam”: When Muslims and Modernity Meet’. *Contemporary Sociology*. Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. pp. 507-11.

³⁷⁷ Minh-ha, T.T. ‘Other than myself/my other self’. In G. Robertson et al (eds.). *Travellers’ Tales: Narratives of home and displacement*. London; New York: Routledge. 1994. p. 9.

³⁷⁸ See Papastergiadis, N. *Dialogues in the Diasporas: Essays and Conversations on Cultural Identity*. London; New York: Rivers Oram Press. 1998. p.1.

³⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 2.

³⁸⁰ See Bekerman, Z. and Kopelowitz, E. ‘Cultural Education- Cultural Sustainability: Towards an Honest Dialog With and Between Communities of Particular Practice’. In Z. Bekerman and E. Kopelowitz (eds.) *Cultural Education-Cultural Sustainability: Minority, Diaspora, Indigenous, and Ethno-Religious Groups in Multicultural Societies*. New York; London: Routledge. 2008.

³⁸¹ Minh-ha, T.T. ‘Other than myself/my other self’. In G. Robertson et al (eds.). *Travellers’ Tales: Narratives of home and displacement*. London; New York: Routledge. 1994. p. 14.

³⁸² Sarap, M. ‘Home and Identity’. In G. Robertson et al (eds.). *Travellers’ Tales: Narratives of home and displacement*. London; New York: Routledge. 1994. p. 95.

front against its oppressor...[and] strength is gained by emphasizing its collective identity”³⁸³. Sarap also relates that by validating cultural identity, which includes religion, a ready-made support-system is available³⁸⁴. This accounts for “peripheral communalism”³⁸⁵, due to social and cultural dislocation from the mainstream society, through which religio-cultural identity is strengthened when there are perceptions of the diaspora group feeling “under attack”³⁸⁶.

First-generation migrants are considered by Will Herberg³⁸⁷ in his 1955 study of American Religious Sociology. Herberg traces the developments of religious communities (Protestants, Catholics and Jews) amongst the first immigrants to the United States. Several parallels can be seen between his study over fifty years ago and immigrant communities confronting religious issues in contemporary Western societies. Herberg proposed that first-generation immigrants were understandably preoccupied with economic concerns, and then sought to re-establish “the sacred symbols of community existence”³⁸⁸ (i.e. synagogues and churches). He suggests that the primary allegiance initially was provincial and regional rather than national, and thus the first churches reflected this. Through commonalities of religion, local identities were brought into question and new issues of self-identification and self-location had to be confronted³⁸⁹. In this present thesis, Herberg’s model has been expanded to both second- and third-generation migrants through the contemporary situation of Muslims, rather than just the third-generation return to religion. Questions of self-identity and self-location are continually significant, although perhaps in completely different locations and by different groups of people with different religious backgrounds (such as Muslims in the West).

Whilst first-generation immigrants may have a notion of home, belonging, culture and religion brought with them from their country of origin, their children may not necessarily have the same attachments to their parents’ country of origin. For the subsequent generations of immigrants, the space that they may feel connected with is one of liminality. They are neither

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ See Bayat, A. ‘A Symposium on “Political Islam”: When Muslims and Modernity Meet’. *Contemporary Sociology*. Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. pp. 507-11.

³⁸⁶ See Wharton, B. ‘Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam’. *Global Change, Peace & Security*. Vol. 20, No. 1. February 2008. pp. 41-58.

³⁸⁷ Herberg, W. *Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology*. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1955.

³⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 11.

³⁸⁹ Ibid. pp. 11-12.

wholly 'of' the country that their parents may feel affiliated with, and neither wholly 'of' the country they were born into. Western Muslims and especially second- and third-generation immigrants have in a sense "a double belonging" and "a double cultural capital" that is defined by both the knowledge of religion and of secular society³⁹⁰. The liminal space of second- and third-generation immigrants may create a degree of confusion and require a level of self-awareness to feel at home in both cultural worlds. Leading on from this, it is religion that may serve as a unifying bridge for some, to link the cultural and national past of their parents to their location in the present. However, just as religion may serve to unify, it may also divide. Analysis of contemporary religiosity amongst some Muslim youth in Britain and the United States (US) shows, what to many may be surprising trends for the younger generations becoming more 'religious' than their parents³⁹¹ with regard to their external public expression of religiosity. This younger generation is self-reflexive and choose to find out for itself about Islam and its compatibility with their locations in the West. This intra-generational conflict in one sense is quite unsurprising, but the way through which the conflict is being expressed, that is, through religion, is³⁹². This move however, is not so unforeseen, if we refer back to Will Herberg's 1955 thesis, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*³⁹³. In examining the generational changes experienced in religiosity by immigrants to the United States, Herberg found that whilst the second-generation of immigrants generally rejected the religion of their parents, it was the third-generation that returned to formulating a religious identity. Therefore, this shift towards religion by second- and third-generation Muslims, rather than being a shift back to religion³⁹⁴, can instead be viewed as a shift towards a neo-revivalist Muslim identity, that may be linked to Roy's conception of neofundamentalism³⁹⁵. For there has been a notable cultural shift of second- and third-generation immigrants whereby rather than identifying with national or cultural labels, religion has become the primary identity of choice amongst some Muslims throughout Europe. Herberg's model of religiosity can thus be applied to Muslims in the West,

³⁹⁰ Gole, N. 'The Islamist identity: Islam, European Public space and civility'. Eurozine. 17 August 2006. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-03-gole-en.html>

³⁹¹ See Mirza, M. 'Getting to the root of 'homegrown terrorism''. Spiked. 30 August, 2006. <http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?site/article/1572/>

³⁹² That is, if we follow the assumption that modernity implies secularism.

³⁹³ Herberg, W. *Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology*. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1955.

³⁹⁴ In the 'fundamentalist' sense of returning to a purist religion of the past.

³⁹⁵ See Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

but the contemporary experience of diaspora Muslims shows that it is the second-generations that are re-formulating their religious identities³⁹⁶.

Whilst the stereotypical image of Islam in the West³⁹⁷ may be one of the subservience of women³⁹⁸ and a lack of autonomy in both sexes, second- and third-generation immigrants in the West are expressing their individualism through religion. In this sense, it is important to note that religion has not simply disappeared, or become merely privatised in our contemporary society. The individualised freedoms to have no religion or express religion in any way has led, not to a lack or disappearance of religion, but to a change in how religion is actively expressed and perceived by both individuals and society.

Many second-generation young women are consciously wearing the hijab (the headscarf), whilst their mothers' generation may not have done so³⁹⁹. Gole⁴⁰⁰ points out that this return to a religious identity by Muslim youth in Europe is being overtly, actively, and visibly expressed through dress. Religious difference and deference for their conceptions of religion is expressed by young women through dress, wearing of the hijab or even niqab (the veil) and for men by growing beards. This visual return to religion is a notable example of the return of the religious to the public sphere, overriding the traditional Western secular split of the private and public in terms of religion. The public display and performance of religious identity is a symbolic marker of belonging to a visible community. In this way, one's religious affiliations are instantly apparent to other Muslims and non-Muslims. It appears, most notably from the 1990s onwards, that choosing to wear the hijab⁴⁰¹ appears to be a growing trend amongst young

³⁹⁶ Refer to 3.4 and 3.5 for discussion about religious identification amongst second- and third-generation British and American Muslims.

³⁹⁷ See Qureishi, E. and Sells, M.A. 'Introduction: Constructing the Muslim Enemy'. In *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003. pp. 1-47.

³⁹⁸ This relates to portrayals and perceptions of Islam. For example the headscarf may be viewed as a sign of the oppression of women. This relates to the invasion of Afghanistan after '9/11' when one of the premises for the invasion was to 'liberate' women from the Taliban. The blue burkha became symbolic of repression.

³⁹⁹ Either perhaps due to their interpretation of religious doctrine through culture, or as a way to integrate, or assimilate into the new society.

⁴⁰⁰ Gole, N. 'The Islamist identity: Islam, European public space and civility'. Eurozine. 17 August 2006. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-03-gole-en.html>

⁴⁰¹ According to R.W. Maqsood (*A Basic Dictionary of Islam*. New Delhi: Goodword Books. 2002. p. 91), hijab is translated as barrier, cover or veil and was originally referred to as a curtain put up in the houses of the Prophet Muhammad's wives for privacy. There are two types of hijab, the inner and outer hijab. Both are considered acts of modesty. The necessity of wearing the hijab is a site of contestation within the Islamic opinion and the

Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries. These second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims are choosing to wear the headscarf as a visual symbol of religious identity⁴⁰². While Western society may view the wearing of hijab as confrontational, individuals and community may see it as something that attracts respect and acts as a religious symbol to themselves. This brings in the issue of religious performance and a study was carried out by Ali⁴⁰³ on the public performance of young Muslim women displaying their "Muslimness"⁴⁰⁴ by choosing to wear the hijab or jilbab⁴⁰⁵ in the United States. His data consists of email interviews, ethnographic field research and participant observation. It should be noted that although this article was published in 2005, the data collection was carried out in 1999, almost two years before '9/11'. Following this, it would be informative to consider more recent data, especially following '9/11'. However, Ali's discussion is a good point of reference that considers the public performance and assertion of the Muslim identities of some young Muslim Americans who have chosen to wear the hijab.

Muslim women who wear the hijab or jilbab are highly visible Muslim actors in the public sector of society through their visible difference. Ali⁴⁰⁶ asserts that there has been a marked increase in the number of second-generation Muslim American women in schools and colleges who wear the hijab and jilbab. This is specifically a marker of the contemporary social landscape (as their parents' and older siblings' generations did not), and is reflective of "shifts in the American social landscape in the late 1980s and 90s"⁴⁰⁷ and portrays the salience of Islam in America. Wearing the hijab, "has suddenly become tolerable and in some ways "fashionable"⁴⁰⁸. For the purpose of his study, Ali considers religion as an ethnic identity in that it is socially constructed and "the boundaries and significance"⁴⁰⁹ of these identities "...vary over time and space"⁴¹⁰. The

commonplace of wearing the hijab is dependent on cultural context. The hijab may be considered a visual symbol of Islam in that it is perceived as a site and sight of Muslim identity.

⁴⁰² See also Humphreys, M. and Brown, A.D. 'Dress and Identity: A Turkish Case Study'. *Journal of Management Studies*. Vol. 39. pp. 927-52 for a discussion on the Turkish context.

⁴⁰³ Ali, S. 'Why Here, Why Now? Young Muslim Women Wearing Hijab'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 95, No. 4. October 2005. pp. 515-30.

⁴⁰⁴ Ali, S. *Ibid.* p. 516.

⁴⁰⁵ A full body covering.

⁴⁰⁶ Qureishi, E. and Sells, M.A. *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁷ Ali. *Ibid.* p. 515.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.* With regard to wearing the hijab as fashion statement, see also popular books such as Moavani, A. *Lipstick Jihad: A Memoir of Growing up Iranian in America and American in Iran*. 2005; and Stratton, A. *Muhajababes*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 2006.

⁴⁰⁹ Ali, S. 'Why Here, Why Now? Young Muslim Women Wearing Hijab'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 95, No. 4. October 2005. p. 516. Ali's italics.

Muslim identity in this way is “contested, fought over, constructed and reconstructed”⁴¹¹. According to the social landscape the boundaries of this group identity will be more visible and significant than at other times. As I argue in this thesis through the concept of ‘self-othering’, “how others perceive and define one has an effect upon one’s construction of identity”⁴¹². Following on from this, external definitions by others (such as ‘othering’) has implications on internal definitions of self (which could lead to ‘self-othering’). Ali argues that the performance of religious expression of the second-generation Muslims in his study is reflective of the salience for them, of their Muslim identities and the privileging of this identity-marker over their national origins⁴¹³. In comparison, an earlier survey carried out in the 1980s⁴¹⁴ on the situation in the United States reflected the abandoning of ‘ethnic’ clothing by Muslims born in the United States. In the 1990s however, there has been a visible change with regard to the hijab and although the vast majority still do not cover, there are an increasingly visible number of women who do.

Displaying religious affiliations in an active and public manner may be considered a statement of belief and identity that is normative and authoritative⁴¹⁵. Those who choose to be visibly different to the status quo (when they may already be considered to be ‘visible minorities’ with regard to skin colour, dress, language and behaviour⁴¹⁶), such as Muslim women opting to wearing the hijab in Western countries without family support, (often despite the possibility of harassment in the context of mainstream society) are either making an active statement of their identity, or in other cases are continuing their lived interpretation of religion family traditions, for example of covering their hair. As for the public display of religion in general, and with regard to this example of the hijab in particular, there is a claim of authenticity in terms of the expression of dress and of religious performance. This can be viewed in one way as being

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid. p. 517.

⁴¹⁵ Though this is not necessarily the case. It is also not always the case that those who do choose to express their religious affiliations through dress are even in fact actively choosing to do so. For some, it may be that is how they are most comfortable. They dress without thinking of actively making a statement to wider society.

⁴¹⁶ See Wharton, B. ‘Twin towers of cultural confusion? Contemporary crises of identity in Europe and European Islam’. *Global Change, Peace & Security*. Vol. 20, No. 1. February 2008. pp. 41-58; Silverstein, P.A. ‘Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe’. *Annual Review of Anthropology*. Vol. 34. 2005. pp. 363-84.

directed, both against secular public space and also, perhaps, against other Muslims. It may be perceived as a visual and 'real' way through which to display and portray that religion, and Islam, in particular should be taken seriously. However, the wearing of the hijab should not simply be considered as a confrontation to the secular society or as a political statement as there may be a genuine desire to dress according to customary norms, that are seen as 'authentic'. Thus, the law banning religious symbols in French state schools, that came into effect on the 2nd of September 2004⁴¹⁷, may be considered an affront to religious custom, tradition and authentic expression. This law is reflective of France's policy of laïcité that seeks the separation of religion from the state and has affected not only Muslims, but also Sikhs who wear the turban.

The way in which religion is being practiced and expressed in contemporary times has changed. Whilst modern life sought to move away from religion as the basis of organised life, postmodern or postsecular society has theoretically, on one level, allowed a dislocation of inherited cultural and religious affiliations. At the same time, the individuation of contemporary life has, on another level, allowed space for religion and spirituality to be re-interpreted in individualised and de-institutionalised terms⁴¹⁸. Religion in the contemporary world has become far more personalised, and the religious identity of migrant Muslims in Europe is no exception to this. In fact, according to Gole, it is proximity to modern life that has triggered the return to religious identity.⁴¹⁹ The experiences of migrants include all that is 'brought' with them from the country of origin to the new country of residence. This includes markers of identity such as culture, religion and ethnicity.

Writing in *The International Migration Review* Zimmermann et al. carried out a study on the 'Ethnic Self-Identification of First-Generation Immigrants'⁴²⁰ in Germany. The approach taken was two-dimensional in that both pre-immigration and post-immigration characteristics⁴²¹ and gender differences were considered instead of viewing attachments between the home country

⁴¹⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3619988.stm>

⁴¹⁸ See Chapter 1.

⁴¹⁹ Gole, N. 'The Islamist identity: Islam, European Public space and civility'. *Eurozine*. 17 August 2006. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-03-gole-en.html> See also Gray, J. *Al Qa'eda and What It Means To Be Modern*. Faber&Faber. 2005.

⁴²⁰ Zimmermann, L., Zimmermann, K.F. and Constant, A. 'Ethnic Self-Identification of First-Generation Immigrants'. *The International Migration Review*. Vol. 41, No. 3. Fall 2007. pp. 769-81.

⁴²¹ Such as levels of education.

and receiving countries as mutually exclusive. Ethnic self-identification is viewed by Zimmermann et al. as complex, variable and fluid. Connections, ties and attachments to the country of origin and receiving country can change over time and are therefore fluid. Whilst "...individuals can alter their feelings over time, place and surroundings"⁴²², the external imposition of ethnic identification is also significant to the migrants' ethnic self-identification. Some individual characteristics may be conspicuous, such as "one's skin colour or hair texture"⁴²³ which can lead to "racial labelling"⁴²⁴ and the status of individuals as 'visible minorities'. Thus, an individual may not consider oneself as 'other' until they are externally 'othered'. This may have implications on one's self-definition, with regard to heritage, country of origin and ethnic visibility.

Zimmermann et al.'s research was carried out in Germany where nine percent of the population are foreigners, and of that nine percent, one-third are Muslim. The research mapped out four paths of post-immigration transition. These are: assimilation, through which the country of origin is fully disengaged with, there is full adaption and identification with the new country of residence. The second path is integration, through which there are strong connections to the origin country and the new country. The third path is marginalisation which involves loose connections and a loss of associations to both the country of origin and the new country of residence. This path is considered an extreme situation. More extreme is the fourth path which is one of separation through which the country of origin is the country that is fully identified with and there is a weak link to the new country of residence.

The results of this study⁴²⁵ showed that for males and females, religiosity and education in the country of origin is not important to the integrated status in the new country. Women in general were more likely to assimilate. Education in the new country was significant for female integration, and older age negatively affected women's integration. Ethnic identification appeared more complex for women, perhaps due to the cultural expectations of home life and work life. In this study, Muslims were the exception and were less likely to self-identify as integrated than other religions surveyed. It is not clear from the study the reasons behind this,

⁴²² Zimmermann et al. Ibid. p. 769.

⁴²³ Ibid. p. 770.

⁴²⁴ Ibid. p. 773.

⁴²⁵ Ibid. pp. 778-9.

but it can be deduced that this could be due to the current salience of Islam in the West and the contested place of migrants in German society, and also due to cultural and social expectations of Muslims in their new country of residence.

Muslim migrants' experiences in the West

The focus of some Muslim groups in the West, instead of being located inwards in terms of integrating the Muslim communities, is often located 'out there' to perceived injustices occurring in the global arena. Gole notes that the displacement of the traditional Islamic authority, the ulama, has led to a new form of interpreting the Islamic texts by individual Muslims and political militants⁴²⁶. This can also be referred to as a move towards *ijtihad* or analogical reasoning employed in the interpretation of Sharia to accommodate the logical and relevant current situation. As primary interpretation and understanding of Islam in the West has been in cultural and political contexts, local, national and social bonds have been overshadowed by "imaginary bonds" between Muslims globally who may feel "socially uprooted" and may consider themselves treated unjustly by society⁴²⁷.

Whilst traditionally Muslims around the world may have been deeply divided (and still are) into religious factions, the Islam of neofundamentalists and global jihadis⁴²⁸ can in fact unite adherents from traditional Muslim contexts and countries by presenting Islam as monolithic as much to itself (with regard to rhetoric of what being and acting as a 'true Muslim' entails of) as non-Muslims may conceive of it. This type of revivalist Islam, exists as a result of the Muslim diaspora. Ethnic and cultural diversity enable unity on the level of religion as no shared history or cultural context is required other than religion. In this sense, rather than Muslims in the West being divided into for instance, Sunni, Shi'a, Ismaili, Sufi, Ahmedi, they can overcome these factions, and be theoretically united by the overarching religion of Islam. However, this is not so much a unity as a surpassing of these sectarian divisions which are considered at odds with 'true' Islam. This 'unity' may seem problematic in countries with large Muslim populations in the non-West, as they have experienced a shared cultural, religious and national history. The transnational experience may be considered a borderless or virtual state in which

⁴²⁶ Gole, N. 'The Islamist identity: Islam, European public space and civility'. Eurozine. 17 August 2006. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-03-gole-en.html> This could also be referred to as a move towards *ijtihad* or analogical reasoning within social contexts.

⁴²⁷ Gole. Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Who may aim to move beyond cultural distinctions in the hope of a globalised Islam.

physical proximity is not necessary to bind people together. Thus, due to the notion of the 'imaginary homeland' or ummah, second- and third-generation immigrants would not necessarily need to be in a Muslim-dominated environment to feel connected to Muslims in different countries of the globe. In this context, it is important to consider the type of Islam⁴²⁹ that is portrayed as normative. This leads to the views of Tariq Ramadan who seeks the formation of a European Islam⁴³⁰. That is, an Islam necessarily of Europe, that is culturally based in Europe, but organised through the unity of the singular Islam. In this way, Ramadan also appeals for a religious transcendence over culture⁴³¹.

Due to the Western or diasporic context, religious identity may become the ultimate identity that unites the group over class, economic status, educational background, language, province and sectarian status all of which are the traditional social affiliations that may serve to divide individuals and groups in a national context. In this sense, the domination of a religious identity may be referred to as a type of 'religious Marxism'⁴³². In the modern world, individuals have the choice to associate with the roles of victimisation and injustice with Muslims in the global context, especially due to communication technologies that enable hyperconnectivity. So far in the twenty-first century, in addition to the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict, associations can be made with Afghanistan and Iraq, post-'9/11'. These claims are on behalf of the disenfranchised, such as in Iraq but these can be considered to be romanticised notions because those in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan deal with issues internally. Diaspora Muslims are external to these type of conflicts. The global connectedness of Muslims can also be observed with the awareness of Muslims in non-Western countries regarding issues involving Muslims in non-Muslim countries as well⁴³³. An important example of this was the response of Muslims in both the West and non-West to Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* in 1988. As Rushdie's background is Muslim, the response by Muslims was to what was perceived as an insult to Islam and the Prophet Muhammad, by 'one of their own'. Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa against Rushdie in 1989 and Rushdie has been considered an apostate by many

⁴²⁹ See chapter 2 for an overview of perceptions of Islam by Muslims, for example, literalists, traditionalists, reformers, modernists.

⁴³⁰ See Ramadan, T. *To be a European Muslim*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 1999; Ramadan, T. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. Oxford University Press: Oxford/New York 2004.

⁴³¹ Ramadan's ideas will be discussed in greater detail in 3.3.

⁴³² In that religion is the primary identity over all other identity-markers.

⁴³³ See chapter 4 for more on importance of the media as a tool for enabling this type of discourse.

Muslims worldwide. Rushdie was recently awarded a knighthood for his contribution to literature, which has sparked criticism and protests in Pakistan and Iran⁴³⁴. For those protesting and condemning the knighthood, it is perceived as a direct and deliberate insult and attack on Islam. Once again, there are calls amongst some Muslims to assassinate Rushdie as a religious duty.

It is important to note, with regard to the issuing of a fatwa, that this is related to the Christian context of excommunication. It is a way of the community at large to make clear that dissent is not tolerated and that the behaviour and practices expressed by a particular member of the wider Muslim community is not 'sanctioned' by the 'moral guardians' of the religion. What is interesting to note is that individuals do not need to profess their Muslim heritage to be negatively targeted in this way. By someone simply being born into a Muslim family (practicing Muslim or not), a shared faith and respect of that faith is assumed. When dealing with religious extremism relating to Muslims, another issue that becomes apparent is that there is no singular authority or guardian of the faith within Islam.

Religion may fill the void of social unity and acceptance when country of origin or ethnicity is not sufficient to bond individuals to one another. Individuals may gain social solidarity from religion. If they are treated negatively in society and marginalised, it is not difficult to understand how they may choose to react and perhaps perpetuate a 'peripheral communalism'⁴³⁵. In this way, it can be understood how individuals who may not fit in to the status quo may associate with other individuals who are also different, in order to gain some degree of social acceptance. The struggle for societal acceptance into the mainstream⁴³⁶ and the assertion of identity in the public sphere is being re-shaped from ethnic to religious terms due to the salience of religion, which in this context is Islam.

⁴³⁴ http://books.guardian.co.uk/news/articles/0,,2106133,00.html#article_continue,
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article1951462.ece>

⁴³⁵ See Bayat, A. 'A Symposium on "Political Islam": When Muslims and Modernity Meet'. Contemporary Sociology. Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. pp. 507-11.

⁴³⁶ Perhaps it is this struggle that is problematic, for those who are different or minorities will never be fully accepted into the mainstream, and nor should they want to as that would dilute and take away what makes them unique. This is why we need a cosmopolitan ethic.

Whilst the current mass-media-voiced-opinion of a religion such as Islam is one of aggression and retribution⁴³⁷, it would be more constructive to assess or discuss the strengths of religion in terms of providing a moral code for individuals, rather than solely focusing on a term like jihad that has been debated by religious scholars since the beginning of Islam itself. By focusing on the negative (by mass media, right-wing politicians and individuals), how can proponents of xenophobic views expect there to be any positive change? If an individual has respect for his/her religion, regardless of his or her own personal religious practices and if the religion or its practices, that are part of their personal identity formation, are criticised (with no constructive aim), it seems logical that the individual will react defensively. The same can be said for immigrants living in Western countries. If they have been harassed purely for how they look, or if someone has reacted to them just for being the 'other', then it makes sense that, as they are being attacked for factors they have no control over, they may personalise their experiences and take control in any way that they could and associate with those with whom they feel secure. When individuals or a grouping of individuals feel that they have no control over the way they are perceived by society, it is natural to want to have some control over societal perception and reaction to them as individuals.

With regard to xenophobic or negative reactions to individuals because of their ethnicity, it is evident that a negative response will produce some degree of negative response, be it public or private in terms of actions and reactions. The ability to critique negativities experienced within society is necessary and healthy for positive change. However, critique must be relevant and non-violent⁴³⁸ and carried out through dialogue. Those who may be negatively attacked may choose to empower themselves, sometimes by becoming aggressive, and reaffirming their identity in this way. When under 'attack', the response may be, "You don't tell me who or what I am, I tell you or show you who I am". In other words, identity is what the individual perceives it to be, and is also informed by this perception, rather than solely being what others perceive it to be. In this case, when one already possesses a religious identity, the political and the religious intertwine which may result in some form of a Muslim 'liberation theology'. A new type of self-empowerment may be realised through religion, and in this context, Islam. Religion, being a

⁴³⁷ See Aly, A. 'Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media'. *Australian Journal of Social Issues*. Vol. 42, Iss. 1. Autumn 2007. pp. 27-42.

⁴³⁸ For a discussion on interfaith dialogue, see Ramadan, T. *To be a European Muslim*. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 1999; Ramadan, T. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. Oxford University Press: Oxford; New York. 2004.

global network, transcends difference and may act as a catalyst (or comfort) towards a new type of self-empowerment. Religion provides tradition and stability and offers a theological framework for interpreting why a negative response was given to a particular individual and what to offer as a response. In this way, 'self-othering' may also be looked at as a type of empowered victimisation. Associating with a religion enables the individual to focus on what binds them to other adherents, rather than focusing on ethnic divides. This of course refers to those who have the same 'authentic' view of religion.

To analyse and try to understand the plight of migrants or exiles that form, in this case, the Muslim diaspora, it is useful to employ theories of fundamental social theorists, such as Marx's idea of alienation⁴³⁹ (which is primarily economic) and societal estrangement, and Durkheim's notion of anomie⁴⁴⁰. According to Durkheim, religion lies in the collective consciousness of society itself and in this way religion is a social phenomenon reflective of societal norms⁴⁴¹. Anomie implies that there is a disjunction between means and goals, albeit in this case, economic means and goals. However, if we extend and elaborate these means in society to lead not only to economic inclusion, but to result in societal acceptance as well, migrants and exiles living in a host country would be the beneficiaries of such a system. Ramadan considers the societal acceptance of European and Western Muslims by emphasising universally-shared values.

3.3 Tariq Ramadan and Western Muslims

Tariq Ramadan is a notable figure in discussions on Islam and the West, Islam and Europe and more specifically, regarding what it means to be a European Muslim⁴⁴². The discussion of Islam in a pluralistic sense, that is, of multiple 'Islams', is one that has become prominent in the West and specifically in Europe with regard to the variety of practices and expressions that are occurring in differing ethno-national contexts⁴⁴³. Ramadan's view is that there is only one Islam and as such, emphasises the singular and universalistic nature of Islam. "There is one

⁴³⁹ Marx, K. and Engels, F. Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. (First published 1844) 1959.

⁴⁴⁰ Durkheim, E. Suicide. London; New York: Routledge. (First published 1897) 2002.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² See Ramadan, T. To be a European Muslim. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 1999.; Ramadan, T. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford University Press: Oxford; New York. 2004.

⁴⁴³ For example, a North African based Islam in France, a South Asian Islam in Britain, a Turkish Islam in Germany, according to the majority ethno-cultural demographic.

Islam, and the fundamental principles that define it are those to which all Muslims adhere, even though they may be clothed in Islamic principles, an important margin allowed for evolution, transformation and adaptation to various social and cultural environments."⁴⁴⁴

In order to describe European Islam, for Ramadan it is necessary to first turn to the fundamental principles of Islam. This will make clear "...what, in their religion, is unchangeable (thabit) from what is subject to change (mutaghayyir)"⁴⁴⁵. Ramadan is opposed to both the views that Islam and the West are incompatible and to the idea of some Muslims who say there are no commonalities between Islam and the West. In this way, he explicitly rejects us/them dualisms and othering on both 'sides'. Ramadan relates:

"This bipolar vision is widespread and gives some Muslims a sense of power, might and legitimacy in Otherness...in practice, the Muslims who maintain these theses only isolate themselves, marginalize themselves, and sometimes, by their excessive emotional, intellectual, and social isolation, even strengthen the logic of the dominant system whose power, by contrast, lies in always appearing open, pluralistic and rational."⁴⁴⁶

Bipolar visions of Islam and the West are thus not a one way process, in terms of the West considering Islam as an 'other'. Muslims living in the West may also have certain conceptions about the nature of Western society being overly permissive, and morally incompatible with religious teachings and with the teachings of Islam with regard to such things as modest dress and prohibitions on alcohol. Essentialist and reductionist viewpoints necessarily flow from one side to other, and thus it is obvious that if the West has particular conceptions of Islam and Muslims, then the opposite will also occur. This creates a situation in which each side is in danger of espousing an inherent incompatibility between the two and following that, irreconcilable and fundamental differences regarding a peaceful co-existence. Thus reactionary identities are given space to form, through which one side creates an identity in opposition to the way they are generalised by the other which puts peaceful co-existence at risk. This type of thinking leaves no space for the notion of a 'global citizenship' or a cosmopolitan worldview which attempts to move beyond essentialism by positing (that which Ramadan proposes in

⁴⁴⁴ Ramadan, T. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. Oxford University Press: Oxford; New York. 2004. p. 9.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid. For Islamic fundamentals see Al-Jabouri, Chapter 2.

⁴⁴⁶ Ramadan. Ibid. p. 5. My italics.

relation to Islam) universal shared values and truths in terms of citizenship as well as with regard to Human Rights discourse and a legalistic framework⁴⁴⁷. With regard to European Muslims, or diaspora Muslims more generally, the key areas to be emphasised in Ramadan's view⁴⁴⁸ are integration, an authentic dialogue and mutual respect⁴⁴⁹. I would also add tolerance and understanding of each side's worldviews in a holistic sense, such as through ethno-religious and cultural diversity, and historical context perhaps through an educational framework. Dialogue and dialogism⁴⁵⁰ is necessary in order to critically understand, assess and evaluate taken-for-granted notions of 'who we are' with regards to both Muslims and the West.

With regard to religion and culture, Ramadan seeks a separation between the two. He sees Islam as necessarily separate from culture due to overarching Islamic principles and states, "Islam is not a culture"⁴⁵¹. This is a contentious issue and is dependent on how Islam as a religion is defined as the religious necessarily emanates from (and continues in or continues through) some type of communal cultural context, be it in historical, socio-political or ethno-national terms. The ways in which a religion is in turn internalised and externalised by the individual, community and society is again dependent on cultural values and cultural significance. Whilst in theory Islam can be said to have no culture due to the universalistic nature and it is claimed that the religion goes beyond time and place, this is a particular faith statement, and not a statement based on how religion is practiced. As Islam is a religion that emphasises religious practice⁴⁵² and is considered a 'way of life', it seems apparent that ethno-national culture⁴⁵³ will necessarily hold some bearing regarding such areas as dissent, blasphemy, apostasy, the things that are considered haram (forbidden), halal (permitted) and makru (neither forbidden nor permitted). Theoretically, it may be said that Islam does not need

⁴⁴⁷ See Chapter 4 for a brief reference to the cosmopolitan ethic.

⁴⁴⁸ "...their [Muslims] universal principals teach them that wherever the law respects their integrity and their freedom of conscience and worship, they are at home and must consider the attainments of these societies as their own and must involve themselves, with their fellow-citizens, in making it good and better." Ramadan, T. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. Oxford University Press: Oxford; New York. 2004. p. 5. Thus, it is not simply a matter of co-existing, but of participating and contributing to the wider society that they are part of.

⁴⁴⁹ Ramadan. *Ibid*.

⁴⁵⁰ Originally formulated from the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin, dialogism refers to self-critique and self-reflection being reached through dialogue and challenges the notion of an essentialised self. See Hermans, H.J.M. 'The Dialogical Self: Toward a Theory of Personal and Cultural Positioning'. *Culture & Psychology*. Vol. 7, No. 3. September 2001. pp. 243-81.

⁴⁵¹ Ramadan, T. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2004. p. 214.

⁴⁵² In terms of the Five Pillars of Islam.

⁴⁵³ Especially in terms of the ulama or consensus of scholars.

culture to endure, if religion is considered a personal matter, if one follows the principles from the Qur'an. However, this idealistic viewpoint is difficult to put into practice when dealing with a communal setting, as the community⁴⁵⁴ may act as authoritative, in ways such as, interpreting 'the word of God' (the Qur'an) and in terms of 'correct' practice, dress, diet amongst other cultural norms⁴⁵⁵.

Therefore, it may be argued that religion is expressed through cultural norms and practices. In contrast, Ramadan considers Islam to be separate from culture due to the "central principle of tawhid"⁴⁵⁶, or faith in the unity of God, scriptural sources such as the Qur'an and Hadith and the "foundations of faith and practice"⁴⁵⁷. Islam is viewed by Ramadan to be "clothed"⁴⁵⁸ in cultural practices however. With regard to first-generation Muslim migrants to the West, he considers that they "...brought with them not only the memory of the universal principles of Islam but also, quite naturally, the way of life they followed in these countries"⁴⁵⁹. In his view, for first-generation migrants, "...to remain faithful to Islam meant...to perpetuate the customs of their countries of origin"⁴⁶⁰. For diaspora Muslims born in the West, Ramadan considers it necessary to separate Islam from the cultural practices (or lived experiences) that first-generation migrants brought with them, and instead to locate their culture not through their ethnic heritage, but within the citizenry of the 'new' or 'host' countries. For second- and third-generation Western Muslims Ramadan's argument is valid, whereas on another level, foregoing the cultural norms of first-generation migrants insinuates that cultural memory, cultural experiences, cultural heritage and lived experiences of religion (that may be enacted through culture) are not valuable modes of expression in the West and cannot be reconciled within this context.

⁴⁵⁴ Such as the supranational ummah and the ulama.

⁴⁵⁵ The term 'culture', as utilised in this thesis, refers to all things that are transmitted socially as opposed to biologically. Following this, religion can be referred to as lived experiences in social contexts. It can be proposed that religions and culture share a symbiotic relationship in that each is dependent on the other for personal meaning and social continuity.

⁴⁵⁶ Ramadan, T. Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 215.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

Although Ramadan's primary focus is on the principle of integration⁴⁶¹ into Western societies, which he considers to have been vital through the history of Islam in enabling Muslims and Islam to exist in diverse and varied cultural contexts, it appears that ethnic heritage is incompatible with these principles. Another concern for Ramadan is to assert universal commonalities between Muslim or Islamic values and legalistic and citizenship codes. He rightly relates that co-existence and harmony can be achieved by (Muslims) focusing on integration and participation in Western societies⁴⁶². It appears that Ramadan's reasoning behind the disengagement of cultural traditions is to focus on the overarching claims of Islam that bind all Muslims together in integrating and participating in the West and to accept all that is not forbidden within Islam. The transcendent claim of the purity of Islam over culture appears to be one that is gaining popularity amongst some second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims in the West.

3.4 Culture, religion, cultural dislocation and religious relocation amongst second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims

The problem with Ramadan's purist approach separating culture and religion is that a symbiotic relationship does exist between culture and religion. Religious identity exists in and from a cultural context which accounts for the vast variation of religious traditions, practices, performance and ritual of those of the same faith. In contrast, and idealistically, revivalist Islam seeks a separation of culture and ethno-regional location from the tenets and fundamentals of religion. Global jihadi organisations transcend culture in that membership is neither exclusive nor culturally- or ethnically-bound. Religious bonds are allowed to be strengthened through association and the freedom to choose to belong⁴⁶³, which can be related to Morris'⁴⁶⁴ notion of assent communities through which belonging is enabled by association.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

⁴⁶³ It can be argued that individuals have a wider freedom of association with dissenting religious community groups in the West and in the global context due to less of a fixed religious identity structure and more freedom of choice rather than belonging to a sectarian religious group solely through descent. There is also less persecution of minority religious groups compared with Muslim countries. For example, Ahmedis are declared to be non-Muslims by the Government of Pakistan.

⁴⁶⁴ Morris, P. 'Community Beyond Tradition'. In P. Heelas, S. Lash and P. Morris (eds.), *Detraditionalization: critical reflections on authority and identity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1996.

As noted, it would not be wholly inaccurate to suggest that it is the cultural dislocation of second- and third-generation immigrants that allows these groups of diaspora Muslims to be susceptible to an ideology of belonging, empowerment and action that can be found within global jihadi discourse. The degree of their susceptibility however, can perhaps be said to be dependent to a degree on their socio-economic state in society (and also on the educational background and background of their parents) and also on the historical situation of national policies towards immigrants and the treatment of culture and religion in these contexts. The social landscape is thus important. Another significant factor is their degree of association and involvement with the Muslim 'community' as a whole. That is to say, a distinction can be made between those Muslims who are not associated with 'the community'⁴⁶⁵.

The transitional and liminal nature of the second- and third-generational diaspora Muslims leaves these Muslims in a position different and unique to that of their parents' generation, in that religion and culture are two significant areas of social interaction that are instrumental to their 'identity projects'⁴⁶⁶. Ethno-religious and culturally-located beliefs, practices and norms may be a 'natural' state for first-generation immigrants who were born in a different physical location, but for Muslim youth in the West these social identity markers may be more fluid in that they are not a 'natural' state within mainstream society, although they may be so in a community setting. Often 'living' a culture at home is vastly different to the culture of mainstream society, so their ways of being have to be re-negotiated with regard to language, dress and socially acceptable and unacceptable behavioural norms and values according to the context and location they find themselves in. This negotiation of identity in the private and public realms is a situational identity⁴⁶⁷ and the presentation of self to the ethno-religiously located community norms and to mainstream society.

The negotiation of identity firstly takes place in any community that Muslim youth are associated with⁴⁶⁸ and secondly within the confines of mainstream or dominant society⁴⁶⁹.

⁴⁶⁵ Community orientation is heterogeneous and dependent on ethnic affiliations and perhaps even along religious sectarian, regional and linguistic lines. Such that it is not necessary that a Muslim from North Africa would consider a Muslim from Pakistan to be part of the same immediate community, but instead consider them as part of a wider Muslim community or Ummah.

⁴⁶⁶ See Giddens, A. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.

⁴⁶⁷ Being an emphasis on particular parts of one's identity according to situation and context.

⁴⁶⁸ Such as a wider Muslim community they may live in close proximity to.

Identity and the identity project in this way is not simply innate and static, but is a process that is constantly redefined and renegotiated according to both internal and external variables. With regard to immigrants in general and Muslim migrants in particular, the expectations of and between the 'host' society and migrants need to be clearly explicated, with regard to such things as societal integration and contribution.

Therefore, it can be said that it is the cultural dislocation of second- and third-generation immigrants that allows these groups of diaspora Muslims to be susceptible to an ideology of belonging, empowerment, action and retribution. The degree of their susceptibility can perhaps be said to be dependent on their socio-economic state in society⁴⁷⁰, educational background, the background of their parents and their own individual prospects. If they have no hope for the future, then they have nothing to lose. Through this nihilistic framework, they may have a propensity towards violence against others and themselves in joining a global jihadi organisation, especially if this group is framed within the context of martyrdom being a worthy and religiously-rewarding and religiously-rewarded⁴⁷¹ endeavour. When considering 'global jihadis', and the external jihad it is important to refer to the historical context of Dar al Harb (the House or Realm of War) and Dar al-Islam (the House or Realm of Islam)⁴⁷². These divisional categories of the world were especially significant in the Prophet Muhammad's time as armed jihad was a reaction to those who attacked Islam, or did not want Islam to exist. However, these categories are not applicable to the modern world due to the reciprocal diplomatic agreements that exist between nations⁴⁷³. Despite this, the idea of separating the world into peaceful nations and nations at war, is one that still does exist amongst those with antagonistic or extremist ideologies.

Whilst the notion of the external and global jihad or struggle does have historical context, the way in which it is now utilised by global jihadis, is not as a form of defence, but as a 'reaction'

⁴⁶⁹ Generational difference and lack of acceptance from within community. See Kibria, N. 'The 'new Islam' and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 31, No. 2. February 2008. pp. 243-66.

⁴⁷⁰ Which emphasises the differences of national context. See Kibria, *ibid* for differences in attitudes of Muslims in Britain and the United States.

⁴⁷¹ Such as the promise of Paradise.

⁴⁷² See Al Sayyid, M. 2004. 'Mixed Message: The Arab and Muslim Response to 'Terrorism''. In Gus Martin (ed.) *The New Era of Terrorism: Selected Readings*. Sage: California, London, New Delhi. 2004. pp. 144-5.

⁴⁷³ Diplomatic agreements signify that another country is part of Dar al-'ahd (the House or realm of commitment).

to perceived injustices, perpetrated by the West on Muslim countries⁴⁷⁴. The external and global jihad whilst on one level encompasses ideologies of hatred of freedoms⁴⁷⁵ on another, it may be considered a defensive stance, a retribution for perceived injustices against Muslims in a Western-dominated world. In this way, by engaging with global jihadi discourse and privileging Muslim as the declared identity is a progressive expression of religion rather than simply an attempt to recreate an idealised past of the ancestors of Islam. This neo-revivalism is neofundamentalist and is specifically and necessarily located in the present late modern age.

It is important to understand that the external jihad or struggle is stressed by global jihadis over the internal jihad. The internal jihad is conceptualised around the notion of an internal spiritual struggle. Of course, the ways in which Muslims conceive of these terms is dependent on their specific hermeneutics. Sufi Islam stresses the internal spiritual struggle over the external physical battle and in this context, an interesting point to consider is why there is a move towards the external rather than internal jihad. Why isn't there a move amongst an extremist minority of youth towards a peaceful form of Islam, such as Sufi practices that embrace all religions? Sufi Islam also has multiple leaders but perhaps this is too steeped in national and cultural traditions rather than the transcendence of them as with revivalist Islam. The move towards the global jihadi Islam also suggests that those attracted to it are attracted to the violence of it juxtaposed against a more peaceful Sufi Islam, as in Britain that is the Islam of the parents' generation⁴⁷⁶. In this way, those engaging in the global jihadi discourse, engage in a self-essentialisation, and may view Islam themselves as inherently violent. The move of Muslim youth towards the 'new' self-essentialised and self-othered Islam, is towards an interpretation of Islam related to the global landscapes of the jihad that transcends culture, and must necessarily be seen as politically active.

Violence may be seen in a sense as restorative and necessary to overcome perceived injustices in the West and global arenas. This can be viewed as reactionary on an anomistic level⁴⁷⁷ reflecting societal dissatisfaction, perhaps based on societal expectations. It reflects some sense

⁴⁷⁴ See Vakil, S. 'Journey of a Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy'. Middle East Policy. Vol. 13, Issue 3. Fall 2006. pp. 175-8, Chapter 2.2 for a synthesis of perceived injustices perpetrated by the 'hypocritical West'.

⁴⁷⁵ See

<http://209.85.141.104/search?q=cache:g48wIod8JHMJ:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html+bush,+they+hate+us+for+our+freedoms&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=nz&client=firefox-a>

⁴⁷⁶ See Shaw, A. 'Why might young British Muslims support the Taliban?' Anthropology Today. Vol. 18, No. 1. February 2002. pp. 5-8.

⁴⁷⁷ Where societal expectations do not much societal reality.

of vision for the future and in this way may be described as progressive. In terms of the attraction to violent ideologies, a discontentment is again reflected amongst those who choose to participate in this form of extremism in the form of textual violence that incites a 'them' and 'us' duality and the propensity towards militant action, for example the language used by the four London bombers⁴⁷⁸. Radicalisation in itself needs to be understood in a broad way in the sense that those who become 'radicalised' are not themselves devoid of agency. Rather than emphasising an us/them duality in values, ideals and ideologies, related through the 'War on Terror' rhetoric⁴⁷⁹, it is more significant to try to comprehend 'their' perception of events, grievances and notions of injustice (even if these are regarded as mere perceptions rather than objective actuality or fact). This is not to say that militant or violent action be in any way excused or tolerated, just that it can be understood on a deeper level as the only recourse to seek justice and to be taken seriously. In this sense, grievances regarding the socio-economic, alienated and anomic status of some younger generations of diaspora Muslim youth in the West may be exploited by those with greater, meaning more far-reaching, agendas relating to the perceived unresolved issues and incompatibilities between the West and Islam.

Contemporary leadership in Islam

There is an unprecedented textual (re)interpretation and unmediated presence of theological doctrine in contemporary times which has been furthered by technological innovations. This has led to a shift in leadership and authority figures for young Muslims to look up to⁴⁸⁰. Importantly, there is no universally accepted singular authority within Islam, except God, which leads to multiplicities in sectarian leadership. Thus anyone can be and act as an authority within Islam as religion is considered a personal matter. However, this 'democratic authoritarianism' has taken on a wider spread of 'leaders' and more significantly, 'followers'. This enables the creation and growth of new sectarian identities relating to the hermeneutics of theology, local, national and global politics and most significantly, for the scope of this thesis, of

⁴⁷⁸ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4206800.stm>

⁴⁷⁹ See

<http://209.85.141.104/search?q=cache:g48wIod8JHMJ:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html+bush,+they+hate+us+for+our+freedoms&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=nz&client=firefox-a>

⁴⁸⁰ See, Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004; Gole, N. 'The Islamist identity: Islam, European Public space and civility'. *Eurozine*. 17 August 2006.

<http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-03-gole-en.html> ; Hervieu-Leger, D. 'In search of certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity'. *The Hedgehog Review*. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69; Boubeker, A. 'Post-Islamist Culture: A New Form of Mobilization?'. *History of Religions*. Vol. 47, No. 1. August 2007. pp. 75-94.

how to act in the contemporary late modern world. This accounts for the diversity of Muslim or 'Islamic'⁴⁸¹ groups that revivalist Muslims can choose to associate with. Religious leadership is no longer confined to Imams and Mullahs, but, "...a celebrity system is rising, and its figures include lecturers, rappers, singers, comedians, actors and television personalities of the Islamic West."⁴⁸² The second- and third-generation of diaspora Muslims therefore belong to the late modern generation of 'pick and choosers'⁴⁸³ with regard to religious and cultural affinity, according to their needs⁴⁸⁴. Rather than describing the space that second- and third-generations inhabit as being one of liminal dislocation, it can instead be also described as occupying a hybrid culture-identity space, that is, an identity in its own right⁴⁸⁵. In this sense, this dislocation can be considered to be a 'new' location of cultural space.

3.5 Case studies of second-generation diaspora Muslims and religious identity

Recent qualitative studies of second- and third-generation Muslims in the West⁴⁸⁶ over this last decade following '9/11' points to an emergence of literature and the attempt to understand social and political issues concerning Muslim youth in the West. The October 2005 edition of *The Muslim World*⁴⁸⁷ explores the multiple ways Islam is understood and practiced by young Muslim Americans. That there is an issue in *The Muslim World* on these issues reflects the attention being given to the identity formation of these Muslim Americans in the post-'9/11' context. This reflects the salience of Islam in the Western world and in the current geopolitic. The aftermath of '9/11' has been especially significant for those with Muslim heritage as this collective group "have found themselves under greater scrutiny by others and are undertaking

⁴⁸¹ I use inverted commas as many Muslims would not see these groups as Islamic, but perhaps view such radicalization to be a subversion of the spirit of Islam.

⁴⁸² Boubeker, A. 'Post-Islamist Culture: A New Form of Mobilization?'. *History of Religions*. Vol. 47, No. 1. August 2007. p. 83.

⁴⁸³ See Hervieu-Leger, D. 'In search of certainties: the paradoxes of religiosity in societies of high modernity'. *The Hedgehog Review*. Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2. Spring-Summer 2006. pp. 59-69.

⁴⁸⁴ See Silverstein, P.A. 'Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe'. *Annual Review of Anthropology*. Vol. 34. 2005. p. 375.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁶ See Peek, L. 'Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity'. *Sociology of Religion*. Vol. 66, No. 3. Fall 2005. pp. 215-42; Sirin, S.R. et al. 'Exploring dual identification among Muslim-American emerging adults: A mixed methods study'. *Journal of Adolescence*. Vol. 31. 2008. pp. 259-79. 2008; Glynn, S. 'Bengali Muslims: the new East End radicals?' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 25, No. 6. November 2002. pp. 969-88; Kibria, N. 'The 'new Islam' and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 31, No. 2. February 2008. pp. 243-66; Abraham, N. 'From Baghdad to New York: Young Muslims on War and Terrorism'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 95, No. 4. October 2005. pp. 587-99; Ali, S. 'Why Here, Why Now? Young Muslim Women Wearing Hijab'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 95, No. 4. October 2005. pp. 515-30.

⁴⁸⁷ See for example Ali, *ibid*; Abraham, *ibid*.

more self-scrutiny as well."⁴⁸⁸ Following this, it can be suggested that this neo-revivalist Muslim identity can be viewed as a reactionary identity to the national and global contexts.

As has been previously mentioned, this characterisation does not of course apply to all Muslim youth. However, through externally identifying⁴⁸⁹ those with a Muslim heritage as primarily Muslim (that being a Muslim is the most important identity-marker), this creates a space through which young Muslims may seek to relate each of their identities to each other. In this context, Muslim Americans may attempt to reconcile how being Muslim impacts on their identity as Americans (and also on their ethnic heritage) and how being American impacts of their identification as Muslims.

All individuals have multiple aspects to their identities that are reflected through ascribed and chosen characteristics. "Identity is based on interactions, perceptions that one is the same or not the same as others, and elements of one's personal and collective identity, including not only religion, but gender, 'race', ethnicity, class, nationality, and generation."⁴⁹⁰ The ways through which personal and collective identities are formulated is significant as it appears that, within the framework of a neo-revivalist identity, the personal identity of Muslim is considered within the collective global context of the supranational ummah and the perceptions of what a Muslim collective identity entails. That is, identity may be performed through perceptions of what it means to be part of the Muslim diaspora and more significantly, for second- and third-generation Muslims living in the West, the reflection and consideration of what being a Muslim means in the West⁴⁹¹. This consideration of their Muslim selves may be reflected upon in a way different to those migrants who have lived in Muslim-majority countries. Arguably, in Muslim-majority⁴⁹² countries, religion and being a Muslim can be considered to be a taken-for-granted identity through the continuation of ethno-cultural and religious practices. Such

⁴⁸⁸ Leonard, K.I. 'Introduction: Young American Muslim Identities'. *The Muslim World*. Vol. 95, No. 4. October 2005. p. 473.

⁴⁸⁹ See Malik, K. 'Born in Bradford'. *Prospect Magazine*. Issue 115. October 2005. http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=7070 ; Rehman, J. 'Islam, "War on Terror" and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism in the Aftermath of the London Bombings'. *Human Rights Quarterly*. Vol. 29. 2007. pp. 831-78.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.* My italics and inverted commas.

⁴⁹¹ In a personal, familial, community, ethnic, national and global sense.

⁴⁹² I use the taken-for-granted status of religion in Muslim-majority countries as an example due to the scope of this thesis, however, arguably, this taken-for-granted relationship to religion may occur for individuals in all countries when their religion is the majority religion.

practices include celebrations of religious festivals such as Eid, fasting during Ramadan and being aware of the call to prayer by hearing the azan. It can be argued that living in a country where one is the religious majority does not necessarily require self-reflection through which one's religious identity is questioned within the dominant societal landscape. In this situation one may participate in religious celebrations, festivals, norms and practices as a part of religio-cultural continuity. This relates back to Davie's conception of 'believing without belonging'⁴⁹³ with regard to religion in the West, that can be inverted to, in countries that are religio-centric, 'belonging without necessarily believing'. This being so, an individual can engage in the practice of religion as it is celebrated through culture, but this does not necessarily indicate a proclamation of faith.

Viswanathan⁴⁹⁴ has argued that in Western democracies, religious difference is considered in terms of cultural difference and because of this, establishing one's religious difference is an ongoing process for migrants and their subsequent generations. It is clear that all minority groups that are 'othered' with regard to the dominant culture will have to actively engage in a long-term process of acceptance in order to establish their difference in the mainstream. Leonard asserts that there are visible tensions "among national, ethnic, "authentic", and "new" forms of Muslim identity"⁴⁹⁵. The "new" forms of Muslim identity are "shaped by a strong American experiential component"⁴⁹⁶, and are arguably personalised and individualised through the postmodern project of the self and reflect contemporary issues of self-reflexivity⁴⁹⁷.

Ethnographic research on Muslims in Britain and the United States⁴⁹⁸ has shown that questions of identity and affiliation which can be broadly considered as identity politics are significant amongst Muslim youth. The issue of assumed affiliation due to a person's cultural and religious heritage is also a significant one. However, it is important to note that one's religious affiliations are not the only way through which Muslim youth can 'self-other'. A re-negotiation of one's cultural and religious heritage can take place in numerous ways, such as

⁴⁹³ Davie, G. *Religion in Modern Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000.

⁴⁹⁴ Cited in Leonard (Ibid). See Viswanathan, G. *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1998.

⁴⁹⁵ Leonard. Ibid. p. 474.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁷ See Chapter 1 and Giddens, A. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.

⁴⁹⁸ See footnote 486.

distancing oneself from the (local/national/global) Muslim community, and developing and emphasising other aspects of one's identity in a hybridised identity project. Second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims in France are an example of this, who are referred to within French society in a manner distinctive to their parents' generation as 'beurs'. This growing trend of politically mobilized Muslims (who may self-define by expressing a "public Islamic religiosity"⁴⁹⁹) are attracted to an Islam of the spectacle. Music is highly significant for their religious expressions and their self-identification⁵⁰⁰.

There have also been several qualitative research studies of the self-identification of Muslims in the United States and Britain following '9/11'⁵⁰¹. The development of a Muslim-American hyphenated identity is thought to have emerged following the crisis of the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001. Sirin et al⁵⁰² consider the Muslim-American identity as socially-constructed and historically-bound through media representation, government agencies, and especially post-'9/11' through public surveillance, and foreign policy concerns as informing negative attitudes towards Muslims. To identify a person as a Muslim is viewed as synonymous identifying them as a collective identity transcending ethnicity and based on shared religious beliefs and shared experiences. Sirin et al consider the Muslim identity to be arguably a cultural identity as it is not dependent on degrees of religiosity⁵⁰³, meaning how religious one is. They carried out a survey of 97 participants aged between 18 and 25 and through surveys and pictorial representations attempted to investigate how the relationship between self-identification as Muslim and as American was influenced by discrimination, acculturation and religious practices and whether there were gender variations in the identification process⁵⁰⁴.

Following '9/11', being a Muslim in the United States⁵⁰⁵ has become a salient religious category and through profiling, the national identity of Muslims has been questioned. Peek's

⁴⁹⁹ Boubeker, A. 'Post-Islamist Culture: A New Form of Mobilization?'. *History of Religions*. Vol. 47, No. 1. August 2007. pp. 75-94.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁰¹ See footnote 195.

⁵⁰² Sirin, S.R. et al. 'Exploring dual identification among Muslim-American emerging adults: A mixed methods study'. *Journal of Adolescence*. Vol. 31. 2008. pp. 259-79. 2008.

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 259.

⁵⁰⁵ The United States has an established Judeo-Christian heritage and also an African-American Islam that is different to immigrants' Islam in practice⁵⁰⁵. In the United States there are three main groups of Muslims. African

research has shown that following '9/11', some Muslims who were surveyed engaged in visibly embracing their American identities through the public display of American flags outside of their houses and avoiding mosques and other locations associated with Islam⁵⁰⁶.

Peek⁵⁰⁷ has identified three stages that the Muslims surveyed in her study went through in developing their Muslim identity. These are, firstly, the religious (Muslim) identity as ascribed, secondly as chosen and finally, as a declared identity. The ascribed identity is taken-for-granted. There is little critical reflection of what it means to be a Muslim during early developmental stages (i.e. childhood). Religion is one amongst a variety of factors that identify individuals during this stage. Other factors include ethnicity and the culture of the parents' generation. Through self-reflection, some participants concluded that "they were more likely to identify themselves in this way because of social norms and external pressure in the US to define oneself by 'race', nationality, or ethnicity rather than religion."⁵⁰⁸ Peek conducted research of New York college students between September 2001 and October 2003. During the ascribed identity stage, most participants reported a lack of self-reflection. However, behavioural practices reflect the internalisation of this process through norms and values, for example, dressing modestly and attending religion classes at the mosque. The environment that the Muslim participants lived in during this stage (such as urban or rural settings, and the number of minorities and especially whether other Muslims were living in the same environment) is considered significant in the pressure to assimilate to "'American' norms and values"⁵⁰⁹. This reflects the significance of whether one is made aware of being a minority or 'other'. Some reported that due to being stigmatised because of their minority status, they often concealed their Muslim identity because of the desire to 'fit in' to mainstream culture⁵¹⁰. These management strategies reflecting religious identity formulation are common in the development stages of all religious identities where religious identity is ascribed.

American Muslims, South Asian Muslims and Arab Muslims. South Asian and Arab Muslims mainly migrated to the United States following the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act⁵⁰⁵.

⁵⁰⁶ Peek, L. 'Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity'. *Sociology of Religion*. Vol. 66, No. 3. Fall 2005. pp. 215-42.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 225. My inverted commas as 'race' is a contested term.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid. p. 226.

The second stage of the Muslim students surveyed was the stage of being Muslim as a chosen identity, as with age, children develop a “more concreted, cognitive conception of their religious identity”⁵¹¹. The participants reflected that as they matured, being a Muslim became their chosen identity rather than it being unquestionable and ascribed. Through their social development, a re-examination process took place through which religious identities were reflected upon. Some of the participants became more religious in high school, but for others, the transition took place at university in the context of “reflection and identity transition”⁵¹² where life choices became more evident. The college or university experience enabled the awareness of larger social networks of Muslims and through peer-group Muslim Student Associations (MSAs) it became easier to identify as Muslim due to the large numbers of Muslims like themselves who had the same social norms and were in similar situations facing the pressure to assimilate.

Of those surveyed, Peek found that peer groups and close friends were highly significant in “constructing, reinforcing and affirming”⁵¹³ the emergent revivalist religious identity. They shared similar experiences of religious exploration in learning about Islam through the MSA in an organisational and social setting. This reflects the collective examination of beliefs and practices and in the construction of a religious identity. The reflection of what it means to be a Muslim in the United States was enabled to be examined through a collective narrative and consciousness that went beyond the individual. Thus solidarity reflects the significance of “social context and narrative space”⁵¹⁴.

Many chose to join MSAs to learn about Islam because “they felt they were not receiving enough religious education at home”⁵¹⁵. They may have learned about the fundamental teachings of Islam from their parents, but found their parents to be “too cultural...as [they] mixed cultural norms with religious practices”⁵¹⁶. The parents were mainly from Muslim-majority countries (who immigrated to the United States in the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s) where they were part of the Muslim majority and in this way there was an infusion of their respective

⁵¹¹ Peek. Ibid. p. 226.

⁵¹² Ibid. p. 227.

⁵¹³ Ibid. p. 228.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid. p. 229.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

ethnic culture in Islam. Islam was a taken-for-granted, given aspect of identity, and it being the majority identity, had no need to be questioned. For the second-generation however, who Peek has interviewed, there is a realisation that “they were part of a small, highly visible religious minority in the United States”⁵¹⁷. This awareness has led to the assertion of Muslim identity. “[A]s they matured, it became increasingly important not only to maintain their religious identity, but also to develop that aspect of themselves.”⁵¹⁸

Thus it appears, that growing up as part of the second-generation of the Muslim diaspora, an exploration takes place of what being a Muslim means in a Western country where their religion (although highly visible) is a minority. The response is that the maintenance of the religious identity is important for these Muslims, but it is also important for them to teach it to their children as well. In some cases, the choice in asserting the religious identity was “in order to reject ethnic, national, or cultural identities that they viewed as un-Islamic”.⁵¹⁹

The MSA⁵²⁰ has provided a new institutional locus through which this generation is able to find out about what is perceived as ‘authentic’ Islam. An Islam that transcends cultural and ethnic divisions and that is located in the global supranational arena may be taken as ‘authentic’. MSAs were founded in the United States in 1963. Funded initially by Saudi Arabia, it can be deduced that this encouraged a Wahabi style Islam to be emphasised⁵²¹. They were created in opposition to alienation perceived by the ‘Americanisation’ of Arab mosques. In this way the MSA has become “an alternative umbrella organization with a mandate to promulgate ‘true Islam’ and to shift the focus away from national or ethnic markers”⁵²². The belief and behaviour that is focussed upon is against ethnic versions of Islam and national divisions, but the focus instead is on the unity and perhaps even ‘purity’ of Islam. There is disassociation with the ethnic background and the focus is upon religious factors which are viewed as the overarching aspect of an Islamic identity. However, MSAs have now become more diverse and organised around political issues following ‘9/11’⁵²³.

⁵¹⁷ Peek. Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ See www.msanational.org/

⁵²¹ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/education/21muslim.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&sq=february

⁵²² Peek. Ibid. p. 230.

⁵²³ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/education/21muslim.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&sq=february

In the twenty-first century, in such contexts, Muslim as a declared identity, is considered in response to a crisis, that is, '9/11' and the aftermath of xenophobia towards Muslims, expressed by, "discrimination, harassment, racial and religious profiling, and verbal and physical assault".⁵²⁴ The affirmation of religious identity is considered especially important in this social landscape and bonds to Islam strengthened through the defence of Islam and the "increased need for a spiritual anchor"⁵²⁵. Increased group solidarity appears to be an important response to the negative treatment of Islam and Muslims. It is seen as important to declare one's Muslim identity and although these students were under pressure to modify their visible display of their Muslim identities (by removing the hijab for women or by men shaving their beards), they are unwilling to do so.

This declaration of faith is seen as important in declaring a positive perception of self and to "correct public misconceptions"⁵²⁶ about Islam. As such, Peek's study is reflective of the dynamic, ongoing and active construction of the identity process and the relationship of religion to the identity-projects of young Muslim-Americans. In a societal landscape where Islam is salient, the formulation of a religion-oriented response by these Muslim-American social actors involves a "heightened reflection and self-awareness, individual choices, and the acknowledgement of others"⁵²⁷. The formulation of a neo-revivalist Muslim identity in this way involves both internal choices and external pressures. Following '9/11', this religious identity has become stronger in the social and political arenas, and important for Muslim-Americans to their "social and personal selves"⁵²⁸. This declaration of identity can be seen as reactionary, self-reflexive, and a site of group solidarity.

The negotiation of a Muslim identity in the West

Negotiating a Muslim identity has also become significant for second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims in Britain. As Kibria's research⁵²⁹ on Bangladeshi Muslim youth in Britain and the United States shows, there has been an increase in a revivalist Islam in terms of

⁵²⁴ Peek. Ibid. p. 231.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

⁵²⁶ Ibid. p. 236.

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

⁵²⁸ Ibid. p. 237.

⁵²⁹ Kibria, N. 'The 'new Islam' and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 31, No. 2. February 2008. pp. 243-66.

identity and practice based on “a concern for scripturalism and totalism, a return to basic principles and an emphasis on Islamic thought for all aspects of life”⁵³⁰. This second- and third-generation diaspora Muslim revivalism is also located within the global context of the ummah. Kibria relates the generational divide between these young Muslims in both the US and British contexts and the declaration of the revivalist identity is an external rebellion against both mainstream Western society and their parents’ generation. Within the revivalist identity, Kibria does not find hostility towards modernity but rather, what she terms the ‘new Islam’, is “...part of a movement of modernity”⁵³¹, that simultaneously affirms it and also reflects anxiety towards modernity, specifically relating to “...moral and spiritual corruption”⁵³². The ‘new Islam’ provided a locus, similar to the participants in Peek’s study who spoke of the need for a “spiritual anchor”⁵³³, from which those engaging with this new revivalist Muslim identity can ‘protect’ themselves from “moral laxity, commodification and spiritual vacuity in the surrounding culture”⁵³⁴. The ‘new’ Muslim identity enabled the individuals to respond to alienation and xenophobia in a public way. Through Kibria’s research on the ‘new’ Islam in Britain and the United States, differences in national context became apparent. Generational conflict between first-generation and subsequent generations was more visible in Britain. Also in Britain there were concerns for the young Muslims of “the dangers of downward mobility” (in socio-economic terms). In the US, participants expressed “fears of cultural loss and assimilation”⁵³⁵ and were concerned about “upward mobility”⁵³⁶. This reflects the different socio-economic backgrounds of Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain and in the United States. In Britain, the Bangladeshi participants tend to be less socio-economically secure, whereas in the United States, Bangladeshis are highly educated and professionally successful. There are similar concerns of the British and American Muslim revivalists. In Britain however the neo-revivalist Muslims are looking for gains whilst in the US, they are afraid of what they may lose. Communication technologies and transnational Muslim movements were significant to both US and British Bangladeshi Muslims.

⁵³⁰ Kibria. Ibid. p. 244.

⁵³¹ Ibid. p. 262.

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ Peek, L. ‘Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity’. *Sociology of Religion*. Vol. 66, No. 3. Fall 2005. p. 231.

⁵³⁴ Kibria Ibid.

⁵³⁵ Ibid. p. 263.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

Summary

The neo-revivalist identity formation is not static, unchanging or the universal norm. Bayat relates that the young extremists are a very small portion of the diaspora Muslim demographic but receive the most media attention. This may be reflective of the problematic status given to this sector within secular Western society. The neo-revivalism of second- and third-generation diaspora Muslims is an expression of Islam separate from their ethnic culture. They often do not have an awareness of traditional Islam. "Suspended from their own ethnic values and dejected by the host culture which views them with suspicion and derision, they look desperately for an outlet to forge identities"⁵³⁷. An "authentic" reference of Islam is sought, one that is "trans-local, global, and abstract...stripped of cultural influences".

The investigation of a neo-revivalist identity formation is important to highlight the implications of the salience of Islam in the West following '9/11'. Religious extremism that is discussed in the context of the global jihad is not by any means an inevitable result of the neo-revivalist Muslim identity. The purpose of discussing neo-fundamentalism is to highlight the apparent visibility of media-reporting and global fear that relates to Islam and how political issues are formulated through religious expression. Religion and religious identities are not incompatible with Western norms, laws and values if we view religion and difference through the cosmopolitan worldview. This denotes everybody as different if identity is considered as an ongoing process of construction, a work in progress, so to speak, that enables different aspects of one's identity to be recognised and realised without being reduced to discovering where the ultimate loyalty lies. Of course, this is an ideal situation, but one that can be realised through mutual respect, self-reflexive on-going dialogue, not with perceived 'group or community leaders', but with individuals who live their respective identities⁵³⁸.

⁵³⁷ Bayat, A. 'A Symposium on "Political Islam": When Muslims and Modernity Meet'. *Contemporary Sociology*. Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. pp. 508.

⁵³⁸ This leads to the cosmopolitan ethic. See Featherstone, M. 'Cosmopolis: An Introduction'. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 1-16; Beck, U. 'The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies'. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 17-44; Turner, B.S. 'Cosmopolitan Virtue, Globalization and Patriotism'. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 45-63; Ramadan, T. 'Manifesto for a new 'WE': An Appeal to the Western Muslims, and their Fellow Citizens'. 7 July 2006. http://www.tariqramadan.com/article.php3?id_article=743

Chapter 4 will consider mediated representations of Muslims. 4.1 will examine internal critiques by Muslims through literary fiction and 4.2 will discuss the portrayal of Muslims in the media before this thesis arrives at its conclusion.

Chapter 4. Text in globalised context: Muslims, contemporary literary fiction and the media

Mediated discourses are significant because firstly, they present perceptions Muslims have of themselves through literary fiction and secondly, they reflect the global consciousness pertaining to the portrayal of Muslims through techno-mass media. Literature and the media are both sites of dialogue, and dialogism that can be read as semantic and semiotic texts. This enables analytically critical interplay of discourses between both the producers and the receivers of mediated communication.

4.1. Diaspora Muslims in the West and literary fiction: 'My Son the Fanatic', *Brick Lane*, *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*

By investigating the primacy of a religious identity as a form of 'self-othering', integration, community and identity issues for intergenerational Western Muslims are explored to contextualise the recourse to religious expression. In this context it is fitting to discuss contemporary post-immigrant literature written by Western Muslims to gain insight into the issues raised and observations made by those who have experienced living as migrants in the West.

Literature is a significant element of an individual and group's identity project, as an expression of their views of and within society. As such it is especially important to consider literary fiction written by multi-generational migrants and minorities in the West in order to gain an understanding of their reflections on self and the 'community'. However, it is important to critically analyse this literature and not assume that, purely due to ethnic heritage or religious ascription, these writers necessarily are the authentic voice of and on the world they are writing about. That said, such literature is useful in stimulating debate pertaining to minority voices, and is also useful in presenting a different and perhaps a more widely-located perspective from the 'inside', on issues relating to Muslims in the West. The authors' presentation of characters in these contemporary fictions, and each of the authors themselves, can be related to one other as part of a process of dialogical reasoning⁵³⁹, with regard to

⁵³⁹ The notion of the 'dialogical self' was initiated by Mikhail Bakhtin. Dialogism refers to critique carried out through dialogue. See Hermans, H.J.M. 'The Dialogical Self: Toward a Theory of Personal and Cultural

minority life-worlds. Literary fiction presents and re-presents a plurality of life-worlds and heterogeneous voices. In this way, polyphonic (or multi-voiced) novels⁵⁴⁰ and short stories may present independent authorship. This may take place within each characterisation through which the characters may narrate their own independent and multiple stories. Also through the act of reading, the reader may take shifting positions. The authorship is representative of "I as the author"⁵⁴¹, and "Me as an observed actor"⁵⁴². Landscapes of imagination enable a scope wider than "the existing conceptions of the self"⁵⁴³ and the position of each character shifts according to situational identity in time and space. In this way, authors are able to position each character through the authors' own social mirror which is reflected upon through the narrative and between the characters' interactions. By reading the works of fiction selected for analysis in this chapter, the reflections of the authors regarding the context of Western Muslims and their views of socio-cultural adjustment issues faced by migrants are highlighted.

When dealing with the subject of migration, one important question to consider is: when do migrants stop being classified as immigrants? The answer to this question is multifaceted, dealing with both the self-proclamations of generations of immigrants (that is, how individuals and communities of immigrants classify themselves in the present and over time) and the mainstream societal response (how individuals and institutions in a mainstream society group classify those with a migratory heritage). Also related is the fluidity of self-proclamations and self-identity can be fluid (especially over and across generations and over and across communities) depending on the interaction of differing social groups and the socio-political, economic and foreign policy climate of the country, and indeed the geopolitical climate. These factors are a backdrop to more localised issues, such as racism and xenophobia and may influence communal attitudes relating to specific local situations just as much as incidents directly related to personal life histories. It is therefore important to have an awareness of such issues to relate them to the turn to a neo-revivalist religious identity that may have implications for religious extremism. These attitudes also need to be contextualised in order to gain insight

Positioning'. *Culture & Psychology*. Vol. 7, No. 3. September 2001. pp. 243-81. I use dialogue here as contrary to monologue which presents a single narrative and views narrative stories in singularity rather than through holistic context.

⁵⁴⁰ See Hermans, H.J.M. 'Voicing the Self: From Information Processing to Dialogical Interchange'. *Psychological Bulletin*. Vol. 119, No. 1. 1996. pp. 31-50.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 33.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*

into the worldviews of individuals choosing to act or perhaps, in their terms, 'react' militantly in the name of religion or to claim a religious identity.

It should be noted that in terms of immigration, integration and assimilation, one important criteria of acceptance into the mainstream of the 'host' society is the visual aspect, that is the first image and impression that individuals have of one another. Both image and 'the visual' are especially important in contemporary society due to the dominance of mediated technologies, where things often have to be seen to be entered into the consciousness as 'real'⁵⁴⁴. Visual images can also reinforce stereotypes. For example men of non-indigenous European descent with beards may be viewed with suspicion, as may women wearing the hijab. It can also be proposed that ethnically- Caucasian Muslims may be accepted by society faster than those of minority ethnic origins who may be considered to be more 'visible minorities' (and continue to be so over and across generations⁵⁴⁵ due to conspicuous personal characteristics such as skin colour). Despite this however, the style of dress may override this point. Other factors to be considered regarding societal acceptance are dress, language (whether they speak the language of their adopted country), and also education, socio-economic status and national context. Religion may also be included in this list of issues to be considered, in particular in a Western, pluralist society. Perhaps more important than religious affiliation however, is a willingness and readiness to accept other religious and cultural traditions and to in a sense co-exist with others rather than engage in an isolationist stance.

The acceptance of other traditions can also be related to treating individuals as such rather than as representatives of the communities to which they may belong (through ascription rather than choice). The cosmopolitan ethic is therefore a useful starting point in moving beyond local cultural particularities, (whilst simultaneously embracing them through a universalised human rights perspective) to participation in a global citizenship with shared values, embracing diversity and pluralism as cultural enrichment. Through this ethic, individuals are respected as human beings, enabled multiple affiliations, and not reduced to any singular affiliation, for it is individuality and difference that is shared. Furthermore,

⁵⁴⁴ This relates to notions of the hyper-real being more real than the real itself.

⁵⁴⁵ See Zimmermann, L., Zimmermann, K.F. and Constant, A. 'Ethnic Self-Identification of First-Generation Immigrants'. *The International Migration Review*. Vol. 41, No. 3. Fall 2007. pp. 769-81; Silverstein, P.A. 'Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe'. *Annual Review of Anthropology*. Vol. 34. 2005. pp. 363-84.

minorities should also not self-victimise by embracing the unconstructive role of victim in society, but should instead, interact and participate in society. The cosmopolitan ethic, although an ideal, needs to be applied by all citizens to realise both the hybridity of transnational identities and a global citizenship that is respectful of difference, is self-reflexive and is dialogical in dealing with issues that may arise. This may be reflected through “the emergence of a new “We”...who would undertake together to resolve...all offences against human dignity”⁵⁴⁶.

In contrast, the isolationist stance could lead to “peripheral communalism”⁵⁴⁷ or “pillar”⁵⁴⁸ communities, whilst maintaining the self-proclaimed important aspects of cultural heritage that are compatible with legal restrictions of the adopted country. With regard to “peripheral communalism”, and a challenged socio-economic state in society of, for example, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Turkish and North African migrants to Europe and the US, it is important to consider the historical experiences of migration pertaining to national and socio-economic context. It is important to deal with issues of immigration and integration into mainstream society as issues of immigration, and not as essentialising these heterogeneous and ethnically diverse groups, and treating them as Muslim issues. This would be overstating the case. Rather than considering that those engaging in separatism, isolationism or “peripheral communalism”⁵⁴⁹ reflect the incompatibility of Islam and secular (Western) society, it should be considered that the extent to which these are immigration issues⁵⁵⁰.

To demonstrate these issues, three pieces of literature will be examined in this chapter: *Brick Lane*, by Monica Ali, ‘My Son the Fanatic’, a short story by Hanif Kureishi and, *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* by Mohsin Hamid. These works were chosen not only because they are

⁵⁴⁶ Ramadan, T. ‘Manifesto for a new ‘WE’: An Appeal to the Western Muslims, and their Fellow Citizens’. 7 July 2006. http://www.tariqramadan.com/article.php3?id_article=743

For a further discussion on cosmopolitanism, see Featherstone, M. ‘Cosmopolis: An Introduction’. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 1-16; Beck, U. ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies’. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 17-44; Turner, B.S. ‘Cosmopolitan Virtue, Globalization and Patriotism’. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 45-63; Appiah, K.A. ‘Cosmopolitanism’: *Ethics in a World of Strangers*. New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company. 2006.

⁵⁴⁷ See Bayat, A. ‘A Symposium on “Political Islam”: When Muslims and Modernity Meet’. *Contemporary Sociology*. Vol. 36, No. 6. November 2007. p. 509.

⁵⁴⁸ For a discussion on pillar communities, separatism and isolationism, see Kramer, J. ‘Letter from Europe. The Dutch Model: Multiculturalism and Muslim immigrants’. *The New Yorker*. 3 April, 2006.

⁵⁴⁹ Bayat. *Ibid*.

⁵⁵⁰ See Bayat. *Ibid*.

contemporary and deal with religious identity and Muslims, but because there are other levels in the writing that deal with notions of home, belonging, nostalgia, exile and issues revolving around being an 'other' to mainstream society. *Brick Lane* and 'My Son the Fanatic' are both set within the context of Britain, whereas *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* is narrated in Pakistan but the story is set in New York.

Comparing all three pieces of literature from the outset reflects differences pertaining to ethnic heritage, national context and socio-economic status. *Brick Lane* deals with Bangladeshi-origin people in Tower Hamlets, East London; the characters in 'My Son the Fanatic' are of Pakistani origin in Britain and the central character in *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* is Pakistani who lived in New York. The two pieces of fiction in the British context deal with characters from working-class backgrounds, whereas Changez in *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* originates from an upper middle-class family in Lahore, Pakistan, is educated at Princeton (on a scholarship) and finds a job at a prestigious corporate firm in New York before '9/11'.

These differences in national context, ethnic heritage and socio-economic status in society relate to Kibria's⁵⁵¹ research findings pertaining to issues for the diaspora of up-ward mobility amongst Bangladeshi Muslim migrants in the US, such as fears of losing the distinctiveness of culture, identity and religion due to the context of the 'decadence of capitalist society' and socio-economic advantage. Also, due to the desire to 'fit in' and become a 'model migrant'⁵⁵² emphasis lies on assimilating into mainstream society⁵⁵³. Pertinent issues for those surveyed in

⁵⁵¹ Kibria relates that during the post-World War II years, there was a migratory flow of those from the former British colonies traveling to Britain which was facilitated by the 1948 Nationality Act. Due to the demand for labour, many worked in unskilled jobs, and a lot of the immigrants travelled from rural areas in Bangladesh (and Pakistan) to Britain. During the 1970s family unification was enabled and localised communities began to be established. There continue to be large Bangladeshi enclaves in old industrial areas such as Tower Hamlets, East London and these groups remain relatively socio-economically disadvantaged. Migration to the United States from South Asian countries is more recent and it was mainly students and professionals who immigrated to the US following the liberalisation of immigration laws after 1965. See Kibria, N. 'The 'new Islam' and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vol. 31, No. 2. February 2008. pp. 247-53.

⁵⁵² For a discussion on effective 'deracialization' strategies due to upward class mobility, see Silverstein, P.A. 'Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe'. *Annual Review of Anthropology*. Vol. 34. 2005. p. 365. Silverstein, *ibid*, also relates that South Asian migrants represent themselves as 'model minorities' in the US to counteract negative minority stereotypes, such as of African Americans.

⁵⁵³ However the other side of this desire to assimilate is the negative impact it may have on the distinctive group identity in terms of cultural and religious transmission across generations. In this way, religion acted as a moral anchor and provided the basis for an alternative way of being in this societal context. The revivalist Muslim

the study of the Bangladeshi Muslim diaspora in Britain related to the fears of down-ward mobility and structural socio-economic disadvantage.

Brick Lane⁵⁵⁴ by Monica Ali and Hanif Kureishi's, 'My Son the Fanatic'⁵⁵⁵ are both set within this social landscape of Britain. Both British authors are children of Muslim migrants to Britain and can therefore be considered second-generation diasporic writers. Whilst both authors are second-generation Britons, they are different generations from each other, but their works of fiction have similar themes such as issues relating to recent migrants to Britain, acceptance into mainstream society and being a Muslim in Britain ('My Son the Fanatic' deals with this theme more fully than Brick Lane).

Monica Ali was born in 1967 in Dhaka, Bangladesh and moved to Britain in 1971. Her mother is English and father Bengali⁵⁵⁶. Hanif Kureishi was born in 1954 in Bromley, England and is of Pakistani origin⁵⁵⁷. Being second-generation authors, this type of literature is cosmopolitan in scope, reaching within and between cultural worlds. The cosmopolitan aspect of their writing can be seen through their reference to more than one cultural context and with regard to their multiple cultural affiliations (Kureishi's being Pakistan and Britain and Ali's being Bangladesh and Britain).

Mohsin Hamid, author of *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* was born in 1971 in Lahore, Pakistan. He moved to New York at the age of eighteen to attend Princeton and later Harvard Law School. He worked in the corporate world in New York before returning to Pakistan as a journalist. His writing is cosmopolitan in scope by locating itself in more than one physical space. The location of place for Hamid is fluid as he converses between cultural worlds. This encourages a hybrid social and cultural experience. The multiple affiliations that are present in this cosmopolitan worldview can enhance perspective of cultural practices and traditions through what Turner has termed "ironic distance"⁵⁵⁸. In Turner's view, a certain reflexive

identity was seen as an alternative coping strategy for 'at-risk' youth who may become involved in crime and to gain a positive sense of self in society when confronted with xenophobia. See Kibria. Ibid. pp. 243-66.

⁵⁵⁴ Ali, M. *Brick Lane*. London: Doubleday. 2003.

⁵⁵⁵ Kureishi, H. 'My Son the Fanatic', In *Love in a Blue Time*. London and Boston: Faber and Faber. 1997.

⁵⁵⁶ <http://www.contemporarywriters.com/authors/?p=auth03B5N513312634963>

⁵⁵⁷ <http://www.contemporarywriters.com/authors/?p=auth57>

⁵⁵⁸ Turner, B.S. *Cosmopolitan Virtue, Globalization and Patriotism*. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. pp. 45-63. 2002. p. 55.

distance from one's own culture and homeland is required to be able to respect other's cultures and to view one's own culture objectively. This cosmopolitan worldview is not limited to those who have multiple cultural affiliations, but is also a by-product of global cultural exchange and social changes associated with globalisation.

The three pieces of contemporary writing have been selected, as each deals with the hardships that migrants and foreigners face with regard to difference, financial security, social and cultural integration (notions of being accepted by peers from the same ethnic community and by the wider mainstream society, dealing with racist attitudes) and of course with regard to religious difference. Therefore these popular fictions are pertinent to issues being dealt with in the West pertaining to multiculturalism, especially in the post-'9/11' context. They reflect the prominence of social issues relating to societal belonging, the hybridisation of religion, and issues of integration and assimilation. 'My Son the Fanatic' is an important short story as it was published four years before '9/11', after which issues of multiculturalism and religion became prominent. Yet, although it was published in 1997, the depiction of a young Muslim (re)claiming his Muslim identity indicates that these issues are not entirely a post-'9/11' 'problem'. Brick Lane was published after '9/11', in 2003, but before '7/7'. The Reluctant Fundamentalist was completed in the summer of 2001, but was published in 2007, after many re-drafts⁵⁵⁹. The story was originally formulated around the theme of a Pakistani man living in New York and returning to Pakistan, but no doubt took on a different form following '9/11'.

This type of literature is, as Boehmer puts it: "...necessarily transplanted, displaced, multilingual, and simultaneously, conversant with the cultural codes of the West..."⁵⁶⁰. Although Kureishi and Ali are British, the literature may be viewed as within, but in a sense not fully of Britain as there are points of reference that relate to other cultural codes as well. This relates to Talal Asad's point about Muslims who have settled in Europe, and are perceived as "in, but not of Europe"⁵⁶¹ as they may not be accepted as 'fully' European because they lack the cultural and historical "civilizational essence"⁵⁶² or collective identity. This attitude may of course also be a

⁵⁵⁹ http://harcourtbooks.com/Reluctant_Fundamentalist/interview.asp

⁵⁶⁰ Boehmer, E. Colonial and Postcolonial Literature: Migrant Metaphors. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. p. 230.

⁵⁶¹ Asad, T. Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2003. p. 164.

⁵⁶² Ibid. p 168.

self-perpetuating one by European Muslims, as they may also reject the historical and cultural heritage of Europe as their own, and are able to choose to identify with being either 'more' Muslim or 'more' European. But such an attitude is an essentialist one rather than a cosmopolitan viewpoint where one can have multiple cultural affiliations without the reductionist 'either'/'or' attitude. Therefore viewing this type of literature as 'not fully British' points to the lack of adjustment to the multicultural character of contemporary Europe for both authors are British (Kureishi was born and raised in Britain and Ali is half English and has lived there most of her life), and this type of literature is an example and a reflection of the multiculturalism of contemporary Britain. What needs to be recognised is that Kureishi and Ali's writing is cosmopolitan in scope as it is simultaneously conversant with cultural codes of both the West⁵⁶³ and the East. The cultural and religious heritage of these two authors is emphasised. The subject matter that each deals with is, in a sense, wider in scope than mainstream literature as they both deal with cross-cultural themes. This in turn points to a cosmopolitan ethic within sectors of the Muslim population, who rather than separate being Muslim from being British, embrace their multiple affiliations and frames of reference.

This, however is a contentious issue as it is not necessary that only migrants can write and inform migrant literature, as non-migrant writers can also develop and engage with cultural hybridity and geographical movement.⁵⁶⁴ Walkowitz's analysis suggests that the classification of migrant literature should be dependent "...more on a book's future than on a writer's past"⁵⁶⁵. However, Walkowitz does concede that the writer does inform and influence the writing and the ways in which the book is received⁵⁶⁶. Thus, life-histories cannot be separated from the present and issues of authenticity, subjectivity, objectivity and exclusivity arise in the context of the post-colonial and transnational novel that deals with the movement of migrants between cultures and physical spaces. Also significant in migrant or transnational writing are issues of "belonging, community, and civic engagements"⁵⁶⁷, and it is evident that issues of belonging to more than one cultural space are realised through all three authors' writings.

⁵⁶³ Boehmer, E. Ibid. p. 230.

⁵⁶⁴ Walkowitz, R.L. 2006. 'The Location of Literature: The Transnational Book and the Migrant Writer'. *Contemporary Literature*. XLVII, 4.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 534.

⁵⁶⁶ In terms of perceived authenticity of the subject matter due to ethnic and cultural heritage.

⁵⁶⁷ Walkowitz, R.L. Ibid.

‘My Son the Fanatic’

The short story, ‘My Son the Fanatic’, is told from the perspective of a father (Pervez) who has emigrated to Britain from Pakistan, and is concerned about the well-being of his son (Ali) who has become more distant and secretive. He notices initially that a lot of the changes in his son’s behaviour are also positive ones however, such as a tidier room and the fact that his son has been giving away most of his possessions, even recently-acquired ones. Pervez drives a taxi, and has worked hard during his twenty years in Britain to ensure that his son is well taken care of and well-educated (his son is studying to be an accountant); he is concerned about Ali’s success and future happiness. Through Ali, Pervez’s “Dreams of doing well in England would have come true”⁵⁶⁸. The story opens with Pervez being slightly wary of his son’s silences and sharp tongue and his attitude that there are “more important things to be done”⁵⁶⁹. Pervez is reluctant to discuss his worries regarding his son with his other Punjabi taxi driver friends as he fears their judgement of the situation. He eventually does discuss the matter and comes to the conclusion with his friends that perhaps his son is taking drugs and selling his possessions to pay for them. Pervez also discusses his son’s behaviour with one of his regular clients, Bettina, a prostitute who has become Pervez’s confidante ever since he helped her out during a violent encounter with a client. She advises him on things to look out for in terms of Ali’s behaviour and physical appearance. The only physical changes that Pervez notices regarding his son are that he has given up cricket, swimming and football (that he used to enjoy and do well at), but still seems relatively healthy, has clear eyes, but has become sullen, watchful and has begun to grow a beard.

Pervez discovers that his fears of criminal activity for his son are unfounded, and instead discovers that his son has started to pray five times a day. Pervez has avoided all religions since he came to Britain as his upbringing in Lahore entailed being taught the Qur’an by a Maulvi who tied a string to his hair to wake him up every time he fell asleep. Pervez discusses his discovery with his friends, who, unusually choose not to comment although they have similar attitudes to religion as Pervez and joke about religious leaders. Their silence suggests that they still respect religion and so cannot disapprove of someone who has chosen to become religious.

⁵⁶⁸ Kureishi, H. ‘My Son the Fanatic’. In *Love in a Blue Time*. London and Boston: Faber and Faber. 1997. p. 120.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p. 119.

Pervez decides to talk with his son about his son's life. Ali is initially reluctant, but eventually concedes to go out to a restaurant with his father. At the restaurant, Pervez orders his usual whiskey and water at which his son winces and questions his father about drinking alcohol. Pervez explains to Ali that he works hard, and that he is entitled to some form of relaxation. Ali seems disgusted by his father, which angers Pervez as "he wouldn't stand for his own son telling him the difference between right and wrong"⁵⁷⁰. Ali says that his father had "...broken countless rules of the Koran."⁵⁷¹ An example that Ali gives is that his father also eats pork and makes his wife cook pork, saying to her: "You're not in the village now, this is England. We have to fit in!"⁵⁷². This attitude of Pervez perhaps indicates his desire to not only integrate into British society, but also to assimilate, or to use assimilation, and 'being like everyone else' as a reason to do as he chooses and to expect his wife to also do the same. Ali says to Pervez, "The problem is this...You are too implicated in Western civilization."⁵⁷³. Pervez replies: "But we live here"⁵⁷⁴. Ali says: "The Western materialists hate us...how can you love something which hates you?"⁵⁷⁵ This conversation between father and son displays not only the differing generational attitudes between a father and son, but also the attitudes and reactions of those who are minorities in Britain in the wider society. For Pervez, none of the things Ali is talking about are concerns for him, as for him, that is just how Britain is, but for Ali, who has most likely encountered some type of racial abuse, religion is the way to counteract the society he does not feel part of. Ali states that, "The West"⁵⁷⁶ is "...a sink of hypocrites, adulterers, homosexuals, drug takers and prostitutes"⁵⁷⁷. He says he is following Islam's laws and will even gladly join a jihad for the reward of paradise if the persecution does not stop. When asked by his father what influenced him to think in this way, Ali stated that it was living in Britain. Pervez says that he loves England, "They let you do almost anything here"⁵⁷⁸. That, for Ali, is the problem. There is no control of people's behaviour. Ali finally tells Pervez that he is going to stop his education as "Western education cultivates an anti-religious attitude", as in the accounting world, it is common "...to meet women, drink alcohol and practice usury"⁵⁷⁹. The fact that his son is

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 125.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

⁵⁷² Ibid.

⁵⁷³ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 126.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 127.

stopping his education is what angers Pervez the most. Pervez concedes to praying with his son and even begins to grow a beard (which his son does not notice). He discusses his attitudes and philosophy of life with his son, but his son sees enjoyment as "...a bottomless pit"⁵⁸⁰.

The story ends with Pervez driving his taxi with Bettina, his confidante next to him. They pass Ali on the street and give him a lift. Pervez becomes aware of Bettina's dress, and starts to become nervous. Ali proceeds to insult Bettina while she is telling him how much his father loves him. Pervez tells Ali to get out, but Bettina ends up jumping from the moving car. Once they are home, Ali goes to pray. Pervez is so angry that he goes home and has a few drinks, and ends up kicking Ali while he is praying, and continues to hit him on the face until he is bleeding as "He knew that the boy was unreachable"⁵⁸¹. Ali does not fight back or even try to defend himself. All he says to his father is: "So who's the fanatic now?"⁵⁸²

The subtext of the short story deals with freedom with and without context, and the consequences from one generation to the next concerning choices made with regard to physical location and upbringing. It seems that for Ali, the spiritual home has replaced the notion of the physical home as a place for security, support and belonging. For Pervez, he enjoys life in Britain for what it is, but Ali has different expectations about what his life should be. Ali's attitude towards the West, as a den for everything morally bad taking place, is an attitude that idealises other locations, as what he talks about also takes place in his father's home of Pakistan. The story shows the father in a helpless situation, as what he is objecting to is religion, or rather, a particular expression of piety that is responded to as increasingly normative. Despite Pervez not being a religious man, he still has respect for religion. It is the central irony of the story that Pervez ends up assaulting his praying son while he is drunk. The father's response reinforces the son's claim of dislocation and piety. Pervez's intolerance to Ali's religiosity may reinforce Ali's ability to take the 'high road' and view his expression of religion as superior. It is interesting to note that Ali's expression of religiosity is in a sense mutually exclusive to (mainstream) society. Activities that have seemingly little to do with religion, such as playing sport, are renounced. Not only has Ali taken to praying, but has also become 'visibly' religious by growing a beard, which is an outward and public expression of his

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 129.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid. p. 131.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

newfound religious identity. This act indicates that for Ali, the revivalist Muslim identity is not merely an internal change, but with it comes a necessary outward performance of faith.

Brick Lane

Brick Lane has been described as a work of realist fiction⁵⁸³ that has a postcolonial story and deals with issues of immigration and multiculturalism. Ideas of double belonging, integration, assimilation, culture in terms of language, dress and issues of authenticity are all dealt with. This can be considered reflective of "Britain's new hybrid society"⁵⁸⁴. Issues of migration dealt with in Brick Lane can be considered in terms of immigrant subjectivity, that is, through both narration in the novel and the central character, Nazneen. The (paradoxical) roles that individuals play within particular cultural and social contexts are exemplified through Nazneen's relationships with Chanu, her husband, and Karim, her lover. These relationships signify "...the double bind that female migrants face, treated as alien by their host nation and as commodities by the men in their own communities."⁵⁸⁵ Nazneen is bound to the realm of domesticity and is considered on the peripheries of mainstream society that she comes to enter into in Tower Hamlets. Nazneen is both the object and subject of the discourse. She is objectified in relation to her marriage arranged by her father in Bangladesh and is the subject of the narrative not only in personal terms, but also acts as a character reflective and "...policed by the pedagogic narration of her origin"⁵⁸⁶.

Brick Lane revolves around the fate and personal agency of Nazneen as experienced through her relationships with her Chanu, her husband, and later through her young Bangladeshi-British lover in England, Karim.

Nazneen was born in a village in East Pakistan in 1967. It was a difficult birth following which her parents had to make the choice of whether to take the baby to the hospital, a great distance away, or to leave her survival up to Fate. Nazneen was reminded of this story as she got older,

⁵⁸³ Walkowitz, R.L. 2006. 'The Location of Literature: The Transnational Book and the Migrant Writer'. Contemporary Literature. XLVII, 4; Cormack, A. 'Migration and the Politics of Narrative Form: Realism and the Postcolonial Subject in Brick Lane'. Contemporary Literature. XLVII, 4. 2006. pp. 695-721; Hiddleston, J. 'Shapes and Shadows: (Un)veiling the Immigrant in Monica Ali's Brick Lane'. The Journal of Commonwealth Literature. Vol. 40, No. 1. 2005. pp. 57-72.

⁵⁸⁴ Cormack, A. Ibid. p. 696.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 700.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid. p 701.

especially the wisdom of her mother's choice to leave her life up to Fate. She learned at a young age that "What could not be changed must be borne and since nothing could be changed, everything had to be borne."⁵⁸⁷ This notion of accepting all that cannot be changed is reflective of fatalism that may be related to religion.

Although *Brick Lane* begins as a fatalist narrative, the reader is aware by the narration at the start that through the novel, Nazneen's identity will be re-formed, from an identity based on a lack of autonomy, as control over her life is not in her hands, to an autonomous identity, "...when for the first time she could not wait for the future to be revealed but had to make it for herself, she was startled by her own agency"⁵⁸⁸.

Nazneen is married off at the age of eighteen to Chanu, a Bangladeshi man who lives in Tower Hamlets, a block of low-cost housing flats, in East London. Following her move from Bangladesh to Britain, Nazneen is faced with issues involving what her husband Chanu describes as "the immigrants' dilemma"⁵⁸⁹, involving issues of assimilation, rather than integration, counteracting xenophobia and re-negotiating identity in a new place.

The immigrants' dilemma is discussed with Mrs Azad (wife of Chanu's friend, Dr Azad), an assimilated Bangladeshi who regards assimilation, especially amongst her daughter's generation as inevitable. Chanu states that "To be an immigrant is to live out a tragedy."⁵⁹⁰ He continues that the tragedy of the immigrant is the clash of values, alienation, racism and "...the struggle to assimilate and the need to preserve one's identity and heritage...children who don't know what their identity is [and] the struggle to preserve one's sanity while striving to achieve the best for one's family."⁵⁹¹ Mrs Azad's response is that assimilation is inevitable. She drinks alcohol and Chanu has a drink with her. About this, he pontificates, "...it's part of the culture here...Back home, if you drink you risk being an outcast. In London, if you don't drink you risk the same thing"⁵⁹². For both Chanu and Mrs Azad, culture is treated as monolithic and unchanging. While Mrs Azad talks about the benefits of assimilation, she chides those that do not

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 16.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁹ Ali, M. *Brick Lane*. London: Doubleday. 2003. p. 112.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid. p. 113.

⁵⁹² Ibid. p. 110.

assimilate, such as Nazneen. Rather than considering integration, by continuing cultural markers that one may find value in, Mrs Azad relates fixed positions, such as "...when I'm in Bangladesh I put on a sari and cover my head all that. But here I go out to work. I work with white girls and I'm just one of them"⁵⁹³. Clearly, Mrs Azad is not 'one of them' due to her ethnic heritage, and by relaying that she covers her hair in Bangladesh and goes to work in England, these points of view are considered to be mutually exclusive, which reflects her fixed position in relation to culture.

As well as discussing the 'immigrant's dilemma', Chanu also talks of the "...Going Home Syndrome" amongst other Bangladeshis. He describes them as "...basically peasants...[who]...miss the land...They don't ever really leave home...[they are]...just recreating the villages here."⁵⁹⁴ Ironically, it is who Chanu also moves back to Bangladesh (without Nazneen and their daughters) at the end of the novel due to the problems that he faces of attempting to assimilate into British society.

Chanu struggles with idealised notions of both Bangladesh, through his continual recitation of the Bengali poet Tagore's poetry, (which he teaches to his disinterested daughters in order for them to know their roots) and his life in Britain, where he struggles to find his place within society. Although Chanu and Nazneen live in Tower Hamlets which has a large Bangladeshi community, Chanu constantly considers how different he is to the others, with regard to his education and prospects. He resigns from a good job that he holds in the Council as he was passed over for a promotion, and eventually becomes a taxi driver.

The issues of immigration and assimilation are dealt with and are reflected through his relationship to Nazneen, whom he does not want to learn English (as he says she does not need to learn it), although he considers himself to be open-minded and educated. Intergenerational struggles are exemplified through his relationship with his daughters, to whom he constantly talks about Bangladesh, about 'fitting in' and about not being accepted by society. This contradiction and confusion is again reflected through clothing, when some days Chanu tells his daughters they must wear trousers under their school uniform (as a sign of modesty), and at

⁵⁹³ Ibid. p. 114. My italics.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 32.

other times he questions them for doing so and berates them for not fitting in. What is reflected through these contradictions are Chanu's own cultural confusion relating to his place in relation to mainstream British society, the Bangladeshi community they live amongst and his ideas of Bangladesh as home. For him, Bangladesh takes on a mythical status, a type of reimagined homeland, but for Nazneen, she is aware of the hardships experienced in Bangladesh exemplified through her sister's letters from Bangladesh.

Nazneen begins an affair with Karim, a younger man who brings clothes to her to be repaired. For Nazneen Karim represents a world outside of her experiences of individual and collective identity⁵⁹⁵. He is at home in England; this is displayed through his Western dress and speaking English. Nazneen and Karim idealise each other as authentic inhabitants of their respective worlds. Karim sees Nazneen as "the real thing"⁵⁹⁶, representing to Karim, "[a]n idea of home. An idea of himself that he found in her." For Nazneen, Karim was patched together. Karim wants to marry Nazneen, but she refuses, saying, "I wasn't me and you weren't you. From the very beginning to the very end, we didn't see things. What we did – we made each other up."⁵⁹⁷

Religion is dealt with implicitly by most of the characters in the novel. Chanu is not religious and does not pray. For Nazneen however, Islam and the Qur'an are familiar, they symbolise and represent security. She takes comfort in the Arabic words (although she does not understand them) and finds solace in prayer in providing structure to her days. At the beginning of the novel, when Nazneen is nervous in having a friend of Chanu's over to the house for dinner, she selects a page at random from the Qur'an and reads a verse: "The words calmed her stomach and she was pleased. Even Dr Azad was nothing as to God...She was composed...Nothing could bother her. Only God, if he chose to."⁵⁹⁸

For Karim, the assertion of a religious identity incites the re-claiming of a sense of self. Karim's sense of religion is hybridised. He receives salat or prayer alerts via his mobile phone. Karim also finds 'authentic' (and collective) identity through his relationship to political religion. In response to literature and graffiti around the flats with anti-Bengali rhetoric, he creates the

⁵⁹⁵ Cormack, A. 'Migration and the Politics of Narrative Form: Realism and the Postcolonial Subject in Brick Lane'. *Contemporary Literature*. XLVII, 4. 2006. p. 706.

⁵⁹⁶ Ali, M. *Ibid.* p. 454.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 454-5.

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 20.

'Bengal Tigers', a religious community group "...open to all Muslims"⁵⁹⁹. Much of the first meeting (which Nazneen also attends as an observer) is taken up by discussion of what to name the group. Leaflets are distributed about violence in Chechnya and Palestine. There is a continual 'war of leaflets' between those that are against the multiculturalism of Britain (such as 'white' supremacist groups) and those who are pro-Islam. This angers Chanu who sometimes takes the side of the Bengal Tigers, and at other time strongly disapproves of them. After three months of the continual leaflet drop off at the flats, Chanu is angered by a leaflet in praise of a martyr. He says: "Are they mad? Poking these mad letters through white people's doors. Do they want to set flame to the whole place? Do they want us all to die shaheed⁶⁰⁰?"⁶⁰¹ However, later in the novel, Karim begins to perform his religious identity through a change of dress. While after '9/11', some Bangladeshi parents told their daughters to remove their headscarves, Karim removed his gold necklace, jeans and t-shirt and instead wore "punjabi-pyjama and a skullcap"⁶⁰². As in 'My Son the Fanatic', the young man also performs his identity through the utilisation of dress. As well as dressing in 'authentic' Bangladeshi clothing to accentuate his difference, it is just as important to consider the type of clothing that he is replacing and what these signify for him. The jeans and t-shirt reflect conformity to mainstream society, and the gold necklace a sign of material excess. Against such overt 'conformity'; the turn to the neo-revivalist religious identity in this way necessitates public expression, public display and public performance of religious identity.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist

*The Reluctant Fundamentalist*⁶⁰³ is another important work of fiction for this study as it deals with a Muslim in the context of the United States, engaging with issues pertaining to living as a foreigner. The premise of the novel is of a Pakistani Muslim man who despite having a secure professional career, decides to leave his job in New York and return to Pakistan. The issues that come up in this work are primarily social (dealing with his place in New York society before and after '9/11') and economic (in relation to professional success), in comparison to the British writing, and especially 'My Son the Fanatic', religion is only secondary.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 238.

⁶⁰⁰ As martyrs.

⁶⁰¹ Ali. Ibid. p. 275.

⁶⁰² Ibid. p. 376.

⁶⁰³ Hamid, M. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*. London; New York: Hamish Hamilton. 2007.

This work of contemporary literature deals with issues relating to the Muslim diaspora in the United States. The novel is set between New York and Lahore, Pakistan and deals with issues of identity faced by the central character Changez, who was born in Pakistan and educated in the United States. A reflective look at Changez's experiences in the United States before and after '9/11', the book is retold in a narrative monologue style to an American stranger at a restaurant in Lahore. The emphasis, rather than being alienation, is disenchantment primarily relating to the type of person that Changez is becoming due to his economic successes. Although he came from an upper middle-class background, Changez goes to Princeton on a scholarship. At his interview with a corporate firm following his graduation, his future boss recognises Changez's ambition to succeed. The personal (internal pressures) and political (external pressures) are intertwined to present Changez's story of living in New York. Due to the cosmopolitan nature of the city, Changez asserts "I was, in four and a half years, never an American; I was immediately a New Yorker."⁶⁰⁴ Changez was at home in the city. Much of the narrative revolves around his infatuation with Erica, who can be seen as a representative of elite Manhattan society that Changez came to socialise with. Yet even prior to '9/11', when Changez's country of origin was brought up, he experienced some negative and condescending reactions pertaining to fundamentalism in Pakistan.

Changez travelled to Manila on a business trip, and it was there that his behaviour began to change. His impression of Manila, as a successful developing country, "with a glittering skyline"⁶⁰⁵ elicited a comparison to Lahore or Karachi in Pakistan. Changez narrates, "...it was one thing to accept that New York was more wealthy than Lahore, but quite another to swallow the fact that Manila was as well."⁶⁰⁶ This comment is reflective of the beginnings of an inferiority complex and, due to the respect the Filipinos gave his American colleagues, Changez, "...attempted to act and speak, as much as my dignity would permit, more like an American"⁶⁰⁷. This attempt at assimilating into American culture was an attempt to become 'just like them' in order to be treated as such. As well as feelings of inferiority, his values are also clouded by 'capitalist superiority' and to be respected for his professional position.

⁶⁰⁴ Hamid, *Ibid.* p. 33.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.* p. 64.

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.* p. 65.

Changez “learned to tell executives [his] father’s age, ‘I need it now’”⁶⁰⁸. Whilst he felt ashamed for changing his behaviour so dramatically, he continued to do so, but didn’t let this show publicly. Whilst still in the Philippines, travelling with an American colleague in a limousine, the Filipino driver looked at him with a hostile stare. Changez later tried to rationalise this, but nevertheless it upset him and he concluded that he and the driver “...shared a sort of ‘Third World’ sensibility”⁶⁰⁹, regarding perhaps jealousy of his success. During the same trip, with the American colleague, Changez had the thought that the American was so “foreign”⁶¹⁰, and that Changez was “play-acting”. He therefore felt closer to the Filipino driver than his own colleague. This reflected his feeling uncomfortable with his successful position in society.

The events of ‘9/11’ took place whilst he was in Manila, and after seeing the Twin Towers collapsing, Changez “smiled”⁶¹¹. Instead of thinking of the victims, Changez smiled at the idea of the symbolic collapse of America, although he had become successful in America. What reinforced this change of attitude was that, at the airport leaving Manila, Changez was taken into a separate room by security to be searched. He “flew to New York uncomfortable in [his] own face...was aware of being under suspicion...[and] felt guilty”⁶¹². Arriving in New York, Changez was again detained. On his return, America was in mourning. He ignored rumours he heard about Muslims being attacked, and tried to carry on life as normal, preventing himself from connecting “...the crumbling of the world around [him] and the impending destruction of [his] personal American dream”⁶¹³.

Worried about Pakistan and his family, Changez travelled to Lahore to visit his family, and while he was there grew a beard. Before travelling back to the United States, he did not shave it off “...perhaps, a form of protest...a symbol of...identity”⁶¹⁴ or as a reminder of the home he left behind in Lahore. After he went back to work in New York, he received negative reactions to his beard, but still did not shave it, which reflects his growing defiance to being regarded with suspicion in the post-‘9/11’ society. The growing of his beard, (which Changez still has at the

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 67. My inverted commas.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid. Hamid’s italics.

⁶¹¹ Ibid. p. 72. Hamid’s italics.

⁶¹² Ibid. p. 74. My italics.

⁶¹³ Ibid. p. 93.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid. p. 130.

end of the novel) may be perceived as either, an act of defiance or a symbol of religious expression (or indeed both). Religion is implicit in the novel despite its title, which may be a deliberate reflection of social conditions being more important than a religious 'pull' in the development of a revivalist religious identity.

Whilst on another business trip, this time to Chile, rather than focusing on work, Changez was preoccupied with politics and being in a new environment. At the risk of being fired, (which he later was) he left Chile two weeks before schedule and returned to New York. Following this Changez returned to Pakistan but remained emotionally tied to Erica in New York. He took a position as a university lecturer and instigated demonstrations for Pakistan's autonomy in international affairs, that came to be seen as anti-American⁶¹⁵. He received warnings for violent encounters that broke out, and at the end of the novel attempts to live a normal life despite "being plagued by paranoia"⁶¹⁶. The novel ends with mutual suspicion as Changez says to the American tourist "...you should not imagine that we Pakistanis are all potential terrorists, just as we should not imagine that you Americans are all undercover assassins."⁶¹⁷ Changez leaves the un-named American tourist at his hotel, and after extending his hand for a handshake, sees metal shining as the American reaches into his pocket. Changez assumes it is a business card holder⁶¹⁸, and the ending is left open, so that the reader, after being presented with the post-'9/11' context of suspicion and distrust between Americans and the Pakistani, can choose the ending accordingly.

The protagonist and narrator of the story, Changez, soliloquises to the American tourist to whom he relates his story to in Lahore. The ending of the novel is left open, but it is clear that they "mirror...[each other's] mutual suspicion". The narrator, from Pakistan, acts as a representative of the Muslim world, and the un-named tourist is representative of America. Hamid's writing is reflective of both the US and Pakistani contexts and relates the contradictory positions felt by a foreigner relating to issues of up-ward mobility and professional success in America and living the "personal American dream"⁶¹⁹. The novel

⁶¹⁵ Ibid p. 179.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid. p. 183.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid. p. 184.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid. p. 93.

emphasises that there are multiple perspectives in any one narrative and in this way seeks to portray our shared humanity and empathy⁶²⁰.

The form of the novel invites the reader to act as a judge. It is simultaneously sympathetic to both the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, and as Hamid asserts in an interview: "I hope that readers will feel my affection and see that my intent is not to gloss over the very real pain of September 11 but rather to reconnect parts of my world, and myself, that have grown increasingly divided"⁶²¹.

Connections and reconnections are both enhanced through media-space. Techo-medias have enabled hyperconnectivity and polyphonic communication; globalisation and the media are thus significant for facilitating dialogue.

4.2 Globalisation and the media

Mass media, increasing globalisation and the hybridisation of culture (and arguably the hybridisation of religion⁶²² as well) are features of post- or late modernity. As mentioned in chapter 1, due to secular Western thought, religion is no longer a singular authority relating to the organisation of everyday life. The postmodern turn enabled the spiritual to re-enter society due to the multiple 'truths' that people may associate with. These multiple truths, with a move towards "hybridity, eclecticism and pluralism"⁶²³, may have been perceived by individuals as a loss of meaning in the contemporary world. The recent post-secular turn reflects the realisation of this continued significance of religion in contemporary society, and religious ideologies may be utilised by individuals to counter the perceived loss of meaning.

The rapidity, intensity and scope of mass-technological medias have impacted many areas of social life, including religion in ways such as how religion can be perceived, spread, localised and globalised. Neofundamentalism, the global jihad and the neo-revivalist Muslim identity can be seen in one way as examples of the reflexive self that critiques contemporary society. In a

⁶²⁰ harcourtbooks.com/Reluctant_Fundamentalist/interview.asp

⁶²¹ Ibid.

⁶²² This hybridisation is reflected in the growth of sectarian religious groups.

⁶²³ Bennett, C. 2005. *Muslims and Modernity: An Introduction to the issues and debates*. London; New York: Continuum. 2005. p. 28.

world of multiple truths and authorities, a singular overarching authority⁶²⁴ may be sought in opposition to, and through rejection of, the dominant worldview of postmodernity, that arguably favours no singularity⁶²⁵. Discontent with the social order has been reflected in the turn to a collective consciousness of religion. Mass media and globalisation have widened the scope of the public influence of religion in a world where global ideologies can be localised and localised ideologies can be spread globally.

In the contemporary globalised world, religions are able to transcend the nation-state through technological processes and the place of nation changes from universal to particular when put in a global context. In this way it is the global context that becomes paramount; interactions on the global stage override local issues as the site of metaphysical struggles for religious supremacy. The world is interconnected as never before and it can no longer be said that there is a separation between the West and non-West (or Muslim-majority countries and non-Muslim majority countries) as techno-mediation transcends these divisions. The formation of individual and collective identities are influenced by this global collectiveness, as the nation-state no longer holds centrality or primary legitimacy, such that "[n]ational identity now becomes one 'difference' among others"⁶²⁶, rather than being the difference among others. Individuals and social groups can be and are connected beyond time and space through ideologies, such as religion, that bind them together. In this way, religion has become a social force which enables it to be legitimised in its own right (rather than being viewed in opposition to some other social force). Therefore, religion has the capacity to lead the new 'collective consciousness'. Religious discourse is facilitated by communication technologies which enables religious literature to be spread freely, and 'new' self-proclaimed religious authorities may form in this arena⁶²⁷. Religion and the voices of individual religious authorities are transmitted through the mass media, such that, "European-born, self-taught intellectuals and telepreachers confirm the loss of monopoly by the religious authorities linked to mosques, and fuel the diversity of a religious offer...appropriate to the individualization of belief"⁶²⁸.

⁶²⁴ Such as Islam.

⁶²⁵ Although the prominence of science may act as authoritative.

⁶²⁶ Ortiz, R. 'Notes on Religion and Globalization'. *Nepantla: Views from South*, Vol. 4, No. 3. 2003. p. 434. This supposed authenticity relates to Muslim-majority countries which, it may be perceived by Muslims and non-Muslims in the West, represent the 'real' location of Islam.

⁶²⁷ As for example, anyone can create their own website.

⁶²⁸ Saint-Blancat, C. 'Islam in Diaspora: Between Reterritorialization and Extraterritoriality'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. Vol. 26, No. 1. March 2002. p. 149. My italics.

Muslims and mediated technologies

Technology and more specifically, the internet has become an important tool in the re-imagining of the Muslim ummah and in one sense acts as a catalyst for the realisation of supranational connectedness. This collective consciousness, defined in terms of religious commonality, has been allowed to manifest extraterritorially and in many ways is expressed and understood in hyper-real terms. Individuals are able to be instantly connected with a multiplicity of ideologies and 'new' forms of authority that are able to claim their authority, not through 'real' physical presence but through claims of 'authentic' geographical location⁶²⁹. This may relate in various ways to an individual's emotional needs of belonging as part of a community, to acceptance (that may be unconditional in terms of being Muslim through descent or of course through conversion), and also in terms of action, of how to be and act in the contemporary (secularised⁶³⁰) late modern world whilst still claiming a religious, and more specifically, a Muslim identity.

In the technologically-connected world of today, community is no longer restricted to physical presence. Whilst the physical community will always provide a backdrop for members and non-members to work with or against each other, participation and allegiances are no longer restrictive and controlled. Cyber-communities are an example of this. Globalisation is not a single process, "but a complex mix of processes"⁶³¹ that may often appear to contradict one another. The utilisation of techno-global forces, such as the internet, by religious groups that are perceived as traditional could be viewed as ironic but in fact demonstrates that sectarian religious groups that utilise technology are necessarily a product of contemporary times⁶³². Therefore cyber communities may act as a catalyst for the realisation of the ummah through online khutbas or sermons, and what Bunt⁶³³ has termed 'E-jihad, 'Online Fatwas' and 'Cyber Islamic Environments'. Such techno-mediation enables globalised and personalised expressions

⁶²⁹ Such as the perceived notion of authentic Muslim authority lying 'out there' in Muslim countries.

⁶³⁰ Of course this is dependent on national context.

⁶³¹ Ibid.

⁶³² Gray, J. *Al Qa'eda and What It Means To Be Modern*. London: Faber&Faber. 2005; Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004; Devji, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.

⁶³³ Bunt, G. R. *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and cyber Islamic environments*. London; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press. 2003.

of religion that respond to the notion of the global ummah. In this sense, the e-jihad has enabled a virtual religare.

The virtual location of mediated technologies enables a space for new individualised religious authoritative figures to be located within, and be made virtually (omni)present in their transcendence of time, place and cultural space. Through websites, individuals may act as authorities, who themselves, "...may not be recognised within national geopolitical borders, and at times can even be ostracised"⁶³⁴ within Muslim countries as their views may be deemed contrary to the official religious position of the State. The majority of these websites that reflect diverse religious authority have been written in English, but following '9/11', there has been a "profusion of Arabic and other language content"⁶³⁵ websites. In this way, the internet enables individual and minority views of religion to be made globally public and acts as a "safe zone"⁶³⁶ for this interaction. An interactive dialogue can now take place "between Muslims living in minority and majority settings, which in some cases augment or supersede"⁶³⁷ transnational and traditional ways of networking. However, as the internet is not easily available to all individuals in Muslim nations, there is a "digital divide" as the voices that represent Muslim countries are of those who have access to the internet, most likely those who are educated, elite, or those who can afford it⁶³⁸. Due to issues of censorship or security, the online environment makes possible the expression, dialogue and personalisation of (radical) ideas that may not be able to be voiced in other environments.

In the Muslim experience, cyber-communities are not the only alternative form of transnational community, as the notion of the transnational ummah has existed since the emergence of Islam, globally connecting Muslims together on faith terms. However, it may be argued that as technology and the world of visual imagery has become prominent, the transnational ummah has become hyper-real. Televised images of war-torn Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq have enabled a sense of visual connectedness amongst many Muslims and confrontations that may not be everyday occurrences are enabled to be conceived of as the norm and as everyday occurrences. These visual images elicit an emotional response, such that those who may be

⁶³⁴ Ibid. p. 13.

⁶³⁵ Bunt. Ibid.

⁶³⁶ Bunt. Ibid. p. 205.

⁶³⁷ Ibid.

⁶³⁸ Ibid. p. 207.

conceived of as being financially better off by living in the West, may feel some pull of responsibility (because of their privileged Western positions) and feel the need to act in some way.

The global made local and the local made global

Globalisation is defined as “action across distance”⁶³⁹. It is a result of the transformation of space and time which has led to the “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”⁶⁴⁰. When considering notions of ‘othering’ and ‘self-othering’, it is important to take into account media representations of minority issues in a given society. The primary goal of media is information and news but, viewed on a deeper level, it can be perceived as a site of contestation⁶⁴¹, continually in a state of flux between forming, informing and re-forming perceptions relating to ethno-national, socio-religious and global consciousnesses. Such technologies, “...construct images, text and sounds that mediate relations within specific communities, but also mediate connections among fellow members of diasporas and communication between different cultural groups and individuals in local, national and transnational spaces.”⁶⁴² This reflects the salience of the mass media in enabling connectivity by reinforcing subjective paradigms and viewpoints whilst simultaneously presenting relativistic heterogeneous truth claims by attaching different levels of meaning to the same event.

It is significant to note that due to the global and mediated spread of information, there is no conceptual divide in this sense between East and West (such that what occurs on a local level can instantly make global news). Inversely, in the globalised age, world issues are also enabled to become localised, and in this way made ‘glocal’⁶⁴³. There is a global audience of local events

⁶³⁹ Giddens, A. *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1994. p. 4. Giddens’ italics.

⁶⁴⁰ Giddens, A. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1990. p. 64.

⁶⁴¹ Bailey, O.G., Georgiou, M. and Harindranath, R. (eds.) ‘Introduction: Exploration of the Diaspora in the Context of Media Culture’. In O.G. Bailey, M. Georgiou and R. Harindranath (eds.) *Transnational Lives and the Media: Re-imagining Diaspora*. Houndmills; Basingstoke; Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2007.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.* p. 3.

⁶⁴³ See Featherstone, M. ‘Cosmopolis: An Introduction’. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 1-16; Robertson, R. Cited in Beck, U. ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies’. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 19, Nos. 1-2. 2002. pp. 17-44. Robertson, R. *Globalization: social theory and global culture*. London: Sage. 1992.

in the re-making of the global into a local issue, and in this way, the media may be 'glocalised'⁶⁴⁴.

Muslims and the media

The plethora of 'glocalised' mediated texts⁶⁴⁵ enables a plurality of truth claims to be prioritised in subjective terms⁶⁴⁶. Through globalisation, the media has become increasingly mobilised and transnational, it transcends time, national and cultural space, and geographical location. Thus, "[t]ransnational media become outlets and means for transporting and translating ideologies and cultural repertoires beyond bounded physical places"⁶⁴⁷. The visual image has become a site of perceived authenticity and is re-located to the realm of the hyper-real.

Considering the relationship between the media and Muslim communities in France, Colin notes that "unlike the situation in English-speaking countries and Spain, there is a notable absence of media in France dealing with Muslim issues"⁶⁴⁸. Colin notes that the reason may be two fold. Firstly, "...very few Muslims intellectuals migrated to France"⁶⁴⁹, and secondly, earlier generations of Muslims in France "...were more likely to see themselves as foreign workers than belonging to a category called 'Muslims'."⁶⁵⁰ A variety of Muslim community magazines and newspapers did emerge in the late 1990s, but it is interesting to note that these community publications did not appear until the third generation. These publications did not last however (despite the sizeable population in France of six million Muslims), one reason being a lack of investment from commercial advertisers due to the content that dealt with Muslim issues⁶⁵¹. According to Colin, the mainstream French media does not specifically deal with "social and cultural realities"⁶⁵² relating to Muslims in France, but when Islam is reported, it is in the context of issues of security, such as terrorism. By disregarding a sizeable proportion of the population (10 percent of which are Muslim), this points to the perception and attitude of

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁵ This refers to images and sounds as well as the written word.

⁶⁴⁶ For example we are informed by news sources according to the type of news we require.

⁶⁴⁷ Bailey, O.G., Georgiou, M. and Harindranath, R. (eds.). Ibid. p. 3.

⁶⁴⁸ Colin, M. 'Muslim Communities and the Media in France'. In O.G. Bailey, M. Georgiou and R. Harindranath (eds.), *Transnational Lives and the Media: Re-imagining Diaspora*. Palgrave. 2007. p. 255.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

⁶⁵² Ibid.

Muslims being situated 'out there' rather than as a part of French and European society⁶⁵³. Thus, whilst the dominant mass media may not have 'space' for French-speaking Muslims, other independent mediated technologies have enabled 'new' sites for information flow. SaphirNew.com is one such internet site aimed at French-speaking Muslims. It is a news medium existing outside of the mainstream and deals with Muslim community information and issues.

Mediatisation: Muslims

On the 30th of September 2005, Flemming Rose published cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten depicting the Prophet Muhammad in a negative light. This became known as the 'cartoon controversy'. The protests and boycott of Danish goods in Muslim countries made it clear that the satirical depiction of the revered Prophet was unacceptable to a sizeable proportion of the world. The publisher defended his rights to publish the cartoons and stated that he was aiming to put Muslims on an equal footing by satirising their religion⁶⁵⁴, and in this way was being inclusive. Rose states: "You are not strangers, you are here to stay, and we accept you as an integrated part of our life. And we will satirize you, too"⁶⁵⁵. Clearly within the West however, Muslims are a minority, so following this, they are not on an equal footing. This is not to say that minorities should be given special treatment, just that to avoid conflict and offense, it would be useful to have some degree of universal standards in depicting specific things that people hold sacred. By the West insisting on freedom of speech and expression that is not relativistic, it itself is acting from an intolerant ideology that disrespects the viewpoint of others that do not agree with their freedoms. This notion that 'our values are more important than theirs' can lead to the perception of hegemonic global news networks acting this out through 'liberal freedoms'. The question to be asked is: Who are these freedoms benefiting?

The Muhammad cartoon controversy in 2005 is another such example of the globalised effects of local issues. Initially published by Jyllands-Posten, as a critique of Muslims, the publishing of the Danish Cartoons (and republishing of these cartoons in some European countries as a show of solidarity and defence of the rights to free speech) of these cartons elicited a (violent)

⁶⁵³ Ibid. p. 256.

⁶⁵⁴ Rose, F. 'Europe's politics of victimology'. signandsight. 30 May 2006.

<http://www.signandsight.com/features/782.html>

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid. Rose's italics.

response by a very visible mass of protesters in countries such as Pakistan who considered the cartoons to be intentionally insulting. The timing of these cartoons should especially be considered in the post-'9/11' world. The first reactionary demonstration came from the West Bank on 30 January 2006 where Danish flags were burned⁶⁵⁶. The Danish cartoons were reprinted in Denmark in February 2008. The response to this came in June 2008 when a car bomb exploded outside of the Danish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan⁶⁵⁷.

With regard to the response of violence, it should be remembered that those who respond violently are a small minority of much larger populations. Without context these protesters may appear to be a critical mass, due to the visual impact of their responses and also due to the media attention that they receive⁶⁵⁸, but in relation to the population as a whole, they are a minority. The protests are reflective of the utilisation of the media (intentionally and unintentionally) as a tool for presenting alternative and reactionary viewpoints, but, with this mediation comes positioning, the presentation of events, and the re-presentation in accordance with time, place and circumstance of publication.

Pope Benedict's speech in September 2006 is a further example of the essentialisation of Islam and the West or Islam and Christianity. Rather than engaging through dialogue with the issues of violence and religion that were brought forth in Benedict's speech, it was the reaction that was focussed on, both in the West and non-West. Many Muslims that protested against the Danish Cartoons and also the Pope's speech may not necessarily have had first-hand knowledge of these publications⁶⁵⁹ as primary sources but may have been informed by others angered by these negative depictions and portrayal of Islam. However, the (violent) reactions such as the car bomb outside the Danish embassy in Pakistan, may reinforce the perception of Islam as inherently violent, rather than the emphasis being on the violent expression of a small minority. These notions of self and other between Muslim countries and Western countries is essentialised on both sides and in this way are self-perpetuating.

⁶⁵⁶ www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&Sid=aSsFMiSwXDEM&refer=europe

⁶⁵⁷ www.dw-world.de/dw/article0,2144,3379455,00.html

⁶⁵⁸ For example, a country such as Pakistan has a population of over a 150 million, so in this respect, demonstrations that have a few hundred people are not that significant.

⁶⁵⁹ For example, they might not have looked at the cartoons or read the speech.

The utilisation of the media as a tool in the 'global *jihad*'

The globalised world in which we live enables instantaneous communication across and between time and space. Mediated technologies⁶⁶⁰ are utilised by global jihadis which shows this neofundamentalist and neo-revivalist Muslim identity (that aims at locating within the Islamic collective) is necessarily a product of the contemporary globalised world. The ideals reflect a progressive (in terms of wanting change) and alternative modernity, not secular but religious and Islamic. Rather than an attempt to re-create some mythical past, they desire a utopian present, one in which Islam is respected, taken seriously and seen as viable (and visible) in the twenty-first century.

Western theorists Baudrillard⁶⁶¹, Zizek⁶⁶² and Devji⁶⁶³ all consider the jihadis' use of media and technology through the primacy of the 'spectacle', that is, by orchestrating an event such as '9/11' through which audience participation is enabled by the media. The audience is a significant part of the spectacle, through the "collective witnessing" of events such as martyrdom, and according to Devji, "this martyrdom achieves meaning only by being witnessed in the mass media"⁶⁶⁴ and as such, the jihad has "...as much to do with the nature of mass media as it does with anything Islamic"⁶⁶⁵. In this way the media spectacle is an end in itself. It enables the continuity of the spectacle beyond the death of any individual. Visual images have a significant impact on global audiences and (used on all 'sides' of the ideological divide) it is these pictorial images that come to present, re-present, make present and make 'real' religio-political ideologies, shown through spectacles such as '9/11'. Dramatic visual attention and global publicity is sought by jihadis to gain exposure for their cause through the media and following this, an audience is important in changing acts of violence into performance⁶⁶⁶.

⁶⁶⁰ Communication medias, such as audio cassettes, radio, television, video, DVDs, mobile and satellite phones and the Internet.

⁶⁶¹ Baudrillard, T. *The Spirit of Terrorism and other Essays*. London; New York: Verso. 2002.

⁶⁶² Zizek, S. *Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and related dates*. London; New York: Verso. 2002.

⁶⁶³ Devji, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 94. *My italics*.

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 99.

⁶⁶⁶ Kellner, D. *From 9/11 To Terror War: The Dangers of The Bush Legacy*. Lanham; Boulder; New York; Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2003. p. 53; McTernan, O. *Violence in God's Name: Religion in an Age of Conflict*. New York; London: Orbis Books. 2003. p. 34.

Considering '9/11', Zizek states that there was an entrance into reality of a "fantasmatic screen apparition"⁶⁶⁷. Baudrillard considers that these attacks reflected a kind of de-ja vu. Due to the genres of films (such as disaster movies) and vicarious or real violence in popular culture, there was an expectation that some type of dramatic and violent event would take place; "[t]he West, in the position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself."⁶⁶⁸ Due to the contemporary preoccupation with the visual, lines have been blurred between fantasy and reality. The events of '9/11' have reorganised these vague boundaries and de-sensitisation to violence has been re-organised by its re-awakening in popular culture.

Islam is made 'real' by the global jihadis through a 'spectacle' such as 'suicide bombing'. This spectacle reflects the response of 'terrorists' to the "demand for reality"⁶⁶⁹. The techno-mediation of "virtual space"⁶⁷⁰ has allowed the jihad visual prominence⁶⁷¹ whereby the jihad is universalised through the mass media and is made uniform and coherent. Devji states: "[a]s a series of global effects the jihad is more a product of the media than it is of any local tradition or situation and school or lineage or Muslim authority"⁶⁷². This is reflected in one way through external mediatisation as the "...landscapes of the jihad receive more airtime than any other object identified with Islam", and thus through mediation and mediatisation, Islam is made universal through the jihad and the relationship between the two becomes blurred so they may incorrectly be deemed synonymous with each other⁶⁷³. The depiction of ruins, caves and battlefields have become 'new' visual and visible sites of global Islam that have displaced shrines and holy cities⁶⁷⁴. Through the broadcasting of these images by satellite television networks, the jihad and Islam are reduced to a "state of immediacy". There are no particularities, or life histories of those engaging in 'battle', just Islam portrayed as the overarching thread.

⁶⁶⁷ Zizek, S. *Welcome to the Desert of the Real!: Five Essays on September 11 and related dates*. London; New York: Verso. 2002. p. 16.

⁶⁶⁸ Baudrillard, T. *The Spirit of Terrorism and other Essays*. London; New York: Verso. 2002. p. 7.

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 76.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 92.

⁶⁷¹ Devji, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London: Hurst & Company. 2005. p. 93.

⁶⁷² Devji. Ibid. p. 87.

⁶⁷³ Ibid. pp. 93-4.

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 92.

Manichean dualisms such as us/them, good/evil, ally/enemy circulate widely in the mass media. Although there is a seemingly infinite number of multi-mediated official (and unofficial) news organisations, they must be critically assessed as each has its own agenda (be it Al Arabiya or Fox News) and its own method of gate-keeping. The reflexive self should seek out discourse that is not essentialised or commodified or dealt with as an object. Instead a more subject-centred discourse should be sought out which displays events in all their humanity. This will enable us to critically differentiate reality from opinion.

Conclusion

This thesis began with the working title: 'The recourse to religious extremism as a form of 'self-othering'. As the research was undertaken, it became clear that the initial title was too limited and limiting and whilst there had been 'homegrown terrorism' in Britain (7/7) where the 'terrorists' were born and bred in Britain, this was not enough to say that this had become a 'phenomenon'. What did become clear through the research was that following '9/11' some second- and third- generation diaspora Muslims were (re)claiming their Muslim identities and, through their hermeneutics locating themselves within the context of the wider 'Islamic' Ummah. This now, for them became the locus for an 'authentic' and 'real' normative Islam, because the religious practice of their parents was seen as too steeped in culture, and not spiritual enough. What these young Muslims came to see as authentic was personal religiosity necessarily enacted in the public realm of society. This emphasis on the personalisation of religion is read through Giddens' notion of the late modern project of the reflexive self⁶⁷⁵. Such religiosity was identified as reactionary to Western society (and the current geopolitic) by developing Hook's 'new failure of nerve'⁶⁷⁶ to a contemporary failure of nerve. As the individual and society share a symbiotic relationship where one impacts upon the other, this contemporary failure of nerve is necessarily a product of time, place and circumstance, and in this way, is a reaction 'of' and from the West. As they are located within the West, neo-revivalism can be seen as a self-critique by Western Muslims to and of their (real or perceived) positions in society. Neo-revivalists self-other not only to their perceptions of how Western society responds to them, but also self-other to the culturally-clothed religion of the generation of their parents.

In considering diaspora Muslims as migrants, Herberg's study, *Protestant Catholic Jew*⁶⁷⁷, was re-developed by analysing the turn 'back' to religion by third-generation migrants, and applying it to the turn 'towards' a new religiosity located in and reinforced by the reified notion of the supranational ummah. The ummah, rather than being created by the 'deterritorialisation' of

⁶⁷⁵ Giddens, A. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.

⁶⁷⁶ Hook, S. 'The New Failure of Nerve'. *The Partisan Review*. Vol. X, No. 1. January-February 1943. pp. 2-23.

⁶⁷⁷ Herberg, W. *Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology*. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1955.

Islam, as Roy proposed⁶⁷⁸, has been enabled to become realised (as the Ummah by definition has always been extraterritorial) through mass migration and globalisation. This hyperconnectivity of Muslims has been facilitated by techno-mediation and new self-proclaimed authorities (due to the lack of a singular supreme authority in Islam, besides God) now have a virtual and interactive global audience. Following this, religion in general, and Islam in particular, due to the dialectic between the global and local, is now very much globalised, re-localised and made 'glocal'⁶⁷⁹.

The essentialisation of Islam and Muslims, as seen through Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations'⁶⁸⁰ thesis is ineffectual and counterproductive to a peaceful co-existence between the West and Islam and has implications for the enactment of the Islamic identity by Muslims. Essentialisation takes a reductionist approach, by identifying a specific example or encounter and generalising this as the norm. Neo-revivalists respond to such essentialisation and 'racialization'⁶⁸¹ of Islam and Muslims, and through their particular hermeneutics, react to this by performing their religious identities in a political fashion. This politicisation of religion may have implications for religious extremism, especially in the current geopolitical climate of the 'landscapes of the jihad'⁶⁸² (and through reactionary governmental policies to this) but this is not necessarily the case.

Islam has also continued to be very much a part of the Western social landscape due to cultural expression in religious practice of first-generation migrants. Religion is enacted through culture and whilst Ramadan⁶⁸³ seeks a separation between the two (which is also the approach taken to religion by neo-revivalists) this discounts the 'lived' social elements of religion by a focus solely on religion as the personalised expression of religiosity. In short, Ramadan seeks Western Muslims to divide aspects of their selves by being religiously Muslim and culturally Western.

⁶⁷⁸ Roy, O. *Globalized Islam: The search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2004.

⁶⁷⁹ Robertson, R. *Globalization: social theory and global culture*. London: Sage. 1992.

⁶⁸⁰ Huntington, S.P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. N.Y.: Simon & Schuster. 1996.

⁶⁸¹ See Silverstein, P.A. 'Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe'. *Annual Review of Anthropology*. Vol. 34. 2005. pp. 363-84.

⁶⁸² Devji, F. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity*. London: Hurst & Company. 2005.

⁶⁸³ Ramadan, T. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 2004.

This leads to issues of assimilation and integration and may have implications in the qualification of ethno-cultural identity formations leading away from relativism and towards inferior and superior ethno-cultural practices. However, Ramadan's notion of active participation and integration of Muslims in Western society is an extremely valid and significant point leading to a reciprocal relationship between Muslims and Western secular society. Through the pressure to assimilate, neo-revivalists perform their reactionary identities in the public societal arena. This is not problematic in and of itself, and only becomes problematic when textual or other forms of violence are engaged with. Through the pressure to assimilate, a separation is sought of ethno-national and religio-cultural identities from the public to the private arenas of society. This may lead to a cultural confusion over the 'essential' aspects in each cultural setting which has implications for affiliations and loyalties of the individual and the collective with regard to acting in different ways in different social and cultural venues.

The solution is to engage with a 'cosmopolitan ethic'⁶⁸⁴ of integration' that overcomes essentialisations. In this arena, the public performance of religiosity is not problematic, as rather than a politicised identity marker, religious performance, such as through ethnic dress is seen as a cultural identity marker. The integrationist approach to immigration is inclusive of difference, and through the cosmopolitan ethic, individuals are treated as such. Diversity is embraced and viewed as cultural enrichment. Shared universal values are focussed upon rather than that which divides, and the goal instead is the realisation of our shared humanity that moves beyond binaries and polar opposites. Hybridity is normative, and issues involving immigration are dealt with as such, rather than being reduced to the realms of religious and cultural incompatibility. Dialogue and dialogism that is self-reflexive is engaged in, in a manner respectful of difference and plurality in order to overcome misconceptions that, more often than not, are perpetuated through ignorance rather than intention⁶⁸⁵. This shared humanity is realised by all in society, minorities as well as the majority culture, and rather than "engaging in

⁶⁸⁴ Ramadan, T. 'Manifesto for a new 'WE': An Appeal to the Western Muslims, and their Fellow Citizens'. 7 July 2006. http://www.tariqramadan.com/article.php3?id_article=743

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⁶⁸⁵ This can be carried out in the educational and media arenas.

crude taxonomy”⁶⁸⁶ through each essentialising the ‘other’, Muslims and non-Muslims are considered, not by what they are, but by who they are: necessarily complex human beings.

As such, against essentialisms, we must remember the diversity of Muslims, who do not engage in neo-revivalism or religious extremism but who do embrace their multiple affiliations rather than seek to self-essentialise, self-divide and self-other.

⁶⁸⁶ Aly, W. *People Like Us: How arrogance is dividing Islam and the West*. Sydney: Picador. 2007. p. 243.

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